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Abstract 
 
My dissertation explores the experiences of a group of separatist nationalist from the 
Dano-German borderland with special emphasis on the 1848 uprisings in Schleswig-Holstein, 
the secession crisis in the United States, and the unification of Germany. Guiding this 
transnational narrative are three prominent members of the Schleswig-Holstein uprising: the 
radical nationalists Theodor Olshausen and Hans Reimer Claussen and the liberal nationalist 
Rudolph Schleiden. Their perceptions, actions, and writings in the years leading up to 1848 and 
during the first Schleswig-Holstein war (1848-1851) advance the understanding of separatist 
nationalism during this period in general and the Schleswig-Holstein uprising in particular. 
Following the failure of the Schleswig-Holstein uprising, the three men came to the United 
States, where the two radicals settled down as U.S. citizens and Schleiden joined them as 
diplomat of a German state. While they had been secessionists in Europe, they looked down on 
the threats of southern secessionists. Faced with the slavery-based southern nationalism, these 
men sided, like many Forty-Eighters, with the North against the oppression of slavery. Their 
decision was in disregard of the many similar arguments used by southerners against northern 
oppression and violations of southern constitutional rights, which mirrored those used by Forty-
Eighters in Europe. During the American Civil War, Olshausen and Claussen once again relied 
on their radical experiences and challenged the Lincoln government during its greatest crisis, 
because the government had abandoned liberal principles. The three Schleswig-Holstein Forty-
Eighters continued to look to their homeland and took interest in its fate. When the Schleswig-
Holstein question reemerged in 1864, Schleiden and Olshausen returned to Europe. Their 
separatist nationalism had not suffered during their stay in the United States, despite their 
opposition to southern secession. They once again supported the independence of Schleswig-
  
Holstein. This dissertation illustrates how the language of secession and nationalism was shared 
during the mid-nineteenth century but also how secessionist movements failed to cooperate with 
one another. This study shows how complex and multifaceted the experiences of Forty-Eighters 
were. 
 
  
This dissertation is approved for recommendation  
to the Graduate Council 
 
 
Dissertation Director: 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________ 
Dr. Daniel E. Sutherland 
 
 
Dissertation Committee: 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________ 
Dr. Randall Woods 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________ 
Dr. J. Laurence Hare 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© 2013 by Niels Eichhorn 
All Rights Reserved 
  
Dissertation Duplication Release 
 
 
I hereby authorize the University of Arkansas Libraries to duplicate this dissertation when 
needed for research and/or scholarship. 
 
 
 
Agreed __________________________________________ 
 Niels Eichhorn 
 
 
 
Refused __________________________________________ 
 Niels Eichhorn 
 
 
  
Acknowledgments 
 
In the process of writing a dissertation, one incurs many debts. Among the most important 
supporters were all the people whose help in archives and libraries allowed me to bringing 
together the research needed for this undertaking. At the University of Arkansas, the amazing 
work of Beth Juhl and the tireless efforts of the Interlibrary Loan office were essential in 
obtaining some rare items. Similarly, I wish to thank the staff in the archives in Bremen, 
Hamburg, Lübeck, the Landesbibliothek Kiel, and the National Archives of Great Britain. 
Outstanding among these many archivists was Mrs. Kornelia Küchmeister in the 
Landesbibliothek Kiel and Mrs. Veronika Landsiedel in the Staatsarchiv Bremen. 
Besides the many archivists and librarians, I also wish to thank the many colleagues and 
friends who have accompanied me along the way. First among them is Terry Beckenbaugh, who 
convinced me to pursue a Ph.D. in history and to look into the diplomatic relations of the Civil 
War era. Then Judy Gentry, who assisted my intellectual growth, pushing me forward in regard 
to connecting Civil War diplomacy and world history. Finally, my professors here at Arkansas, 
like Dr. Randall Woods and Dr. Laurence Hare, have aided in bringing this work together. The 
biggest professional thanks go to my main adviser Dr. Daniel Sutherland, who had to suffer 
through a series of drafts of my dissertation and go beyond his usual commenting work 
improving my grammar and writing. 
Finally thanks go to all the friends who accompanied along the way. Among them, those 
old and dear friends like Michael, Jitka, Wilma, and Heinz and those who were closer in 
Arkansas like Kevin, Aaron, Scott, and Ahmet. 
 
Fayetteville, Arkansas, May 2013 Niels Eichhorn 
  
Table of Contents 
Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 1 
 
Chapter 1.  Schleswig-Holstein’s Sons ................................................................................... 13 
 
Chapter 2.  Helstat: Denmark and Schleswig-Holstein after the Congress of Vienna ........... 32 
 
Chapter 3.  Schleswig-Holstein in 1848: A Special Case ....................................................... 55 
 
Chapter 4.  The First Schleswig-Holstein War: Crushed by Great Power Diplomacy ........... 78 
 
Chapter 5.  No Amnesty and Uncertain Future..................................................................... 106 
 
Chapter 6.  Schleswig-Holsteiner in the Antebellum United States ..................................... 118 
 
Chapter 7.  Secession in North America: A Revolutionary’s Dilemma ............................... 145 
 
Chapter 8.  Civil War and Radicalism .................................................................................. 171 
 
Chapter 9.  The Second Schleswig-Holstein War and German Unification ......................... 191 
 
Chapter 10.  Memory and Memoirs ...................................................................................... 221 
 
Bibliography ......................................................................................................................... 238 
 
  
Abbreviations 
 
AHL Archiv der Hansestadt Lübeck 
AHR American Historical Review 
APP Christian Friese, ed., Die auswärtige Politik Preussens, 1858-1871 
BFSP Great Britain, British and Foreign State Papers 
Bund Stenographische Berichte über die Verhandlungen des Reichstages des 
Norddeutschen Bundes 
CAU Universitatsbibliothek, Christian Albrecht Universität, Kiel 
CB Correspondenz-Blatt (Kiel, Germany) 
DD Der Demokrat (Davenport) 
DZ Dithmarsische Zeitung (Heide, Germany) 
LBSH Schleswig-Holsteinische Landesbibliothek, Kiel 
MB Mississippi Blätter (St. Louis) 
NAUK National Archives, London (Kew Gardens) 
Reichstag Stenographische Berichte über die Verhandlungen des Deutschen Reichstages 
SAB Staatsarchiv Bremen 
SAH Staatsarchiv der Freien und Hansestadt Hamburg 
WP Westliche Post (St. Louis) 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
Introduction 
In 1848, Europe was turned upside down. For three years, revolutionary movements 
eclipsed monarchical power before peace, stability, and monarchy were restored. A little over a 
decade later, the United States experienced an even worse four-year stint of secession and civil 
war. It was a period of major upheaval throughout the world. From Auckland to Montreal, from 
Richmond to Buenos Aires, from Warsaw to Nanking, revolutionary movements, separatists, 
nationalists, liberals, conservatives, and many other groups competed to imprint their visions on 
states and nations. From 1840 to 1880, the world witnessed over 140 different conflicts, many of 
them concentrated around the Atlantic Ocean. The revolts of 1848, the American Civil War, and 
the Wars of German Unification stand out and have drawn the most historical attention by 
historians studying the mid-nineteenth century. One group in particular participated in all three 
of these upheavals, the so-called Forty-Eighters. 
Historians have not overlooked the Forty-Eighters, revolutionaries from Europe who 
came to the United States. Their radicalism, democratic spirit, and desire for national unification 
contributed to the outbreak of the Civil War. Many of these recent immigrants joined the 
Republican Party and provided a new language for the sectional struggle that opposed the 
institution of slavery. These immigrants also contributed to the outcome of the war, since many 
fought in the Union armies. Although the German-American Forty-Eighters have become a 
fashionable group to study, the areas of inquiry have shifted little since the first major study on 
the subject.1 
Over time, historians have devoted much attention to individual Forty-Eighters in order 
to understand their actions and personalities and thus draw conclusions about the larger group. 
                                                 
1 Adolph E. Zucker, ed., The Forty-Eighters: Political Refugees of the German 
Revolution of 1848 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1950). 
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However, these biographies focus on major figures, such as Carl Schurz, Friedrich Hecker, and 
Adolf Douai.2 Other works provide overviews of the Forty-Eighters or economic histories that 
explain why Germans, and not just political refugees, migrated to the United States.3 Finally, 
there is the scholarship on those Germans who joined or aligned with such political opposition 
movements as the anti-Lincoln radicals or the abolitionists.4 
A few problems exist within this scholarship. For example, Germans in the American 
South have been given scant attention.5 Historians rarely assess the distinctions in the political 
backgrounds of the Forty-Eighters. They portray German-Americans as one homogeneous 
immigrant community. Some historians have provided brief backgrounds to a handful of 
German-Americans, yet these treatments focus largely on those socialists, communists, or 
Marxists who remained involved in labor movements. Rarely mentioned are the backgrounds of 
the Forty-Eighters, their roles in Europe, and their ultimate destinations.6 More troubling is the 
                                                 
2 Sabine Freitag, Friedrich Hecker: Biographie eines Republikaners (Stuttgart, Germany: 
Franz Steiner Verlag, 1998); Justine Davis Randers-Pehrson, Adolf Douai, 1819-1888: The 
Turbulent Life of a German Forty-Eighter in the Homeland and in the United States (New York: 
Peter Lang, 2000); Hans L. Trefousse, Carl Schurz: A Biography (Knoxville, University of 
Tennessee Press, 1982). 
3 Charlotte L. Brancaforte, ed., The German Forty-Eighters in the United States (New 
York: Peter Lang, 1989), Bruce Levine, The Spirit of 1848: German Immigrants, Labor Conflict, 
and the Coming of the Civil War (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1992); Carl Wittke, 
Refugees of Revolution: The German Forty-Eighters in America. Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1952. 
4 Mischa Honeck, We are the Revolutionists: German-Speaking Immigrants and 
American Abolitionists after 1848 (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2011); Jörg Nagler, 
Fremont contra Lincoln: Die deutsch-amerikanische Opposition in der Republikanischen Partei 
während des amerikanischen Bürgerkrieges (Frankfurt a.M., Germany: Peter Lang, 1984).  
5 Andrea Mehrländer, The Germans in Charleston, Richmond and New Orleans during 
the Civil War Period, 1850-1870: A Study and Research Compendium (Berlin, Germany: Walter 
deGruyter, 2011). 
6 Edith Lenel, Friedrich Kapp, 1824-1884: Ein Lebensbild aus den Deutschen und den 
Nordamerikanischen Einheitskämpfen (Leipzig, Germany: J. C. Heinrichs’sche Buchhandlung, 
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total lack of geographical distinction among the Forty-Eighters. Historians tend to group together 
radical revolutionary nationalists from Baden with socialist democrats from the Rhineland and 
separatist radicals from Holstein. Though convenient to study all of these individuals as one 
large group, such analysis prevents a clear understanding of the nuances of their revolutionary 
European experiences and how their subsequent actions in the United States represented breaks 
or continuations of those experiences. 
In order to deal with these shortcomings in the historiography, this work will illustrate 
some of the strong connections and striking similarities between the secessionist movement in 
Schleswig-Holstein and the secessionist movement in the United States. The experiences of three 
separatist-nationalist Forty-Eighters from Schleswig-Holstein who participated in both 
movements offer a means to understand these connections and similarities. Since very few of 
these men have left historical records indicating their opinions, observations, and actions on both 
sides of the Atlantic, this work utilizes three leading figures to demonstrate the importance of 
assessing Forty-Eighters with attention to both their background and their actions. The three men 
are the radical separatists Hans R. Claussen and Theodor Olshausen and the liberal separatist 
nationalist Rudolph M. Schleiden. This approach also shows why historians should pay closer 
attention to the origins and backgrounds of the Forty-Eighters, whose widely diverse experiences 
make it difficult to group them in a single mass of German-Americans. Many of the migrants 
were radicals in Europe. In some cases, their radicalism continued, but others grew more 
conservative as time passed. Even as there was continuity in their radicalism, their secessionism 
took a dramatic shift. In Europe, they had been ready to fight all the great powers to win their 
                                                                                                                                                             
1935); Alfred Vagts, Deutsch-Amerikanische Rückwanderung: Probleme-Phänomene-Statistik-
Politik-Soziologie-Biographie (Heidelberg, Germany: Carl Winter Universitätsverlag, 1960). 
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separatist struggle; in the United States, they fought just as hard to suppress the secession of the 
southern states. 
Despite these three men being leading figures in the uprising in Schleswig-Holstein and 
within their local immigrant community, the historical literature rarely mentions them. 
Biographical sketches of them fail to illustrate the complexity of their experiences,7 are plagued 
with an uncritical (or even plagiarized) presentation of the subject,8 or present a superficial 
understanding of the experiences in the United States.9 This study will illustrate how important it 
is to connect the experience in Europe with those in the United States since they clearly 
influenced one another. 
By looking at the intellectual transfer of ideas and the legacies Forty-Eighters brought 
with them to the United States, this study addresses a relatively new scholarship. In the past 
decade, historians have placed the American Civil War into a larger international, revolutionary 
framework. While such studies challenge the perception of the war as an exceptional event in the 
country’s history, they also illustrate how the language and intellectual currents that eventually 
brought about the war were not solely developed in the United States. 
Don H. Doyle recently laid the basis for the study of the American Civil War as part of a 
much larger struggle over nation-state development. He further showed how secession was an 
                                                 
7 Helmut Steinsdorfer, “Zur Erinnerung an Rudolph Schleiden (1815-1895) - Diplomat, 
Politiker und Publizist aus Schleswig-Holstein,” Die Heimat 102 (September 1995): 201-215. 
8 Ernst-Erich Marhencke, Hans Reimer Claussen: Kämpfer für Freiheit und Recht in zwei 
Welten (Frankfurt a.M., Germany: Peter Lang, 1999); Nikolaus Schmidt, “Hans Reimer 
Claussen: Ein ‘Achtundvierziger’ in Amerika, 1804-1873,” M.A. Thesis, Ruprecht-Karls-
Universität, Heidelberg, 1989. 
9 Joachim Reppmann, “Freedom, Education and Well-being for All!” Forty-Eighters 
from Schleswig-Holstein in the USA, 1847-1860 (Wyk, Germany, Verlag für Amerikanistik, 
1999); LaVern J. Rippley and Joachim Reppmann, eds., Hans Reimer Claussen, 1804-1894: 
Eine Lebensskizze. Wyk auf Föhr, Germany: Verlag der Amerikanistic, 1994. 
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international phenomenon during the mid-nineteenth century. In his first study on the subject, 
Doyle proposed that there were many similarities between the events surrounding Italian 
unification and those in the United States during the Civil War era. Doyle was especially 
interested in how southerners in the United States and residents of the Two Sicilies resisted 
attempts by powerful northern states to impose an alien way of life on them.10 The connections 
made in the work were still tentative, but they illustrated that much could be gained from 
stepping out of the nation-state centered narrative and engaging in comparative or transnational 
works. 
Building on Nations Divided, Doyle added two edited volumes that continue the theme of 
nationalism and secession in the world. In Nationalism in the New World, contributors explore 
the often-overlooked development of nationalism in the Americas, but with the United States and 
the issue of southern nationalism playing only a marginal role.11 More useful for comparing the 
separatism of the U.S. South with other global secession movements is Secession as an 
International Phenomenon. Besides essays on the general questions of secession, this volume 
looks at secession in the southern states from a variety of angles and introduces a series of other 
secession movements in world history. The only troubling part is that the U.S. South is given 
such prominence that the work leaves the impression that the Confederacy became a model for 
other secession movements. Two essays dealing with pre-1861 secession movements in the 
Caribbean Basin, on Texas and Yucatan, suggest that New Orleans was central in the formation 
of secessionist thought in the region. All of the essays explaining secession outside of the 
                                                 
10 Don H. Doyle, Nations Divided: America, Italy, and the Southern Question (Athens: 
University of Georgia Press, 2002). 
11 Don H. Doyle and Marco A. Pamplona, eds., Nationalism in the New World (Athens: 
University of Georgia Press, 2006). 
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Americas deal with modern secession movements, totally ignoring nineteenth century secession 
movements in such countries as Poland, Greece, Sicily, and Hungary.12 
Doyle’s work laid the foundation for other international studies. An essential study 
connecting the language of abolition in the United States with events in the Caribbean, especially 
the slave uprising in Saint Domingue and British emancipation, is Edward Rugemer’s The 
Problem of Emancipation. Rugemer shows how northern anti-slavery supporters looked to the 
Caribbean for inspiration in their own struggle against slavery and how southerners looked to the 
same region for evidence that abolitionism was a dangerous and economically disastrous 
proposal.13 Rugemer’s work insures that future historians will have to take emancipation in the 
Caribbean and other Latin American countries into account when talking about the slavery 
question and the coming of the American Civil War. 
This study will address primarily two other recent works by Andre Fleche and Paul 
Quigley. Both authors make convincing arguments that the language used in the United States 
during the antebellum years to describe oppression and constitutional conflicts was employed 
universally throughout the North Atlantic world. Both scholars also illustrate how Forty-Eighters 
and their revolutionary language influenced the escalation of sectional tensions in the United 
States. While Quigley approaches the subject in terms of a struggle over nationalism, Fleche is 
more interested in the revolutionary character of events and their international contexts. He even 
shows, for example, how Irish separatists faced a dilemma during the sectional crisis in the 
                                                 
12 Don H. Doyle, ed., Secession as an International Phenomenon: From America’s Civil 
War to Contemporary Separatist Movements (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2010). 
13 Edward B. Rugemer, The Problem of Emancipation: The Caribbean Roots of the 
American Civil War (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2008). 
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United States, having to decide between support for separatism against outside oppression and 
the liberty and republicanism of the Union.14 
This study will show that secessionism was not restricted to the Americas or modern 
Europe, but that it also became a vibrant ideology in the Dano-German borderland of Schleswig-
Holstein. Furthermore, the careers of the three separatist-nationalists who are the focus of this 
work will show how important it is to study the Forty-Eighters before their arrival in the United 
States if we are to understand their actions and decisions in America’s rush toward war. Like the 
Irish, Schleswig-Holstein’s Forty-Eighters were separatists, but their liberal, even radical, 
proclivities allowed them to avoid the dilemma faced by their Irish counterparts. This work will 
thus offer a more nuanced perspective on the Forty-Eighters and build on the connections 
emphasized in recent scholarship. 
The choice of Schleswig-Holstein as a point of departure requires some explanation. 
Although the Schleswig-Holstein uprising was unique in many respects, it was also very similar 
to the secession of the southern United States. Both movements were expressions of the larger 
trend of separatist-nationalism in the nineteenth century, even thought, in contrast to the 
sectional conflict in the United States, the conflict in Schleswig-Holstein was almost as old as the 
princely states that occupied the base of the Jutland peninsula. Because of its strategic location, 
the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein had been battlegrounds since the Middle Ages. In the 
eighth century, Danes, Franks, and Slaves battled each other for control of the region. In order to 
stop incursions from the south, a defensive perimeter known as the Danevirke/Dannewerk (both 
the German and Danish spelling will be used in this work) was constructed. Initially, the land 
                                                 
14 Paul Quigley, Shifting Grounds: Nationalism and the American South, 1848-1865 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2012); Andre M. Fleche, The Revolution of 1861: The 
American Civil War in the Age of Nationalist Conflict (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 2012). 
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was broken up into dozens of small fiefs, which over the centuries became consolidated. When, 
in 1460, the Danish king Christian I established a permanent claim to the duchies, national myth 
was born as a result of the Treaty of Ripe’s “Up Ewig Ungedeelt”(forever undivided) clause, 
which stipulated that the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein were never to be separated. 
In the following centuries, the Schleswig-Holstein question became increasingly more 
complicated as the Danish House of Oldenburg broke apart and created additional lines of royal 
succession. As a result, the House of Oldenburg was not the only family with claims to the 
duchies, the Swedish kings and Russian tsars having also established family ties and claims in 
the duchies. The succession question had become so convoluted that by 1860 British Prime 
Minister John Henry Temple, Viscount Palmerston, exclaimed in agony, “Only three people 
have ever really understood the Schleswig-Holstein business—the Prince Consort, who is dead—
a German professor, who has gone mad—and I, who have forgotten all about it.” 
The big clash came in 1848, when a new Danish king tried to institute a constitution that 
would have integrated the duchy of Schleswig with its mixed German-Danish population, and 
the Danish kingdom, while leaving the southern duchy of Holstein, with its German population, 
as part of the German Bund.15 The conflict escalated into a full-scale war that lasted longer than 
any of the other European uprisings that year, and among all the uprisings (the Roman Republic 
potentially excluded), it alone drew the attention of all the great powers of Europe.  
Few historians have given this complicated and complex rebellion the attention it 
deserves. With the exception of a recent short article by Steen Bo Frandsen about the Danish 
                                                 
15 The German name will be used throughout to avoid confusion with Confederacy in 
Civil War America 
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perspective on the uprising,16 most works on the Schleswig-Holstein question are either dated or 
written from the German or Danish perspective, which few scholars in North America read.17 
While Schleswig-Holstein is briefly mentioned in most studies of the German revolutions of 
1848, these discussions and do not grant the uprising the detailed attention it deserves. After all, 
the conflict over Schleswig-Holstein may have begun as part of the “Revolution in Europe,” a 
concept that acknowledges the independent nature and origins of various revolts across the 
continent, but it became part of the “European Revolution,” drawing all the European powers 
into the fighting.18 
It is the unique character of the Schleswig-Holstein uprising among the 1848 rebellions 
that makes it important to the new Atlantic world of the mid-nineteenth century. The Schleswig-
                                                 
16 Steen Bo Frandsen, “Denmark, 1848: The Victory of Democracy and the Shattering of 
the Conglomerate State,” in Europe in 1848, 289-311. A number of Danish works exist but have 
received only limited attention, see Claus Bjørn, 1848: Borgerkrig og Revolution (Copenhagen, 
Denmark: Gyldendal, 1998); Claus Bjørn, ed., 1848: Det Mærkelige År (Copenhagen, Denmark: 
Museum Tusculanums Forlag, 1998). 
17 Otto Brandt, Geschichte Schleswig-Holsteins: Ein Grundriss (Kiel, Germany: Walter 
G. Mühlau Verlag, 1981); William Carr, Schleswig-Holstein, 1815-1848: A Study in National 
Conflict (Manchester, United Kingdom: Manchester University Press, 1963); Manfred Jessen-
Klingenberg, Standpunkte zur neueren Geschichte Schleswig-Holsteins (Malente, Germany: 
Schleswig-Holsteinischer Geschichtsverlag, 1998); Ulrich Lange, ed., Geschichte Schleswig-
Holsteins: Von den Anfäengen bis zur Gegenwart (Neumünster, Germany: Wachholz Verlag, 
1996); Keith A. P. Sandiford, Great Britain and the Schleswig-Holstein Question 1848-64: A 
Study in Diplomacy, Politics, and Public Opinion (Toronto, Canada: University of Toronto 
Press, 1975); Alexander Scharff, Schleswig-Holstein und die Auflösung des dänischen 
Gesamtstaates, 1830-1864/67 (Schleswig, Germany: Gesellschaft für schleswig-holsteinische 
Geschichte, 1973, 1980); Lawrence D. Steefel, The Schleswig-Holstein Question (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1932); Gerd Stolz, Die Schleswig-holsteinische Erhebung: Die 
nationale Auseinandersetzung in und um Schleswig-Holstein von 1848/51 (Husum, Germany: 
Idstedt-Stiftung, 1996); Nick Svendsen, The First Schleswig-Holstein War 1848-1850 (Solihull, 
Great Britain: Helion And Company, 2007). 
18 Matthias Middell, “Europäische Revolution oder Revolutionen in Europa,” in 1848 im 
europäischen Kontext, ed. Helgard Fröhlich, Margarete Granner, and Michael Weinzierl 
(Vienna, Austria: Turia + Kant, 1999), 13-14. 
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Holstein uprising was a separatist uprising against what was perceived as oppressive Danish 
policies. The uprisings became an internal civil war, with radicals and liberals fighting one 
another while trying to keep the Danes at bay and enlisting German support. The three men 
featured in this dissertation all took important and unique roles in this uprising. 
The first part of this work will focus on the careers of Claussen, Olshausen, and 
Schleiden in Schleswig-Holstein and their roles in the first Schleswig-Holstein war. The beliefs 
and values developed during those years stayed with in their trek across the ocean and defined 
their roles in the American Civil War. While Claussen and Olshausen embraced radicalism and 
challenged the status quo in the duchies during the Vor-März (pre-1848 period in German 
history), Schleiden became a nationalist working in what he perceived as a foreign capital, 
Copenhagen, Denmark. As the conflict started in 1848, the two radicals became nuisances for the 
governments of the duchies with their demands for democracy and a vigorous prosecution of the 
war. Schleiden, as a diplomat, tried to win foreign support and assisted in the negotiations for a 
ceasefire and peace terms. When the uprising failed in 1851, the three men went in search of new 
homes. 
All three men ended up in the United States, the topic of the second half of this study. 
Two of them arrived as immigrants; Schleiden went as a diplomat for the Hanseatic city of 
Bremen. They all came in conflict with the growing sectional tensions of the United States. 
While Schleiden initially remained aloof and focused on his diplomatic work, even he could not 
ignore the expansionist tendencies and violent sectionalism of the southern states. Olshausen and 
Claussen as early members of the Republican party and opponents of slavery, opposed 
everything for which the South stood. Like many other Forty-Eighters, each man contributed to 
the sectional break in 1860-1861, and it is here that the paradox of these Forty-Eighters emerges. 
11 
 
 
 
They had been ardent secessionists in Europe, but when faced with a secessionist movement and 
a nascent nationalism constructed on the institution of slavery, they abandoned their beliefs to 
support the Union. 
This did not mean that their theoretical devotion to nationalism, radicalism, or 
secessionism had lost any of its strength. While Schleiden again assumed the role of negotiator in 
the early war, Olshausen and Claussen remained radicals and challenged the Lincoln 
administration’s conduct of the war, just as they had challenged the governments in Schleswig-
Holstein. While Claussen’s radicalism weakened over time, Olshausen’s remained strong. In 
1864, he left the United States because he disapproved of Lincoln’s reelection and the 
administration’s war-time policies. 
By then, as well, the Schleswig-Holstein question had caused another war in Europe. 
Even while the Schleswig-Holstein Forty-Eighters refused to support the southern secessionists, 
with whom they shared many experiences, they were ready once again to be secessionists in 
Europe. They did not always act in unison. Schleiden was glad to support the new Schleswig-
Holstein revolt and its princely pretender in 1864, while Olshausen insisted on a democratic-
republican government, but neither man wanted Prussian rule. Like their secessionist 
counterparts in the United States, the German nationalists again failed to gain independence. 
Nevertheless, just as former Confederates produced a Lost Cause literature to redeem 
themselves, so the Schleswig-Holstein separatists tried to rescue their legacy by challenging the 
Bismarck-centric history of German unification. 
Concerning terminology in the present work, a few clarifications are necessary. The word 
“radical” will refer to the various European extremists who supported democracy, republicanism, 
and the reduction of aristocratic involvement in the judicial process. Radicals also included early 
12 
 
 
 
socialists and communists. Radicals were not afraid of the masses and wanted to include them in 
the political process. “Liberals,” by contrast, were more concerned about oppression from above 
and below. They were predominately middle class and supported limited democracy and 
constitutional monarchy. On the right side of the political spectrum were “conservative” and 
“reactionary” elements. In looking at events in the United States, southern secessionists will be 
referred to as fire-eaters to avoid any confusion between their secessionist movements and the 
European agendas. 
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Chapter One 
Schleswig-Holstein’s Sons 
Since it is essential to understand the background of the Forty-Eighters and what they 
stood for in Europe in order to better understand their actions in the United States, the next four 
chapters are devoted to the background of Hans R. Claussen, Theodor Olshausen, and Rudolph 
Schleiden. This chapter will present their upbringings, educations, and early careers. For all three 
men, this was a formative period. They came into contact with the ideas of liberal-nationalism. 
Olshausen and Schleiden even experienced the policies of the reaction and how the monarchical 
order suppressed revolutionary activities. These were important lessons to learn, which they 
carried with them for the rest of their lives. 
Theodor Olshausen was the fourth son of Detlev Olshausen and his first wife Ida, who 
died only two years after Theodor’s birth. Born on June 19, 1802, Theodor grew up in a religious 
family. His father was pastor in Gückstadt.1 Theordor’s initial schooling took place in the 
Gelehrtenschule in Glückstadt. When his father assumed a new position as superintendant in the 
principality of Lübeck, the son transferred to the Gymnasium in Eutin, where he finished his 
basic education.2 He then had to decide where to pursue a university education, and if he would 
follow in the footsteps of his father and two brothers and study theology. 
Instead of theology, Olshausen opted for law, but his inability to follow and adhere to the 
law soon brought him into conflict with the reactionary authorities of the post-Napoleonic era. 
Like many sons of Schleswig-Holstein, Olshausen entered the University of Kiel in 1820. After 
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one year, he sought to broaden his education and study at the University of Jena. While in Jena, 
Olshausen, like many liberal-minded students, became involved with a Burschenschaft and the 
Jünglingsbund. Burschenschaften were student fraternities, which held liberal-national ideals. 
The authorities perceived them as threats to the conservative order and frequently cracked down 
on their activities. In 1823, Olshausen returned to Kiel.3 
However, Olshausen’s activities in a Burschenschaft drew the attention of the 
authorities.4 His Burschenschaft was officially closed in August 1822, and he claimed that he 
and his fellow students closed their chapter down as ordered.5 Nevertheless, the authorities 
investigated their activities, and seventeen members of the Burschenschaft were implicated and 
faced harsh penalties. For the moment, Olshausen was among the lucky ones. He had no 
leadership role and he had followed the disbandment order.6 Regardless, he had critical words to 
say about the reactionary authorities, comparing the repression and prosecution of the student 
group to “Turkish despotism.”7 His words soon caught up with him, but he had embraced the 
radicalism that would define the rest of his political career. 
When the Danish authorities launched an investigation into the Burschenschaft, 
Olshausen faced his first major difficult decision, since this investigation could lead to his arrest 
and imprisonment. Already in April 1824, he had made plans for a possible escape from Eutin to 
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Verlag fu�r Amerikanistik, 2003), 31-33. 
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Paris. To mislead the authorities, he had created a smokescreen by telling people that he intended 
to go to the University of Göttingen. He knew that he could not go to that city because one of his 
friends from Jena was already incarcerated there.8 A warrant for his arrest was issued in late 
July.9 He went at once to Amsterdam, only to that he had spent so much money on his escape. 
By the last day of August, Olshausen had reached his temporary safe haven in Paris.10 It was not 
the last time that he had to escape from the authorities. 
Upon his arrival in Paris, Olshausen discovered that his refuge was not a safe one. In 
addition to his lofty expectations of Paris, Olshausen had to admit that his inability to speak 
French would make it difficult to find work. Due to his woeful financial situation, he 
contemplated returning to Amsterdam, from where he could either return to the German states or 
go to the United States. He assumed that everything would be better in the United States.11 
Olshausen then discovered another problem beyond his financial woes. All foreign residents had 
to register with the police in Paris and present a passport, to be issued by the diplomatic 
representatives of their homelands. Olshausen was in possession of a passport, thanks to his 
brother Justus, but he had no interest in being arrested by the Danish minister in Paris. Ignoring 
the registration order, he felt secure12 until December, when the French authorities in 
conjunction with the Prussians made arrests of fugitives and rubble rousers.13 As a result, 
Olshausen departed for Switzerland, where under a false name, he tried to earn money teaching 
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mathematics at a local gymnasium.14 While he felt more comfortable and secure in Switzerland, 
he could not find a more permanent job.15 
After two years in Switzerland, Olshausen, for reason unknown, returned to Paris for a 
year before heading to southern Germany. In February 1828, he was offered a position as editor 
of the Neue Augsburger Zeitung. He also contemplated the purchase of the paper, but found the 
price of 1,000 gulden prohibitive. Despite that, Olshausen hoped he could expand the 
newspaper’s circulation. The only real competition came from the Augsburger Allgemeine 
Zeitung, which, he claimed, was unpopular with the residents.16 He worked tirelessly to make a 
success of the paper, but reactionary censors were a constant problem for the liberal-minded 
Olshausen, and threats to shut down the paper did occur.17 Olshausen also clashed with the 
owners of the paper, who required more work than the job was worth. In early July 1828, after 
only five months at the paper, he questioned the owner’s inconsistency in pay and workload. 
They achieved a compromise that allowed Olshausen to leave his position, but he was again 
without an occupation.18 It was Olshausen’s first newspaper experience but like his revolutionary 
behavior and exile, journalism would be a mainstay in his life. 
Without a job, Olshausen considered his possibilities, including a return to Holstein He 
had come to appreciate some of the changes that were occurring in the duchies, especially the 
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introduction of the Norwegian constitution in Denmark, which was more liberal in character. He 
decided to return home.19 By December 1828, he had requested amnesty from the government 
and called on friends and family to write letters to the king on his behalf.20 He received a full 
pardon, which meant he could finish his law degree and settle down to a legal career.21 
However, Olshausen was not interested in a legal career and soon found another calling. 
Once more, trying the newspaper business, he took over the Correspondenz-Blatt in Kiel.22 As 
editor, he used the paper to promote the Holstein cause for autonomy from Denmark. In the 
following years, he did not limit himself to the newspaper but took on a leadership role in the 
community. As a firm nationalist, Olshausen was a driving force behind the construction of the 
rail line between Kiel and Altona, which connected the bustling Elbe port near Hamburg with the 
Baltic Sea. For his tireless work defending the railroad, he was made a member of the board of 
directors, on which he served from 1844 to 1848.23 Consequently, by the time of the 1848 
uprising, Olshausen was an experienced revolutionary, having been active in the 
Burschenschaften, a political exile in a series of European countries, and the editor of two 
progressive newspaper. 
Another leader of the democratic-radical movement in Schleswig-Holstein was born two 
years after Olshausen. Hans Reimer Claussen was born into an ancient peasant family in 
Fedderingen, near Heide, in Dithmarschen, on February 23, 1804. Despite the agricultural 
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background of his family, Claussen enjoyed writing and reading more than working in the 
fields.24 While still in primary school, Claussen had taken a position as a scribe with the church 
in Hennstedt.25 He then attended the Gelehrtenschule in Meldorf.26 From 1824 to 1829, he 
studied law at the University of Kiel.27 After passing his exams, he established a practice in 
Heide, not far from his home.28 However, it was not the legal practice that allowed Claussen to 
break out of his provincial background but the marriage to Annina Amalia Claudine Rahbeck, 
the daughter of a Danish chancellery secretary.29 
In 1834, Claussen became involved in the national and constitutional question of 
Holstein. In that year, he published a series of five articles in the Dithmarsischen Zeitung. The 
articles offered a clear liberal criticism of Holstein’s politics but stopped short of democratic 
radicalism. Claussen criticized especially the privileged and encrusted order that governed the 
duchies and prevented the establishment of an efficient political and impartial legal system. He 
suggested that Holstein’s diet should consist of members who had been elected by enfranchised 
voters, rather than by appointment or noble status. He suggested that women should have the 
right to vote, though not to hold office. He proposed that only a third of the diet be elected each 
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year, and that the passage of laws should require a two-third majority. He also wanted meetings 
of the diet opened to the public. However, while Claussen was liberal in questioning the 
aristocratic and privileged elite’s political position, he also feared that the mob and its unruly 
character that could influence politics in the wrong direction.30 Clearly, his suggestions were 
influenced by other democratic experiments at the time in Britain, France, and the United States. 
He believed that the two English-speaking countries, in particular, provided examples of how the 
democratic system should work. It is unclear when Claussen came in contact with those systems, 
but he would remain an admirer of them for the rest of his life. 
After this initial engagement in politics, Claussen moved his legal practice to Kiel to be 
closer to the chief appeals court, the highest court in the duchies.31 However, he was unhappy as 
a lawyer and looked for other possibilities in Dithmarschen. In 1835, he applied for the position 
of church administrator for Burg and Süderhastedt, but complications arising out of a client’s 
legal case apparently undercut all possibilities of a return to Dithmarschen.32 
Another setback in Claussen’s political career came when he took up the defense of his 
hometown, Fedderingen. The town was under investigation by the authorities because some 
individuals had gotten behind on tax payments. Claussen argued that it was unjust and without 
legal precedent to hold an entire village responsible for the actions of a few.33 The county 
administrator, Carl Georg Heinrich Lempfert, disagreed and made sure Claussen was removed 
from the political scene. Lempfert was also in charge of selecting the church administrator, the 
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position for which Claussen had applied. As a result of the disagreement, Lempfert “questioned 
Claussen’s loyalty and called him a ‘demagogue.’” 34 He also brought attention to Claussen’s 
lowly social origins by calling noting, “The hatred, which occurred quite frequently among 
peasant towards higher officials,” was part of Claussen’s nature.35 As a result, Claussen’s 
application came to nothing. 
Without a chance to enter the administration of the duchies, Claussen returned to political 
writing. He contributed more frequently to Olshausen’s Correspondenz-Blatt.36 He also took up 
the liberal cause for Holstein and made contacts with such prominent leaders as Otto Fock, 
Friedrich Hedde, Caspar Engel, Theodor Mommsen, and Wilhelm Ahlmann.37 As a result, 
Claussen was characterized as a “Neuholsteiner,” a group of politicians who argued for the 
complete separation of Holstein from Schleswig. Claussen dismissed the “up ewig ungedeelt” 
slogan espoused by many Schleswig-Holstein nationalists. Instead, he asked people to focus on 
the unification of Germany and Holstein’s inclusion in the new entity.38 The movement remained 
relatively isolated because most nationalists were unwilling to sacrifice Schleswig,39 but 
Claussen had in only a few years developed into one of Schleswig-Holstein’s most radical 
thinkers. 
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In 1842, Claussen won the election to the Holstein diet from the Neustadt-Heiligenhafen 
district.40 As a representative, Claussen continued to promote liberal values. For example, he 
supported revisions of the legal system, especially the abolition of secret court proceedings. He 
advocated public hearings and insisted that decisions be made by a panel of judges.41 Influenced 
again by the precedents in the Rhineland and the English-speaking world, he made an effort to 
introduce trial by jury in Holstein.42 Similarly, Claussen supported a suggestion to open the 
meetings of the diet to the public and to allow journalists to report on the meetings. He justified 
the changes as a means of preventing corruption among the delegates and providing more public 
oversight.43 It was during the financial and tax reform debate that Claussen was first attacked by 
a member of the diet as a radical democrat. He denied the accusation, but it was true.44 Most of 
his proposed changes went nowhere, but his long political career, eventually to span two-
continents, had started. 
Ten years younger than Olshausen and Claussen, but no less turbulent in his youth and 
early adulthood, was Rudolph M. J. Schleiden. After his parents, Christian Schleiden and Elise 
von Nuys, married on January 25, 1806,45 the couple used some of the money Christian had 
made in trade to fulfill his dream of returning to his native country, Holstein, and engaging in 
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agriculture.46 He was lucky enough to be offered the large manor of Ascheberg, which had been 
owned by the prestigious Rantzau family,47 but unlucky enough to purchase the manor during a 
time of crisis and war in Europe. The couple struggled during the worker shortages and 
economic dislocation of the Napoleonic wars, and it was toward the end of those trying times 
that they had their fourth child, Rudolph, born on July 22, 1815.48 
Christian Schleiden was able to maintain the manor until 1825, when an agricultural 
depression, precipitated by reduced import duties on agricultural goods, and heavy taxation 
forced the sale of the estate. Writing at the end of his life, Rudolph Schleiden recalled with a hint 
of resentment that Denmark had lowered the tax burden for the kingdom while continuing to 
collect taxes in the duchies with military vigor. Appeals by the duchies for help from the German 
Confederation were heard but remained unanswered.49 The situation got even worse in the midst 
of the depression, when Sweden acquired Norway, thus eliminating an important export market 
for Schleswig-Holstein’s agricultural goods.50 Schleiden wanted to carry on because he knew 
that selling the manor would bankrupt him, but as his financial resources dwindled, he was 
forced to sell the manor below his own purchase price.51 The family found a new home, but 
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young Rudolph had been exposed to the national differences between Denmark and German-
Holstein, a seed of antagonism had been laid. 
To secure his family’s future, Christian Schleiden took a job with the German American 
Mining Company of Elberfeld. In December 1825, he went to Mexico to direct operations there, 
but returned to Europe in the summer of 1827 to become managing director of the company.52 
All went well until the summer of 1831, when reports of the company’s faltering operations in 
Mexico sent him once again to that country.53 Corruption had so devastated the finances of the 
company that Schleiden moved its headquarter from Mexico City to the mines in San Simon de 
Angangueo, Michoacan.54 Equally troubling, Mexico was in the midst of a civil war. Schleiden 
faced off against bandits and other lawless elements.55 Shortly after sending a letter to his son on 
October 25, 1833, Schleiden contracted a fever, and the expertise of a German doctor could not 
save him. On November 8, 1833, he died in a distant country, far from his wife and family.56 It 
was a tragic loss, and Rudolph Schleiden’s first exposure to the larger Atlantic world. 
Rudolph decided to honor his father’s last request by studying law instead of theology, 
which he preferred. Despite contemplating a career in the Prussian civil service, entering the 
University of Kiel57 on October 18, 1834, he began his new career under the guidance of 
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Professor Nicolaus Falck.58 While not interested in joining a Burschenschaft or Corps, despite 
his liberal political views, Schleiden did have to learn how to handle weapons.59 Unfortunately, 
the dueling skills he acquired would cause two major embarrassments during the latter part of his 
college career. 
In the late summer and early fall 1835, Schleiden participated in the protest surrounding 
the visit of the well-known but controversial Professor N. David. Joined by a few local citizens, 
the students offered a chorus of “Hurrahs” in front of David’s hotel as they celebrated well into 
the night.60 Their action created concerns for the university’s curator, who, fearing a large 
student protest, closed the university in September. Schleiden and many of his friends decided to 
continue their studies in Berlin.61 He was unimpressed by the Prussian capital, but enjoyed the 
cultural life of Berlin, with its museums and theatres.62 He also broadened himself intellectually 
by attending lectures in political theory, history, and national economics, given by such famous 
professors as Karl Friedrich von Savigny.63 After a year in Berlin, he continued his studies in 
Jena. 
Schleiden described his year in Jena as formative for his judicial career because of the 
lectures given by the Geheim Justizrath D. Christoph Martin on criminal law and Geheimrath 
Karl Ernst Schmid on state and international law.64 However, there was also a long shadow over 
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his Jena year. When Schleiden overheard a young army officer make some insulting comments 
about his family, Schleiden told him that his word were not worth his uniform. The officer 
demanded satisfaction, and on April 11, the two men faced each other with dueling swords at 
Castle Weissenfels. According to the prevailing dueling code, one of them would have to suffer 
six deep cuts before honor was restored. Schleiden’s fifth strike hit his opponent directly on the 
breast. Despite fears that he would live for only a few hours, the officer survived his wounds, but 
Schleiden, as will be seen, learned nothing from the rather serious incident.65 
Regardless of the generally good experience in Jena, Schleiden decided to move to 
Göttingen, which at the time had one of the best universities in the German states.66 He looked 
forward to Heinrich Thöl’s lectures on commercial law and Friedrich Christoph Dahlmann’s on 
politics.67 However, Schleiden arrived in Gottingen at a precarious time. The new king of 
Hanover, Ernest Augustus, claiming that he was not bound by the old constitution that existed 
between the Kingdom of Hanover and the United Kingdom, had annulled the agreement. Seven 
professors in Göttingen protested the change and refused to consent to the new constitution. 
Their leader was historian and legal scholar Dahlmann. 
Schleiden found himself in the middle of the student protests surrounding the so-called 
Göttingen Seven. He had particularly close ties with Dahlmann, whose house he visited on an 
almost daily basis and where he met some of the other six professors: Wilhelm E. Albrecht, 
Jacob and Wilhelm Grimm, and Georg G. Gervinus. Following the submission of the protest 
against the new constitution on November 18, 1837, many of the students, Schleiden included, 
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welcomed the professors with hurrahs and jubilation. Despite Dahlmann’s objections, the 
students staged a protest, which was broken up by Hanoverian cavalry.68 
Reacting swiftly to these threats, the king dismissed the professors, who were also 
accused of having instigated the student protests. The leaders, Dahlmann, Jacob Grimm, and 
Gervinus, had three days to leave the kingdom. Failure to comply would result in their arrest. 
Schleiden was upset to learn that his favorite professor had been dismissed, but the continued 
presence of cavalry with drawn sabers, infantry, and police ensured that no new serious protests 
would emerge.69 Demonstrations in front of Prorector Friedrich Christian Bergmann’s house and 
a temporary suspension of lectures by other professors in sympathy with the Göttingen Seven 
followed, and the protestors did not go unpunished. Schleiden, who had joined the 
demonstrations, had to appear before the university court. In his memoir, he prided himself on 
his refusal to accept any leniency from the court. Instead, he stood up for his principles and 
welcomed a four-day prison sentence.70 Since some of his favorite professors were leaving, 
Schleiden seriously considered leaving Göttingen, but he stayed until the end of the term before 
returning to Kiel.71 It was his first revolutionary experience, and he would continue to stand up 
for his principle, even to his personal detriment. 
While Schleiden had the clear intention of finishing his law degree at Kiel, in January 
1839, he had a knack for getting into trouble, and soon made a serious and far reaching mistake. 
Stepping in to negotiate a disagreement between two misbehaving corps comrades and a 
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barkeeper, he was challenged to a pistol duel.72 On January 20, a Sunday, the duelists and their 
seconds met in the Düsternbrocker Woods. Schleiden intended only to wound his opponent, but 
he missed the target. With the next shot, Schleiden was hit on the buckle of his shoulder strap 
and the bullet pierced the flesh near the shoulder. After some arguing, he and his opponent 
agreed to continue the duel the next day.73 
Instead of resuming the contest, Schleiden was called before the prorector and the 
university court. Initially, it appeared as though he would escape serious punishment, but when 
one of the doctors was brought before the court, the truth came out and a lengthy incarceration 
loomed. Based on a local law from 1731, which punished all duels that did not result in death 
with exile or imprisonment, the court sentenced Schleiden on May 15 to two years incarceration 
in the castle (city-gate) at Nyborg.74 On June 12, 1839, Schleiden reported to Nyborg, where the 
local commander, Colonel von Lützen, tried to make his stay as comfortable as possible.75 With 
the help of some locals and friends in Kiel, Schleiden obtained books and continued his 
studies.76 Upon the urging of friends, he decided to use the death of King Frederik VI, on 
December 3, 1839, to apply for a reduced sentence and pardon from the new king, Christian 
VIII.77 The first request failed when the chancellery for Schleswig-Holstein and Lauenburg 
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opposed the pardon, but Crown Prince Frederik Carl Christian encouraged Schleiden to try 
again.78 
In early June, Schleiden renewed his request for a pardon based on an elaborate legal 
argument. The commander of the local troops informed him that the crown prince and the king 
had decided that he would be pardoned shortly after the coronation.79 When the king visited 
Nyborg, he announced to Schleiden that his prison term was over and that it would not affect his 
possible future in the civil service, which by then became his ambition.80 Shortly after his return 
to Kiel, Schleiden applied to finish his exams.81 On October 5, 1840, the grueling exam process 
commenced, and Schleiden passed.  
Through friends, he secured a third secretary position with the Conferenzrath Ludwig 
Heinrich Scholtz, head of the local authorities in Storman.82 Scholtz was responsible for the 
districts of Reinbeck, Trittau, and Tremsbüttle, as well as for the sovereign’s manors Wandsbeck 
and Wellingsbüttel.83 Schleiden was the most junior member of this local bureaucracy, but he 
bore his fair share of the workload.84 He learned to make clear decisions and to stick with them. 
Once Scholtz advised him, “Take your case back with you and present it again as soon as you 
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have come to a definite decision, I will then tell you if you made the right choice.”85 Much like 
his revolutionary college experience in Göttingen, his work in Storman, which at times was 
almost diplomatic in nature, was another valuable lesson for Schleiden. 
Nevertheless, Schleiden aspired to more, and so looked for a career in the Danish civil 
service in Copenhagen. His first opportunity for a career change came in December 1841, when 
Schleiden learned that one of his former professors, Dr. Georg Hanssen, had accepted a new 
academic position in Leipzig. For a time, Schleiden contemplated an academic career for 
himself, as a professor of political science, but the death of a colleague in Reinbeck obliged him 
to remain at his post.86 His superior, in talking with him about the lost opportunity, raised new 
hopes by indicating that a civil service career would allow faster advancement than an academic 
one. So for the moment, Schleiden remained in Reinbeck.87 However, by 1843, a new 
opportunity had arisen with an opening in the administration of Schleswig-Holstein in 
Copenhagen. Schleiden seriously considered the change and the possibilities for advancement in 
Denmark until receiving an invitation from Adolph von Warnstedt to apply for an auscultanten 
position with the General Customs and Commerz Collegium in Copenhagen.88 
On June 26, 1843, Schleiden visited Copenhagen to present himself to the king, who 
promised quick action on his request.89 On July 25, having received confirmation of his 
appointment, Schleiden assumed his new position under the director Christian Albrecht 
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Bluhme.90 The collegium was responsible for collecting tariffs and making custom policy for 
both the kingdom and the duchies, although the two systems were fully separated.91 The 
regimented work pace and more formal language required some adjustment by Schleiden, who 
missed the independence of his earlier position.92 However, as the officials gained more trust in 
Schleiden, he was given, by 1844, more responsibilities under the department head, Karl 
Francke.93 
Toward the end of 1844, Schleiden was asked to accompany the customs inspector into 
the duchies to gain first-hand knowledge of the situation there. Since the trip required the 
permission of the king, the latter requested additional information concerning the impact of 
railroads on trade in the German states and Belgium.94 Like a small child in a candy shop, 
Schleiden soaked up everything of interest that he saw during his stay in Belgium, the 
Netherlands, and France. He later claimed, “In the eleven days in Paris, I saw more of the sights, 
than in any later multi-months stay.”95 Toward the end of the long journey, he received 
promising news. Francke had recommended him as the new committirten in the collegium. 
Schleiden’s youth raised questions about his ability to fill such an important position, but he had 
the job by November 11, 1845.96 He was also in position to defend the interests of the duchies 
against Danish rule. 
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The educational and early career experiences of Claussen, Olshausen, and Schleiden were 
crucial in shaping their future actions and perceptions. In all three cases, their political views 
were shaped by their experiences in the Danish-German borderland and their university years. 
While Schleiden never turned as far to the left as Olshausen and Claussen, all three held liberal 
views and desired political change. Olshausen and Schleiden had gained valuable experiences 
with revolutionary politics, reactionary crackdowns, exile, and imprisonment. Furthermore, 
Schleiden had gained valuable political experience in the Danish civil service that would be used 
over the years to defend his home country against Danish oppression. Olshausen and Claussen, 
too, were ready to stand up for their nationalist beliefs, as they used the press and the Holstein 
diet to propagate their political views. It was in these first thirty to forty years of their lives that 
their nationalism and liberalism took form, and they would soon have opportunities to put those 
views into action. 
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Chapter Two 
Helstat: 
Denmark and Schleswig-Holstein after the Congress of Vienna 
It was in the so-called Vor-März, the years between 1815 and 1848, that the three 
Schleswig-Holsteiners developed their nationalist and liberal views. As the Danish government’s 
policies increasingly came to be seen by German nationalists in the duchies as oppressive and 
unconstitutional, the three men added a secessionist streak to their nationalism, and in the case of 
Olshausen and Claussen, helped to radicalize the language. All three assumed leadership 
positions among the Germans in the duchies and in Copenhagen. With the Danish government 
increasingly under the influence of liberal-nationalists and their demands for the incorporation of 
Schleswig, and the king wishing to clarify the relation between his German subjects and 
territories, the tensions escalated. By 1848, the Dano-German relations in this contested 
borderland had spiraled out of control. Only a small spark was required to cause a major conflict. 
The conflict between Denmark and the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein had started 
with the emergence of nationalism, which had arrived in the duchies in the baggage of the 
French revolutionary armies. Denmark had long desired to consolidate its territory, and by the 
last quarter of the eighteenth century, this had become possible.1 Denmark created the so-called 
helstat (united state), and all dynastic claims were settled in favor of the House of Oldenburg. In 
Copenhagen, the German Chancellery was in charge of the duchies’ administrative and legal 
system. In addition, sections within the pension office (Rentenkammer) and the general customs 
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office and commerce collegium also dealt with affairs in the duchies.2 After the Danes sided with 
Napoleon in the war,3 Norway was disassociated from Denmark and Lauenburg provided to 
Denmark in compensation.4 In response, the German Chancellery became the Schleswig-
Holstein-Lauenburgian Chancellery.5 Since Denmark continued to govern the duchies from 
Copenhagen, there was a growing dissatisfaction with Danish rule, the result being a slowly 
developing spirit of liberal-nationalism among the people. 
Two major Holstein nationalists of the Vor-März influenced Schleiden’s nationalist 
views. In 1815, Friedrich Christoph Dahlmann, under whom Schleiden would later study in 
Göttingen, and with whom he likely had a number of conversations about the future of the 
German lands, gave his famous “Waterloo Speech.”6 He hoped that the energy used to fight 
Napoleon would not go to waste, Dahlmann said, especially not the cooperative spirit between 
the various peoples who had opposed the emperor. He pointed to the victories at Leipzig and 
Waterloo to illustrate the newfound strength among the German peoples and to highlight how 
they had stood united against the French. “The secret of the art of revolutionary warfare is 
exposed,” he declared, “‘the universal legacy of the French Revolution,’ was defeated with its 
own weapons.” His argument for unity among the “German tribes,” as he phrased it, was based 
on their shared interest in liberty, justice, and traditionalism. Furthermore, Dahlmann argued, the 
German states should not allow old quarrels to undermine their new unity. In relation to the 
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duchies, he claimed that to Schleswig belonged to the German Bund, his argument based on the 
close ties between the two duchies.7 Like Dahlmann, so, too, would Schleiden argue for the 
unification of Germany and the inclusion of Schleswig in the German Bund. 
The other nationalist influence on Schleiden was Uwe Jens Lornsen.8 On November 5, 
1830, Lornsen published a pamphlet dealing with the constitutional question of the duchies. 
Much like Schleiden later, Lornsen had worked in the administration of the duchies in 
Copenhagen and criticized their inefficient governance. Based on the problems plaguing the 
administration of the duchies, Lornsen suggested that the king should call a provisional state diet 
to represent the entire population and rectify the situation. His suggestions included taxes 
originating with the state diets of the duchies and a consolidation of the duchies’ administration 
separate from that of Denmark. His ultimate solution was to replace the helstat with a dual state 
solution, believing that a separation of the duchies was necessary for a modern and efficient state 
and economy. In contrast to the “Neuholsteiner,” he wanted to maintain the unity of the duchies, 
which he emphasized by using the word “Schleswigholstein.”9 Both Dahlmann and Lornsen had 
a major impact on the young minds of Claussen, Olshausen, and Schleiden as they searched for a 
national identity. 
At the time, the Danish monarchy realized that political change was necessary. The 
German Bund had increased the pressure on Denmark to grant Holstein a constitution. In 
response, the Danes implemented a constitution that created diets for the four parts of the 
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monarchy: Holstein, Schleswig, Jutland, and the islands. However, these diets had only an 
advisory role and could not engage in law making.10 As Claussen would experience during his 
time in the Holstein diet, many reforms were proposed to the Danish monarch, who always 
refused them, antagonizing the German nationalists. While all property-owning Christian men 
over twenty-five were allowed to vote, the liberals criticized the secrecy of the diet meetings.11 
The reforms were a step in the right direction but far from satisfactory to liberal-nationalist or 
even radical demands. 
Like all nationalists, Schleiden, after his return to Kiel in 1838, had taken a keen interest 
in politics. That fall, he tried to attend every political meeting held by candidates running in the 
election for the second Holstein diet. He observed that the peasantry included educated and 
active men who were German nationalists but conceded that politicians from the cities still gave 
the best speeches. In particular, the chief editor of the Kieler Corresponz-Blatt, Olshausen, 
impressed the young student. In his speech, which Schleiden lauded for its clarity and simplicity, 
Olshausen asked the audience to sign a petition that requested the right of the duchy to vote on 
its own tax laws. While Schleiden was still defining his liberal-nationalism, Olshausen had 
already taken a leadership role in the radical-nationalist movement. 
A perception of Danish oppression was building, especially if the duchies were to have 
no say in their own affairs. The taxation question had been a heated topic for several years. The 
Obergerichtsrath Magnus Graf von Moltke had called it an injustice by the king to prevent the 
state diets of the duchies from determining their own taxes. Schleiden agreed with Moltke but 
did not think that a king was infallible. Furthermore, being a stickler for legal details, Schleiden 
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disapproved of the election of Georg Ludwig Friedrich Balemann and Sven Hans Jensen. 
According to laws from 1831 and 1834, only landholders could be elected, which these two men 
were not. Schleiden did not approve of sacrificing the law even for a good cause, including the 
election of men who had first-hand knowledge of the impact of the heavy tax burden.12 While 
wanting liberal changes, Schleiden respected the law even if it injured the cause he supported. 
The death of Frederik VI in 1839 and the rise of Christian VIII did not bring dramatic 
changes. Christian VIII was well prepared for the national and liberal challenges ahead. He 
rejected the requests of Copenhagen’s residents for freedom of the press and the repeated request 
from the duchies for tax sovereignty. Apparently, the new king wanted to copy the Prussian 
monarchy. Frederick would want to improve the material interest of his subjects, and grant them 
a more liberal constitution, but only if retaining his rights as sovereign.13 Schleiden remained 
silent in these debates, still trying to rise within the Danish civil service. 
The “Neuholsteiners” around Olshausen and Claussen were not silent and protested the 
changes in taxation imposed on the duchies by Denmark. Olshausen took up the taxation 
question in his Correspondenz-Blatt. Influenced by a remark made by Karl Lorentzen concerning 
the Holstein diet, Olshausen published a historical review on May 4, 1839. The article was 
intended to undermine the legacy of the Johann Friedrich Struensee ministry, which had 
supposedly reduced the national debt. After an elaborate presentation, Olshausen concluded that 
while Struensee had not been successful in reducing the debt, the duchies had been much better 
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off under his government.14 The nationalists were moving toward separatism as their perception 
of Danish oppression increased. 
In early May 1839, the Holstein diet agreed to send Lorentzen’s tax proposal to a 
committee. One could not fail to notice the challenges this suggestion would face. The 
Correspondenz-Blatt called it “one of the most difficult political problems.” On May 8, the 
editor, probably Olshausen, elaborated on the constitutional question and its importance for both 
Denmark and the German states. After drawing comparisons to Austria, Prussia, and the 
Netherlands, which also had parts of their territory excluded from the Bund, the Corresponz-
Blatt observed that absolutism prevented a constitution and new tax laws in Holstein. Denmark 
was in a precarious situation because granting Holstein a constitution could create similar 
demands in Denmark itself. The author could not but sympathize with the Danish dilemma, 
which explained why only Holstein among the German states was still without a constitution.15 
In a follow up article, the Corresponz-Blatt continued to elaborate on the problem. 
Noting Holstein’s national character, the author admitted, like a good “Neuholsteiner,” that 
Schleswig lacked a similar sense of identity. Eventually Schleswig would have to pick a side and 
deal with its Dano-German division.16 One could see in the article that the Corresponz-Blatt was 
not ready to wait for Schleswig, but not everyone was as impatient as the Neuholsteiner. In the 
Holstein diet, Joseph Graf Reventlow-Criminil challenged Claussen’s radical argument that the 
two duchies were fundamentally different.17 Much like Claussen, the Corresponz-Blatt remained 
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undeterred and continued to demand more control for the diet in financial matters, including tax 
rates and general fiscal policy.18 On the one hand, the duchies and Denmark were drifting apart 
under the German separatist demands, but at the same time, the liberals and radicals were 
starting to fight one another within Holstein. 
The divisions within Schleswig-Holstein politics were all too apparent by the early 
1840s. The Corresponz-Blatt, as the organ of the democrats and “Neuholsteiner,” was under fire. 
On September 16, 1840, the editor complained how the paper was attacked by the “Schleswig-
Holstein Parthei,” which stood for unity of the duchies and independence from Denmark. The 
most recent attack was due to the Corresponz-Blatt’s strong opposition to the 1839 language 
patent, which allowed Danish to be used for official business in northern Schleswig. Olshausen 
had to confess that a state of Schleswig-Holstein remained unattractive to him. After all, 
Schleswig was not a German land. Olshausen again argued that Holstein had to decide where it 
belonged. A constitution and close ties with the German Bund would be politically 
advantageous. Ties with Denmark might allow changes (freedom of press) impossible in the 
reactionary Bund. The state needed to chose or remain backwards. Schleswig was still chaotic. 
Olshausen did feel for the people in Schleswig.19After voicing more criticism of the “Schleswig-
Holstein Parthei,” He drew attention to their disinterest in German unification and their lack of a 
program for a united Schleswig-Holstein.20 The contested borderland in Schleswig with its 
divided national loyalties crystallized a battleground. 
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Meanwhile, Schleiden faced a different situation. Of the principals in this story, he was 
the only one who worked for the Danish administration in Copenhagen. As a result, Schleiden 
faced the increasing challenges of the Danish nationalist Eider-Danish Party. He had assumed 
that going to Copenhagen would place him closer to the “pulse of the nation,” which it did, but 
that pulse also produced the oppressive policies that angered the German duchies.21 Still, 
Schleiden seldom regretted being so far from home. He found ways to assist the duchies in the 
hostile environment of the Danish capital,22 and his nationalist spirit only grew there. He was 
more ready than ever to stand up against the Danes. 
The hostile environment made working for the Danish administration difficult. Even fifty 
years later, Schleiden could recall, “Under the circumstances, it took a high degree of loyalty and 
sense of duty for the German officials to continue their duties with composure and without 
denying one’s views to avoid clashed with Danish colleagues and people having other 
opinions.”23 Schleiden did not even see eye to eye with his benefactor Karl Francke and many of 
their political debates must have turned quiet heated. In contrast to Francke, Schleiden believed 
that rights and ancient laws were more important than the character of the Danish helstat.24 
In the commerz collegium, Schleiden experienced frequent clashes between Danish and 
German nationalists. When the collegium dealt with the Elbe shipping revisions commission, the 
department head for Denmark, Wilhelm Carl Eppingen Sponneck, voiced strong protests against 
what he perceived as preferential treatment for the duchies. Danish nationalists, like Sponneck, 
escalated many intradepartmental debates involving Schleswig. Schleiden condemned the new 
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Danish nationalist organizations. He claimed that “they had set their eyes on the conquest of 
Schleswig.” In 1844, a renewed effort was made to foster Danish nationalism in Schleswig, 
especially by emphasizing the Danish language.25The German nationalists felt increasingly 
under attack by Danish nationalist and their desire to incorporate Schleswig into the Danish state. 
In October 1844, the mayor of Copenhagen, Tage Algreen-Ussing, declared in the diet 
for the Danish islands that Denmark was an indivisible empire. With Algreen-Ussing not even 
being a member of the Eider-Danes, his speech indicated how widespread Danish nationalism 
had become. Schleiden was still outraged by the speech a half century later. Luckily, opposition 
within Denmark quickly silenced Algreen-Ussing, who proved to be too radical.26 Nevertheless, 
it was clear that the Danish nationalists were prepared for a fight over Schleswig. Their leader in 
Schleswig, Nis Lorenzen, showed as much by urging the Danish government to use Danish in 
the administration of North Schleswig, a grave insult to the German nationalists.27 In an effort to 
defuse the issue, the Danish king announced a new royal patent in March 1844. The patent 
allowed members of the diet of Schleswig who could not speak German, to give their speeches in 
Danish. To the disappointment of the king, both sides criticized his suggestion, which only 
worsened the conflict.28 
The debate surrounding the language patent continued to create major misunderstandings 
between the two nationalities. As part of an inspection tour in Holstein in 1845, Schleiden visited 
Schleswig, including some of the Danish parts of the duchy. He observed that many of the 
Danish-speaking inhabitants had been so inundated by the propaganda from Copenhagen that 
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they strongly resented Germans. They were “oblivious about the legal relationship within the 
state,” as he put it. 29 With the two nationalities mistrusting each other more each day, the 
possibility of a civil war in Schleswig was not out of the question. 
Besides these misunderstandings between Danes and Germans, even the German 
population in Holstein was increasingly divided over the national and liberal questions and how 
far their separatism should go. Schleiden perceived that the leaders of the “Neuholstein” party 
overemphasized the irreconcilable differences with Denmark. In a letter to Justus Olshausen, 
Peter Wilhelm Forchhammer explained that the Danish government purposefully implemented 
its harsh policies, enumerating some of the recent contentions. Forchhammer continued to accuse 
the government of Anton Wilhelm Scheel and Moltke of being unwilling to change their 
policies. He even called Scheel the “Kakodämon of the land,” meaning evil spirit of the land. 
Foreshadowing events to come in 1848, he said, “I believe that our Schleswig-Holstein one day 
will come free from Denmark and establish an independent state. I also believe that this will not 
be possible without a preceding general war.” Forchhammer was not sure that an independent 
Schleswig-Holstein would be any better off in the European state system than under Danish 
rule,30 but as the perception of Danish oppression increased, this sort of separatist language grew 
stronger. 
Theodor Olshausen had taken up the language question as early as 1839. Under a 
suspicious claim to impartiality, the Correspondenz-Blatt explored the historical roots of both the 
language and nationality issue. Olshausen noted that the nationality division was older than the 
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political debate about it. Both sides demanded the supremacy of their language because neither 
one wanted “to turn home into a foreign environment.” At the same time, he admitted, German 
was the language of instruction. In an emotional diatribe, Olshausen claimed that Denmark was 
lagging behind intellectually, including in philosophy and theology. As a result, the article 
concluded, “The Democratic element in Schleswig can not be allowed to force the German 
education system into a Danish one and thus lower its standards.”31 
In 1846, tensions increased when the government’s censors began looking more closely 
at political speeches. On September 3, the Correspondenz-Blatt announced that Theodor 
Olshausen had been arrested. It was soon clear that his political speeches were the reason.32 Hans 
R. Claussen took up Olshausen’s defense in a pamphlet, and thirty-two prominent Holsteiners 
supported him. Claussen argued that Olshausen had not acted treasonously and demanded that he 
be released. He speculated that Olshausen’s arrest was an effort to derail his election to the 
Holstein diet, thus keeping an eloquent speaker out of the politics. Even if Olshausen’s speech 
had contained disloyal sentiments, Claussen insisted, his incarceration was still illegal, especially 
since he had not called on anyone to engage in passive resistance, had not engaged in passive 
resistance himself, and was unlikely to flee the country. Claussen believed that Olshausen’s only 
crime was to have given speeches concerning the illegitimate July 27, 1846, rescript.33 From the 
radical perspective, Denmark was undermining freedom of speech and thus encroaching on the 
basic rights of the duchies. 
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In Copenhagen, Schleiden’s recent promotion to committirter gave him a leadership role 
in his section of the commerz collegium and a better post in which to protect the rights of the 
duchies. An opportunity to use his new position came in 1846 in a case involving the merchant 
ship Hektor, whose captain was accused by another section of the commerz collegium of having 
eradicated the required brand “Dansk Eiendom” from the ship’s beam. The words had been 
mandated since the Napoleonic wars to clarify ownership. Schleiden protested that this particular 
section of the collegium had no authority in the matter since his section alone was responsible for 
the operation of customs offices in the duchies. 
Schleiden suspected that a section head named Sponneck was responsible for the 
interference. In the next meeting of the collegium, Schleiden went on the offensive by 
delineating his section’s authority. He stood alone in the ensuing debate, but he successfully 
forced new instructions to be written, the wording fashioned by Schleiden himself. Due to the 
lateness of the hour, Schleiden left the meeting before everyone had signed the instructions. 
Later, when presented with the finished document, he spotted some revisions written by 
Sponneck. Schleiden angrily erased them. There was no verbal exchange between the two that 
evening, but subsequent meetings brought heated exchanges.34 Schleiden’s superior defended his 
actions, but the rift between Denmark and Holstein was growing. The frontlines had hardened, 
and the nationalists were fighting each other over even the smallest issues. 
In July 1846, the Danish king tried again to reduce tensions in an “open letter” to the 
Prince of Augustenburg and the duchies that addressed the issue of succession to the throne. The 
letter began with the controversial statement that Schleswig was historically part of Denmark. 
From that point, the king elaborated on the circumstances of how the Danish crown had received 
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the dukedom of Schleswig and the provision that the king/duke “should succeed to both 
territories undivided.” Only when the House of Gottorf had relinquished its claim to the throne of 
the duchies could Schleswig be “incorporated” into Denmark and a clear succession established. 
Thereafter, any heir of king Frederik III would be ruler under “an Agnate hereditary rule of 
succession.” 
Despite the Augustenburgs paying homage to the Danish king in 1721, they lodged a 
reservation in 1806 concerning the succession question. The Danish king explained that the 
Augustenburgs were under the erroneous assumption that they had some right to the 
succession.35 Few in the duchies agreed with the king’s “open letter.” Instead of clarifying the 
succession question, the king’s claim caused new excitement and anger. The letter was a final 
confirmation that the Danish state was willing to ignore the laws of the duchies, its constitutional 
rights, and the succession rights of the princes of Schleswig-Holstein. 
As a result of the open letter, the popularity of Christian VIII among the German 
population declined dramatically.36 In 1847, more evidence emerged that the king planned to 
alter the relationship between Denmark and the duchies to the disadvantage of the duchies. 
Anxious to avoid another mistake like the open letter or the 1844 language patent, the king 
wanted to draft a new constitution, based on the Prussian model, to unite his realm.37 It was clear 
that the idea would cause problems. However, after the controversy following the open letter, the 
idea of a new constitution seemed the best hope of solving the succession question.38 With both 
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sides dug in and the nationalists in Holstein having developed a separatist attitude, the 
constitution could unravel the Danish kingdom. 
In early 1847, following the election for the next Holstein diet, the Danish government 
further alienated the German nationalists by denying the elected representatives Deseler, 
Wiggers, and Tiedemann their patents, and thus preventing them from taking their seats in the 
diet. Balemann told Schleiden that the government’s action “made the break with the country 
evermore difficult to heal.”39 The king was certainly aware of the issue, but failed to intervene. 
The separatists were given more ammunition against Denmark. 
Additional affronts to the German nationalists came during the king’s annual birthday 
tour of his realm. Knowing the hatred that existed against him in the German regions of his state, 
the king snubbed them completely. It was not the first time Christian missteped on such tours. 
Previously, Scheel had “shielded” the monarch because he feared attacks on the sovereign. On 
another occasion, the king told Hermann Graf von Baudissin-Sophienhof, who accompanied the 
royal coach through his land, that he was not to visit the king in Plön. The reasons are unknown. 
A similar incident happened to Graf Friedrich von Reventlou-Preetz, who was refused an 
audience with the king because he was “another member of the disloyal diet.”40 The king had 
shown much insensitivity toward his German subjects, and not visiting Holstein in 1847 made 
him look more so. Likely with some hindsight, Schleiden wrote in his memoirs that without a 
solution, the death of Christian VIII could bring major problems.41 For the German nationalists, 
the king added fuel to the fire of separatism by ignoring their legitimate demands. 
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The national question escalated when on January 20, 1848, Christian VIII died.42 The 
duties of state fell to the new king, Frederik VII. Danish nationalists of the Faedreland Partei 
immediately sought to influence the new king in hopes of achieving the incorporation of 
Schleswig.43 Initially, Frederik resisted the pressure from such Danish nationalists as Henrik 
Nicolai Clausen, Joakim Frederik Schouw, and Lauritz Nicolai Hvidt to reform the state.44 
Soon the question of the new constitution was again on the table. The Danish privy 
council debated the merits of a new constitution.45 Frederik endorsed the results of the debates 
on January 28. The new constitution conceded some independence to the various parts of the 
kingdom. There would be a common diet that included representatives from Denmark and the 
two duchies, although, the diet would have no say in fiscal matters. Laws that dealt with the 
entire kingdom were to come before the diet, but it would not replace the local diets. While the 
people would not ratify the constitution, Frederik did allow a body of advisors to inspect the 
document. The local authoritative bodies and orders, but not the local diets, would select these 
advisors. Even though the drafting of the new constitution would take time, its mere promise 
awakened critics on both sides of the issue. Schleiden welcomed the proposal, because it put the 
duchies and Denmark on equal levels.46 Others nationalists would disagree. 
In Copenhagen, Danish nationalists were concerned, because they saw the new 
constitution as a first step toward losing both duchies to the German Bund. The parity between 
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the German and Danish representatives in the new diet especially raised questions.47 In the 
duchies, too, the proposed constitution was greeted with suspicion that had been fostered over 
the previous decades.48 The Germans, which had developed their nationalist-separatism and 
liberal-radicalism over the past decade, questioned if they should participated in drafting the 
document. However, their absence would have allowed the Danes to dominate the proceedings 
and write a constitution unfavorable to the duchies.49 
Since the Danish king was willing to have the draft constitution inspected by leaders of 
the various parts of the kingdom, the German nationalists saw an opportunity to demonstrate 
their dissatisfaction with Danish policy. Schleswig-Holstein instructed its delegates to support 
only a constitution that retained the old relationship between Denmark and the duchies. It was 
not a good omen. The British minister to Denmark, H. William W. Wynn wrote the British 
foreign secretary, Lord John Palmerston, “This early demonstration of hostility is of course most 
unwelcome to the Government, but of which it is not likely that any advice will be taken.”50 The 
separatist nationalists’ opposition indicated that more conflict was still to come; there was a 
revolutionary fervor in the air. 
In the midst of this heated debate over the constitution came news on February 29 of 
revolutionary events in Paris. Schleiden recalled the moment in his memoir: 
My trust in the values of the constitutional system were not shattered by the quick 
toppling of a throne that had lasted for seventeen years and had the support of the 
majority of the delegates in the legislature. The majority had, based on the way it 
was composed, supported the government, but not represented the vast majority of 
the people. I believed that every people had and must have the right to political 
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representation, if the people are politically educated. Not only in England but also 
in the south German states had representative bodies illustrated their ability to 
secure legal liberty against despotism. My countrymen place their hope with a 
representative constitution to secure their rights because the provincial diets had 
shown themselves incapable.51 
Not everyone took such a cautious liberal view. The animosity between Denmark and Schleswig-
Holstein continued to grow, and some Danes knew that rebellion was just over the horizon, and 
with rebellion, there would be war.52 
While Copenhagen was abuzz over the new constitution, a joint meeting by the diets of 
Schleswig and Holstein took place in Kiel. As members of the Holstein diet, both radical-
separatist-nationalists Theodor Olshausen and Hans Reimer Claussen were present. The meeting 
called on the people of the duchies to reject all attempts to tie Schleswig-Holstein closer to 
Denmark. The separatists had won the day and were ready to oppose Danish oppression. During 
the joint meeting, news of the impending overthrow of the government in Paris arrived. 
Additional meetings under the national colors of the German nationalists took place in the 
following days. During these early March meetings, the Neuholsteiners continued to argue for 
the independence of the duchies.53 
At the same time, the Danish nationalists saw an opportunity to incorporate Schleswig. 
Hvidt called for a meeting of the Faedrelands Partei on March 7 to define their policy 
concerning Schleswig. The leading voices in the meeting, besides Hvidt, were Clausen, Orla 
Lehmann, and Anton Frederik Tscherning.54 The proceeding of that meeting and a second one on 
March 20, which called on the Danish monarchy not to surrender Schleswig, indicated that 
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tensions were close to fever pitch. The demand to retain Schleswig closed with a call for a new 
ministry that consisted only of loyal Danes.55 In contrast to the separatism of the Germans and 
showing that they could be just as radical as their German counterparts, the Danes called for the 
unification of all Danish nationalists in a Danish state. 
As the rebellious spirit spread across Europe and the Danes remained silent about the 
demands of German nationalists, the people of the duchies elected a new diet on March 13.  
Radicals like Claussen and Olshausen won. At a meeting of liberals from both duchies in 
Rendsburg, a call was issued for a united diet of Schleswig and Holstein to debate the 
constitution of the duchies and the inclusion of Schleswig in the German Bund. A five-man 
deputation that consisted of Olshausen, Claussen, Lucius Carl von Neergaard-Oevelgönne, Jacob 
Guido Theodor Gülich, and Casper Engel submitted these demands to Copenhagen.56 All five 
were either left-wing radicals or left leaning and had gained a separatist nationalist reputation.57 
One has to wonder if the diet of the duchies intended to provoke the Danes by sending these 
radicals to Copenhagen. At the same time, with the demand to include Schleswig in the German 
Bund, the duchies had made another separatist statement that threatened the integrity of the 
Danish helstat. 
Misunderstandings caused some of the tension. Each side was unaware of the true 
intentions of the other, so that rumors were given credence they did not deserve. Wynn informed 
Palmerston on March 22 that much excitement had been caused by “false and exaggerated 
accounts . . . of the proceedings of an ultra-Danish meeting.” He likely referred to the March 20 
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meeting of the Faedrelands Partei. While the radicals seemed to be temporarily blocked in 
Holstein, Wynn was still worried about the agitations there. 58 Rumors still circulated that the 
separatists had created a provisional government designed to sever all ties with Denmark.59 
Radical nationalists on both sides had made Schleswig their prize and were unwilling to give 
ground. 
In light of this escalation, the Danish king made a fateful decision. Either scared by the 
events across Europe or concerned about the rumors from the duchies, Frederik VII announced 
to his ministers on March 21 that Schleswig should be incorporated into Denmark. The entire 
ministry resigned in protest, and the king faced the difficult task of forming a new ministry.60 As 
a result of the developments, some of Schleiden’s German colleagues wondered if it was not 
time to resign and return to the duchies to assist their compatriots. Schleiden did not participate 
in the meeting but urged them, to remain since a mass resignation would undermine any 
reconciliation attempts. Furthermore, there was as yet no reason to resign. The monarchy had not 
officially announced the incorporation of Schleswig, and no treaty or law had yet been breached. 
Also, they did not know who the new ministers would be or what program they would 
implement. “Only once a clear intrusion in the independence of the duchies had occurred would 
the time have come for action,” he insisted61 They did not have to wait long for clarity. 
On the morning of March 22, Schleiden caught his department chief Francke before 
work. He learned that after a long night of discussion Francke had agreed to join the Carl Emil 
von Bardenfleth ministry on the condition that the Schleswig question be left open. The promise 
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was soon broken. As a result, Francke resigned from the cabinet. The king asked him to remain, 
granting him unlimited powers within his ministry. However, the king cautioned, there would be 
no compromise on the Schleswig issue and Francke would have to support the monarchy. When 
Francke still refused to cooperate, the king gave him a kind goodbye. Wrongfully assuming that 
the king had also dismissed him from his position in the commerce and customs collegium, 
Francke prepared to depart Copenhagen.62 
During the morning conversation between Schleiden and Francke, a steamship from Kiel 
arrived with the radical delegation from Holstein. Schleiden went on board to meet them, but it 
became clear the mission had little chance to succeed when a mob seized the delegates and 
escorted them to the house of Consul Hage. The consul promised not to allow the delegates to 
leave the city until they had seen the king. However, the danger from the mob increased when 
rumors emerged that the duchies were already in a state of open rebellion. These were confusing 
hours, with one of Schleiden’s acquaintances even claiming that the revolution was underway.63 
Being a pacifist, Schleiden continued to hope for peace. On March 23, he loyally 
executed his duties by dispatching a series of requests for reports from various officials in 
Holstein. He then went to meet with the commission, which had just returned from an 
unproductive meeting with the king. The crowds in Copenhagen further disheartened them. At 
the same time, Francke had changed his mind again and conditionally agreed to head the 
Schleswig-Holstein government, replacing the disliked Scheel. He voiced doubts, however, that 
the visiting commission would succeed. Rumors continued to claim that the duchies were in 
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open rebellion.64 Pacifism was not going to work any longer, the separatist-nationalists had 
assumed control of events. 
March 24 brought more bad news. Expecting a speedy answer to the delegation from the 
duchies, the steamer to Kiel, carrying Schleiden’s dispatches, had been delayed. The delay 
helped to escalate the situation in the duchies, where the separatists assumed the delay was 
caused by Denmark preparing for war.65 Meanwhile, the commissioners had been removed to the 
royal castle for their own safety. An attempt by Schleiden to see them failed. He then heard that 
Olshausen had already been escorted to the harbor and that the other four were to follow soon. 
Their security could no longer be guaranteed, not even in the royal castle.66 
Later that day, Schleiden learned that the boundaries of Denmark had been extended to 
the Eider, thus incorporating Schleswig. Schleiden knew what he had to do. After writing his 
resignation, he fled the capital, and advised others to do likewise. Francke, too, tendered in his 
resignation and prepared to depart. All Germans who had served in Copenhagen and who had 
submitted their resignations tried to leave on the steamer to Kiel, a kind of Holstein Ark. Trying 
to avoid suspicion (after all, they were about to commit treason), Schleiden left his baggage in 
his room and was prepared, if necessary, to use his official position to board the steamer. Twenty 
Germans joined Schleiden on board, some with their families, to await departure, but Schleiden 
was equally anxious about the political situation that awaited them in the duchies.67 
The royal document that had escalated the crisis was soon widely known. It started rather 
favorably, promising to guarantee Holstein’s status in the German Bund. Freedom of the press, 
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electoral reforms, and the possibility of arming the people were also mentioned. The king even 
granted the duchy its own civil administration, military organization, and financial 
responsibilities. However, the bone of contention was Schleswig, which the king referred to as 
“our duchy of Schleswig.” As a result, the king emphasized his desire to strengthen the ties 
between Denmark and Schleswig with a new constitution. At the same time, some local and 
provincial institutions, like Schleswig’s own diet, would maintain the independence of the 
duchy. Despite this appeal for peace, Denmark had made a serious blunder.68 The letter was 
unacceptable to German nationalists, whose passions for separation was only increased by the 
Danish refusal to acknowledge the rights of the duchies. 
The uncertainty of the news from Copenhagen, especially the delayed steamer, escalated 
events in the duchies. Without clear information from Copenhagen, and expecting that the 
mission would not bring any successful news, the leaders in Holstein called for a provisional 
government, to be constituted by Wilhelm Hartwig Beseler, Jürgen Bremer, Friedrich Graf von 
Reventlow-Preetz, Martin Thorsen Schmidt, Theodor Olshausen, and Friedrich von Nör.69 They 
emphasized in their proclamation that they acted in the name of an “unfree sovereign” who had 
been forced by the people in Copenhagen to take a hostile position toward the duchies. While the 
provisional government condemned the Danish nationalist attack on the sovereign German land, 
it made sure to explain that the government was not in rebellion but merely seeking to rule in the 
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duke’s name. At the same time, the provisional government prepared to support the liberal 
German unification movement.70 The separatists had taken over and the uprising had started. 
The separatists and radicals had come a long way. While German nationalism in the 
duchies had emerged with such influential figures as Dahlmann and Lornsen, its revolutionary 
separatist streak was not exposed until German and Danish nationalists moved apart. The 
perception that Denmark was passing oppressive laws, imposing illegal tax burdens, ignoring 
justified demands for reform, violating the constitutional relationship between Denmark and the 
duchies, and, of course, attempting to integrate Schleswig into Denmark and thus rupturing the 
Treaty of Ripe’s “up ewig ungeedelt” clause added fire to the German separatists and their desire 
to establish an independent Holstein or Schleswig-Holstein. As the tensions increased, the 
radicals on both sides gained influence. By 1848, the relations had escalated to such a degree that 
mistrust between the two nationalities was unbridgeable. The Danish king’s decision to integrate 
Schleswig in conjunction with the new Danish constitution was the spark that set the long 
simmering conflict ablaze. The next few months would show the strength of the separatist 
nationalists in the duchies and whether they would be able to sustain the duchies’ independence. 
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Chapter Three 
 
Schleswig-Holstein in 1848: 
A Special Case 
After the Danish king had proposed a new constitution that integrated Schleswig into the 
Danish kingdom and the five-member commission from Schleswig-Holstein to Copenhagen was 
delayed in its return, the nationalist, separatist, and radical leaders in the duchies decided to take 
action. In the name of the duke of the duchies, who had been cornered by Danish nationalists, the 
provisional government assumed power and intended to protect the duchies against Danish 
oppression. Of course, the king of Denmark, the duke of Holstein, and the duke of Schleswig 
were one and the same person. In effect, the people of the duchies rose up against the king in the 
name of the duke. Since the separatists had won the day in late March, and the duchies had risen 
up against Danish rule, the question was whether they would be able to maintain their newfound 
independence. While the German nationalists were secessionists within the Danish state, they 
favored unification of the German states. The new question was whether the unity of the 
Schleswig-Holstein movement would last or if the old conflict between liberals and radicals 
would reemerge. 
This chapter will explore the internal dynamics of the Schleswig-Holstein uprising from 
its start on March 24 until the conclusion of the Malmö ceasefire on August 26. The attention 
given Olshausen and Claussen will show how their radicalism influenced their political 
decisions, and how they promoted their political agendas, including democracy and a vigorous 
conduct of the war, in both the German states and Holstein. In Schleiden’s case, the diplomatic 
and negotiating skills that would be central to his success in the coming decades would be tested 
for the first time in 1848. Many of the experience of the three men are illustrative for their future 
work. 
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After Wilhelm Hartwig Beseler, Jürgen Bremer, Friedrich Graf von Reventlow-Preetz, 
Martin Thorsen Schmidt, Theodor Olshausen, and Friedrich von Nör had assumed power, the 
first order of business was to protect their fragile creation against Denmark, which aimed to put 
down the rebellion. Troops of the new government quickly occupied the fortress of Rendsburg 
and seized the arsenal,1 but weapons for untrained soldiers would be useless against the well-
trained Danes. As a result, on March 24, the government asked the Prussians for military 
assistance. To gain military support, the duchies needed diplomats to fight the war abroad.2 
After Schleiden arrived in Kiel and discovered that the duchies had rebelled by claiming 
loyalty to their duke, he was ready to work for the provisional government. Schleiden and Karl 
Francke immediately went to Rendsburg to offer their services to the provisional government.3 
For unknown reasons, the provisional government decided to employ Schleiden in a diplomatic 
role. 
Soon, Schleiden had instructions to go to Hanover and Frankfurt to request assistance 
from both the Kingdom of Hanover and the German Bund. Schleiden recalled, “It was a strange 
start of my diplomatic career . . . I was representing a government, which, as long as it was not 
recognized by the German Bundestag, was not legitimate and could not be recognized from the 
government in Hanover.”4 Schleiden was to serve as a diplomat without being appointed as a 
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diplomat. As a result, his negotiations were slightly more complicated than his work in later 
years. However, this was the foundation of an almost two decade long career as a diplomat. His 
role as a negotiator in these difficult circumstances would help him many times in future talks. 
The mission to Hanover was successful. The government agreed to concentrate 10,000 
soldiers along the Elbe, to be deployed if a Danish invasion of Schleswig occurred and the 
German Bund authorized their use.5 With this diplomatic success, Schleiden went to Frankfurt. 
On March 29, he arrived in time for the first meeting of the Vor-Parlament, which was to work 
out the preliminaries for the Frankfurt Parliament. He met unofficially with the Austrian and 
Prussian ministers, who gave him their full attention but not their support. After all, he was the 
representative of a separatist revolutionary movement. 
A much trickier problem was to convince the Danish representative at the Bundestag, 
Friedrich Christian Ferdinand Rigsfriherre von Pechlin von Löwenbach, to vacate his post in 
favor of Schleiden.6 Schleiden had met Pechlin fifteen years earlier and was now in the awkward 
position of replacing him.7 His own uncertain legal status made Schleiden cautious, not wanting 
to overstep his authority and hurt the duchies’ cause.8 He did have a lengthy conversation with 
Pechlin, who after much contemplation submitted his resignation. However, Pechlin, with no 
intention of accepting Schleiden as the new representative of Holstein, insisted that the legation 
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archives be handed over to a duly appointed new minister from Denmark.9 Schleiden still lacked 
international legitimacy, as did the separatist uprising in the duchies. 
While Schleiden negotiated with Pechlin, he paid a visit to his old acquaintance Karl 
Theodor Georg Philipp Welcker, whom he accompanied to the Vor-Parlament. As a liberal, 
Schleiden found the speeches of radicals like Gustav von Struve and Friedrich Karl Franz Hecker 
inflammatory, and hoped that a constitutional, parliamentary, monarchical system would prevail. 
Claussen, once elected to the Frankfurt Parliament in April, agreed with Schleiden, even though 
he was a radical democrat himself. Claussen called it criminal to force democracy and 
republicanism on people by force of arms. His statement was likely influenced by Hecker’s 
activities in Baden. Instead, Claussen preferred to create a democratic republic by peaceful 
means.10 As the diplomatic representative of Schleswig-Holstein, Schleiden was invited to 
participate in the Vor-Parlament.11 Despite making it sound in his memoirs like an invitation, 
Schleiden seems to have lobbied for permission to join the parliament.12 
Despite the Vor-Parlament being intended to discuss preliminaries for the Frankfurt 
Parliament, Schleiden treated his role within the assembly in diplomatic terms, intending to 
advance the cause of the duchies.13 As a result, he pushed for the inclusion of Schleswig in the 
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German Bund and affirmation of the perpetual unity of the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein. 
To his surprise, Carl Georg Heinrich Lempfert, Claussen’s old nemesis from Dithmarschen, had 
not brought up these matters when he addressed the parliament.14 In his speech, Schleiden 
explained that he had expanded his original mandate to the Bundestag to participate in the 
debates because “one who today is sent to the princes, is at the same time sent to the people.” He 
reminded the parliament that there were foreign enemies against whom Schleswig-Holstein 
needed help from a united Germany. Schleiden explained that Schleswig, despite its Danish 
population, was and had been tied to Holstein for centuries, and that based on those ties, it should 
be made part of the German Bund.15 Here, Schleiden not only showed his diplomatic ability but 
also his strong national allegiance to both Schleswig-Holstein and Germany. 
Schleiden’s request was supported in a March 28, 1848, proclamation by the provisional 
government. It explained that the independence of Schleswig had been threatened and that the 
unity of the duchies had to be preserved. As a result, the provisional government called on the 
German Bund to incorporate Schleswig, and so prevent future Danish attempts to do so.16 
The Danish monarchy disagreed. On March 27, the king declared that Holstein was a 
separate entity and should have its own constitution. The king appealed to the people of 
Schleswig to stand by the monarchy, which would unite the duchy with the kingdom and provide 
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a constitution that would maintain some part of Schleswig’s independence. He implied that the 
rebels in the duchies were without honor.17 
Among the German nationalists in Frankfurt, Schleiden’s proposal was greeted with 
cheers of support. However, when the presiding officer asked if all were in favor of Schleswig 
joining the Bund, Professor Carl Gustav Schwetschke of Halle challenged a request for 
unanimous support. By including an area that was not in the Bund and inhabited by non-
Germans, there were legal questions, he said, that needed to be addressed. Unknowingly, 
Schleiden had precipitated a debate that would plague the German experiment throughout 1848, 
a debate characterized by the concepts of Grossdeutsch (Germany with Austria) and 
Kleindeutsch (Germany only). A representative from Mecklenburg proposed that West and East 
Prussia should also be included in the Bund. Again, supportive cheers indicated the assembly’s 
approval. Most important, Schleswig had been added to the Bund. The new question before the 
meeting was the inclusion of Prussian territories. These territories, if included, would also 
participate in the debates about the future of Germany.18 
Schleiden became even more prominent when the Vor-Parlament selected from among its 
own members the representatives for the Fünfziger-Ausschuss, which was to lay the groundwork 
for the future parliament. Schleiden and Julius Gülich were elected to represent Schleswig-
Holstein. In a few weeks, Schleiden had been transformed from a mid-level Danish bureaucrat to 
one of Schleswig-Holstein’s primary representatives abroad.19 In the Fünfziger-Ausschuss, 
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Schleiden continued to promote the inclusion of Schleswig in the Bund and its participation in 
the upcoming elections for the Frankfurt Parliament.20 He was gaining both parliamentary and 
diplomatic experience in Frankfurt that would become essential in years to come. 
However, Schleiden’s parliamentary experience would not last long; his energies were 
more essential as a diplomat. With Prussian support and the troops necessary to protect the 
duchies against Denmark, the Fünfziger-Ausschuss agreed with Schleiden’s suggestions that a 
representation be made to Prussia. Frankfurt decided to send Schleiden and Karl Mathy from 
Baden.21 The Prussians needed little motivation from the Frankfurt representatives; however, 
their initial support had already come under European scrutiny. As a result, the duchies’ 
diplomats would face a difficult task. 
The Danes were quick to recruit foreign support. On March 28, 1848, the Danish foreign 
minister held a conference with the representatives of Russia and Great Britain in Copenhagen. 
After explaining the situation, the foreign minister blamed the Prussians for the escalation of 
revolutionary fervor in the duchies. According to him, the Prussian proclamation of March 23, 
with its appeal to the German people, was to blame for the uprising in Schleswig. The Danes 
hoped for Russian and British aid in dealing with Prussia and settling the Schleswig-Holstein 
question.22 While their hope for a direct intervention would not be fulfilled, international 
pressure soon came to bear on the Prussians. 
Meanwhile, in the duchies radicals, like Claussen, who remained in the legislative branch 
of the Schleswig-Holstein government, continued to press for the implementation of their 
                                                 
20 Jucho, Verhandlungen des Deutschen Parlaments, 2:4-5. 
21 Schleiden to provisional government, April 14, 1848, Fasc. 1, Nachlass Schleiden, 
CAU; Schleiden, Schleswig-Holsteins erste Erhebung, 20-23; Aktenstücke, 2:85 
22 Protocol of March 28, 1848, Aktenstücke, 2:44-46. 
 62 
political program, including a broad, unrestricted electoral franchise. Claussen took especial 
issue with the ancient electoral system of voting by estates, which he said was outdated. He 
suggested that a committee be established to look into electoral reforms, but his attack on the 
privileged orders did not sit well with some members of the diet, such as Theodor Graf 
Reventlow-Jersbeck.23 Claussen, now a strong supporter of an independent and democratic 
Schleswig-Holstein, who argued that the ties between the duchies and Denmark should be 
severed,24 had moved away from his earlier “Neuholsteiner” position to support German 
unification and a united Schleswig-Holstein.25 However, this radical challenge at a time of 
national crisis was not appreciated, and Claussen and Olshausen would continue this agitation 
much to the detriment of their cause. 
While the radicals challenged the provisional government at home, Schleiden faced 
diplomatic challenges abroad. Upon their arrival in Berlin, he and Mathy met with minister 
president Gottfried Ludolf Camphausen and discovered that their task had eased significantly. 
Prussia had already ordered its troops into Schleswig, knowing that Denmark would not 
voluntarily evacuate the duchy. Unfortunately, the order had arrived too late for Schleswig-
Holstein’s troops. The Danes had planned to surround the enemy in the Flensburg area. After a 
diversionary landing at Holdnaes, east of Flensburg, the Schleswig-Holstein army was divided 
and weakened. On April 9, the armies met at Bov/Bau. The disorganized troops of the duchies 
retreated all the way to the Eider.26 Prussian and German support was badly needed to avoid 
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early defeat, but at the same time, this meant an escalation from a regional rebellion into an 
international war. 
But for the duchies, the Schleswig question was of equal importance. The Prussians 
insured Schleiden and Mathy of British neutrality. However, Camphausen was reluctant to 
endorse the entrance of Schleswig into the Bund until the end of the war.27 As a result, the 
duchies again requested that Schleswig be formally included in the Bund,28 although, with 
Frankfurt losing influence over that question, attention now focused on Berlin. On May 12, 1848, 
Schleiden was recalled from Frankfurt and appointed to represent the duchies in Berlin. He 
replaced Georg Waitz, who had been elected to the Paulskirchen Parliament in Frankfurt.29 In 
Berlin, Schleiden would not only face Prussian’s political situation but also be exposed to the 
international pressure of the great powers. His diplomatic skills would be put to the test. 
While Schleiden continued his diplomatic work, the radicals were gaining ground. After 
he had departed Frankfurt, the new representatives for the Paulskirchen Parliament assembled in 
the city, among them the radical Hans R. Claussen. Having been elected as a radical democratic 
with socialist leanings, Claussen became an active participant in the debates on the future of the 
new Germany. As a strong supporter of a German republic, he had to explain to non-republicans 
that a republic would not mean statelessness, anarchy, or worker-run governments.30 Claussen 
supported a state structure in which the rulers were legally held to the same standards as the 
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average person.31 He pointed to the United States as the best blue print on which to model a 
German executive.32 As a supporter of the independence of Schleswig-Holstein, he also endorsed 
the U.S. federal system, which left considerable powers with the states.33 Few of these radical 
ideas would appear in the final constitution of 1849. However, Claussen continued to 
demonstrate in his radical views his love for the American political system. 
Meanwhile, always looking to after the interests of the duchies, Claussen and two other 
delegates proposed on July 11 that any ceasefire or peace negotiations with the Danes adhere to 
German laws. Furthermore, Frankfurt had to be kept well informed of the progress of such talks. 
The resolution was meant to deal with rumors that Prussia had prepared an independent treaty 
detrimental to the duchies.34 In a speech defending the resolution, Claussen not only referred to 
the authority given to Prussia to negotiate an honorable peace, but he also reminded his listeners 
that the Treaty of Ripen united the duchies and that the Danish king had treasonously abrogated 
it with his new constitution. Here, the presiding official stepped in to remind Claussen that the 
personal union was not subject to debate and could only unnecessarily complicate matters. After 
the reminder, Claussen continued his speech, making sure to impress upon his listeners that 
peace at any price was not acceptable. While many delegates disagreed with his arguments and 
language, Claussen’s proposal that the negotiations needed to be closely monitored to insure an 
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honorable peace received the support of a majority.35 Nationalism and support for the separatists 
still ran strong among the German parliamentarians. 
At the same time, fears that Great Britain might intervene increased international pressure 
on the Bund. It reacted by dispatching Hamburg’s Syndicus Edward Banks to London to assist 
Christian Karl Josias von Bunsen, the Prussian minister, in negotiations with the British 
government. The representative of Frankfurt was provided with all the necessary historical 
documents to address any British concern. The question faced by the German diplomats was if in 
a gesture of good faith, the German troops should withdraw from Schleswig. While Schleiden 
supported the idea of Great Britain assisting in a negotiated settlement, he vehemently opposed 
an evacuation of Schleswig.36 Like all the nationalists, Schleiden was unwilling to sacrifice the 
diplomatic or military position of the separatist movements in Schleswig-Holstein. 
To improve the duchies’ diplomatic situation, Prussian military aid was needed to turn 
the war around. On April 23, 1848, the troops under General Friedrich Heinrich Ernst Graf von 
Wrangel, the new commanding officer of the German forces in the duchies, won the Battle of 
Schleswig. The defeat forced the Danish army to retreat to Flensburg, which Wrangel’s troops 
occupied on April 25. The two sides faced each other on the heights west of 
Sonderburg/Sønderborg near Düppel/Dybbøl.37 The order for Wrangel to continue to push the 
Danes out of Schleswig had come directly from Berlin after Denmark rejected a Prussian peace 
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offer that included the evacuation of Schleswig.38 Denmark had rejected it because the islands of 
Alsen/Als and Aero/Ærø, which were officially part of Schleswig, were also to be evacuated.39 
As the German army continued to advance into Denmark, international pressure increased. 
Schleiden arrived in Berlin during these military victories in Berlin. In his first meeting 
with Prussian foreign minister Heinrich von Armin, he addressed the military and diplomatic 
situation, including the Russian and British fears about a German advance into Denmark40 and 
the increasing lack of enthusiasm in Berlin to support the uprising.41 Prussian policy adjusted 
under international pressure, and as opportunities arose to curtail the revolutionary movement at 
home, Wrangel’s troops were needed in Berlin.42 Schleiden’s diplomatic work was becoming 
more complicated as the Prussians desired to appease the great powers. 
Still, Schleswig remained the main topic of discussion, as. Schleiden pressed von Armin 
on the issue of Schleswig’s incorporation in the Bund. The Prussian foreign minister remained 
reluctant to agree since such a policy could undermine international negotiations.43 While the 
representatives of the warring states discussions a ceasefire in London, Schleiden worried that 
the withdrawal from Jutland would be interpreted as a sign of German weakness.44 That was 
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probably the case. Certainly, in the course of the negotiations in London, the Danes did not 
change their terms.45 Confidentially, foreign minister Frederik Marcus Lensgreve Knuth told the 
British minister in Copenhagen, H. William Wynn, that all recent problems stemmed from the 
Germans in Holstein. While the loss of Holstein was acceptable, Schleswig as part of the 
German Bund would not be tolerated.46 With both sides wanting to claim the hopelessly divided 
Schleswig, negotiations stalled. The Schleswig-Holstein question was no longer a internal 
Danish or Dano-German conflict but an international one, which made Schleiden’s work in 
Berlin that much more difficult. 
As the Danes and Prussians made proposals for the settlement of the conflict in 
Schleswig-Holstein, British foreign minister Lord Palmerston had no easy task bringing the two 
sides together. Even when a second round of suggestions arrived in London at the behest of 
Palmerston, the Danes had left their demands unchanged. Palmerston was not amused but he still 
favored the Danish side in the conflict. As a result, the Prussian minister refused to negotiate any 
further.47 For the moment, Palmerston was unable to get the two sides to agree. Diplomacy had 
failed to solve the Schleswig-Holstein question. 
If this failure had not been bad enough, a new power entered the picture, ready to join the 
Danes militarily. An altered balance of power was the last thing the Swedish government 
wanted. In mid-May, the Swedish consulate in Hamburg informed the provisional government 
that troops would be sent to Denmark, though they were not yet to engage in combat. The 
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duchies regretted that Sweden felt the need to protect the “security of the north” in this way.48 
Soon 4,000 Swedish soldiers arrived on Fünen/Fyn with orders to intervene in the conflict if 
Denmark needed them to defend against German invaders. When German troops crossed into 
Denmark, Great Britain and Russia became extremely concerned. The two governments 
suggested again a ceasefire to allow the diplomats to do their work.49 Besides their military role, 
the Swedes were also preparing a diplomatic initiative. With the Swedes joining the Russians 
and British, Schleswig-Holstein was more than revolution-plagued Germany or Prussia had 
bargained for. 
As the summer months brought mob violence and barricade fighting across Europe, 
Berlin, too, suffered political upheaval that brought down the government.50 On June 25, the 
diplomatic novice Rudolf von Auerwald took over the government.51 The changes promised to 
have an impact on the duchies, which relied on Prussian support. On June 19, Alexander Gustav 
Adolf Graf von Schleinitz, who had temporarily taken over the foreign office, tried to use the 
Swedish government, instead of the already established British connection, to negotiate an 
armistice.52 The Prussians focused their attention on the Swedes and Russians. Since Great 
Britain would not militarily intervene, they wanted to dispel Swedish fears.53 
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Regardless of the talks between Sweden and Prussia, Great Britain remained involved, 
with Palmerston making a new ceasefire proposal on June 23. The Prussian government was 
surprised that talk of a ceasefire and peace preliminaries had been revived, and that the concerns 
voiced by Bunsen had been dismissed by Lord Palmerston.54 Palmerston was obviously not 
favorably disposed towards Schleswig-Holstein. The duchies’ separatism and its threat to the 
integrity of the Danish monarchy were too much for Europe to accept at mid-century. 
Around June 20, the Prussian government authorized Albert Graf von Pourtalès to 
proceed to Sweden and negotiate. The Prussians could not have picked anyone less qualified. 
Pourtalès, who had been assigned to Constantinople, was unfamiliar with the issues in northern 
Europe.55 He proved as much on July 2 in a ceasefire agreement he signed with his Danish 
counterpart Knuth, under the supervision of the Swedish minister Friherre Gustaf Nils Algernon 
Adolf Stierneld and cabinet secretary Christoffer Rutger Ludvig Manderström. The deal 
established a six-month ceasefire and included temporary administration of the duchies run by a 
five-member commission.56 In the agreement, the hostilities would stop and prisoners would be 
exchanged. All captured ships would be returned, and German and Danish troops would leave 
Schleswig.57 On July 5, Pourtalès returned to Berlin with the agreement.58 Prussia, under 
international pressure, was anxious to have the ceasefire implemented, and so it turned to the 
diplomat from Schleswig-Holstein to convince the duchies of this necessity. Schleiden was to go 
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with Pourtalès to the provisional government and promote the agreement.59 He faced one of the 
most difficult diplomatic challenges of his career. This could spell the end of Schleswig-Holstein 
independence. 
Back in the duchies, Beseler joined Pourtalès and Schleiden on their way to Wrangel’s 
headquarters, where they talked about the terms. Interestingly, only Pourtalès knew them, and his 
lack of understanding of the Schleswig-Holstein question soon became apparent. The Prussian 
did not know that men from Schleswig served in the Danish army. They could be stationed in 
Schleswig, while the Danish army formally evacuated.60 Unhappy with being kept in the dark, 
the provisional government informed the Prussian government that they could not agree to the 
ceasefire’s terms until its exact details and wording were known.61 As a result, the provisional 
government dispatched Schleiden and Reventlou to Berlin to renegotiate.62 
Through loyal supporters, the provisional government learned the details of the ceasefire. 
When Reventlou and Schleiden, during their stay in Berlin, visited Wrangel’s residence, they 
found that the general had left for an inspection tour. He had hidden the agreement under a stack 
of newspapers, easy for the two visitors to find.63 The two men could demand specific revisions 
of the treaty. In the meetings with Auerwald and Hans Graf von Bülow, they were able to obtain 
some concessions and clarification.64 They were unable to complete renegotiations, but that did 
not trouble them for long. 
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When in late July, the representatives of the warring nations, Great Britain, and Sweden 
met at Bellevue to discuss the ceasefire terms in more detail, they failed to come to an agreement 
in regard to the prisoner of war question.65 A new ceasefire had to be negotiated. The duchies 
had won a respite, but it was increasingly clear that their diplomats would be unable to exercise 
much pressure in this game of great power diplomacy. Prussian support was increasingly a 
liability, and antagonism for Prussia increased. 
In the duchies, opposition to the ceasefire was strong. The radicals, especially, opposed 
any deal that would compromise the separatist agenda of the uprising. On July 8, 1848, Friedrich 
Hedde, a member of the radical Olshausen clique and Olshausen’s successor as editor of the 
Correspondenz-Blatt, published a short pamphlet to explain the ceasefire and its implications. He 
drew particular attention to the most humiliating parts of the treaty. Listing the withdrawal of 
German troops from the duchies, the payment for damages done in Jutland, and the replacement 
of the provisional government by a new government, Hedde called the document “one 
humiliation piled upon another.” He predicted that things might get worse and pointed to a 
paradox. The victor in this ceasefire, he marveled, was bowing to the defeated and paying them 
instead of taking their territory. “As a result of such a humiliating ceasefire,” he declared, “grow 
an even more humiliating peace will probably grow out of it.”66 
Hedde had no good words for the diplomats responsible for this fiasco. The negotiators, 
he said, had been “totally incompetent.” After dealing with the known details of the treaty, 
Hedde closed by once more leashing out against the diplomats. He accused them of being stuck 
in the past, still adhering to the Congress of Vienna. As a result, they would not side with an 
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uprising that tried to alter the existing balance of power. The only people that Schleswig-
Holstein could trust were the German people. “On our own power and the German people must 
we rely,” Hedde insisted. “Otherwise, at the end, we have suffered through the revolution and 
war without victory or honor.”67 Unfortunately, an honorable peace was increasingly unlikely. 
While Hedde voiced the radicals’ opposition to the ceasefire and the government’s 
representatives, Olshausen’s disgruntlement with the provisional government increased as well. 
The radicals prepared to oppose the moderate and even conservative provisional government of 
the duchies. In mid-August, Theodor Olshausen tendered his resignation. Schleiden 
sympathetically wrote that Olshausen departed because he realized the downhill track forced on 
the government by the sacrifices it had made.68 
Olshausen’s resignation was accompanied by a debate in the diet and the provisional 
government over the direction of the uprising. The debate in the diet pitched the radicals once 
more against the more conservative and moderate elements. Claussen commented on 
Olshausen’s resignation with a political statement of his own. The seven members of the 
provisional government, he argued, had no legitimate right to rule. They had not been elected 
and did not have the consent of the governed. They were, in effect, usurpers. He spoke of the 
“revolution” that had given the provisional government its right to exist, and which had been 
confirmed by the diet. Conservative members like Bremer challenged Claussen’s use of the word 
“revolution.” They argued that they had acted in the name of the duke of the duchies. Claussen 
continued by saying that by whatever definition, the nation was caught up in momentous 
changes. While this debate over semantics was going on, the diet refused to accept or refuse the 
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resignation of Olshausen. Instead, they merely thanked him for his service.69 While the radicals 
had not directly challenged the government, their opposition was growing. 
As violence threatened the residence of the Prussian minister president Rudolf von 
Auerwald,70 the Prussians realized that a military presence was required in Berlin, and to achieve 
that, and, the duchies needed to be pacified. In mid-August, the ceasefire negotiations between 
Prussia and Denmark recommenced in Malmö. Christian Høyer Bille, a Swedish official 
negotiated for the Danes, and Gustav von Below represented Prussia.71 On August 26, von 
Below signed the official ceasefire agreement with Denmark.72 It was a disadvantageous treaty 
for the duchies, but all attempts by Schleiden to prevent the inevitable ratification failed.73 Great 
power diplomacy was outclassing the diplomacy of the duchies, whose separatism was 
increasingly isolated. 
The ceasefire was to be in effect for seven months. German and Danish troops were to 
withdraw from the duchies except for two small contingents from each side to protect the 
hospitals and arsenals. The soldiers from the duchies were placed under the authority of a new 
government, which consisted of a president and vice-president selected by the kings of Denmark 
and Prussia. The president was to be Carl Graf von Moltke-Nütschau, with Adolf Blome as his 
second. The ceasefire nullified all laws passed since March 17 except those deemed necessary 
for governing the duchies.74 
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With this challenge to the separatist experiment in the duchies, outrage was widespread 
among the politicians in Schleswig-Holstein. Schleiden was among those angered by the treaty.75 
On August 27, the provisional government notified him that they would not support the treaty. A 
new diplomatic initiative was needed to convince the Prussians that the ceasefire was 
unacceptable.76 The Prussians had expected as much, but they also expected, as von Below told 
Schleiden, that the duchies would accept the agreement in due course.77 Below’s statement did 
little to calm the anger. 
In Frankfurt, Olshausen informed his brother Justus about the reactions in the parliament 
when the news of the ceasefire terms arrived. While some delegates in the ensuing debate spoke 
favorably of the treaty, Olshausen was one who demanded the release of all documents related to 
the negotiations a halt to the withdrawal of the troops. The latter demand was not accepted, much 
to Olshausen’s disgust, but he was pleased, as was Schleiden, that the people in the duchies did 
not overreact and turn to violence. He now assumed, as did some leaders in Frankfurt, that the 
duchies could establish a more permanent government and cut ties with Denmark.78 The radicals 
and moderates were united in their nationalist enthusiasm and opposition to an imposed treaty. 
However, while the Malmö ceasefire signaled a possibility for a fully independent Schleswig-
Holstein, little could be done about the ceasefire’s implantation. 
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On August 31, the Prussian government informed the duchies of the terms of the 
ceasefire.79 People now saw that the Prussians had clearly gone too far and exceeded the powers 
granted to them by Frankfurt. The German government was similarly outraged by the results of 
the Malmö talks, and this general lack of support opened the door for the provisional government 
to view the ceasefire as non-binding.80 The government was equally concerned that, while many 
promises had been made by Prussia, Denmark had made very few.81 It fell again to Schleiden to 
approach the Prussians and asked for a clarification of the terms. For the nationalist, peace at any 
price was not acceptable.82 
Hoping that Frankfurt would intercede, the Schleswig-Holstein diet asserted on 
September 4 that it could not be disbanded against its will and that any changes to the governing 
of the duchies would require the support of the diet.83 Von Below and Moltke-Nütschau, the 
ceasefire commissioners, soon realized that resistance in the duchies would make the assumption 
of office by the new administration difficult. Disgruntled that the members of his government 
had refused his orders, Moltke-Nütschau departed Holstein. Von Below tried to get a member of 
the provisional government to assume the presidency. Beseler refused unless major alterations 
were made to the ceasefire. Others made similar demands.84 
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While the duchies hoped for support from Frankfurt, it was not forthcoming. Initially, a 
majority in Frankfurt had voted against the implementation of the ceasefire,85 but with new 
pressure exercised in Prussia and Frankfurt, and the realization of a possible escalation, the 
Frankfurt parliament by September 16 had changed its mind and urged acceptance of the 
ceasefire. The representatives of the duchies favored its implementation, and hoped for its 
speedy implementation.86 The next task was to get the provisional government and diet to agree 
to the ceasefire.87 Schleswig-Holstein agreed to the ceasefire, but there were clear signs of 
continued resistance. 
The duchies had held elections for a constitutional assembly that would draft a 
constitution for Schleswig-Holstein. The duchies hoped to create a fait accompli, which would 
place the duchies on a better political footing than if they had remained an insurrectionary 
government.88 The uprising was moving away from a government ruling in the name of the duke 
toward an independent Schleswig-Holstein. 
In response to Malmö, the provisional government once again called for a meeting of the 
diet. After Bremer, as representative of the provisional government, had presented the details on 
the ceasefire, Claussen requested that additional documents of the negotiations be made 
available. He was in line with the demands his radical colleague Olshausen had made in 
Frankfurt. At the same time, the diet made sure that its legitimacy was not questioned by stating 
that it could not be abolished and that new laws would require its endorsement.89 While the 
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duchies moved to the next chapter in their uprising, the politicians in the duchies and the diet 
tried to maintain some of their authority. 
During these five months, March 24 to August 26, 1848, the Schleswig-Holstein uprising 
built on many developments of the previous decades. The mistrust that had developed between 
the duchies and Denmark was clearly visible in the opposition to detrimental or ambiguous 
ceasefire terms. While the separatist-nationalists initially focused on governing the duchies in the 
name of the duke of the duchies, international pressure moved the uprising farther and farther 
away from this goal. Three men at the center of this narrative were in the midst of the 
developments. Schleiden faced a new task with the diplomatic duties pressed upon him. While he 
was an able diplomat when dealing with the German states, he was less successful in exerting 
pressure on Prussia. By August, it was clear that the duchies’ separatist challenge was going to 
bring international pressure and cause the desertion of its allies. It was an important lesson that 
was largely overlooked at the time. For Claussen and Olshausen, the events of 1848 offered 
many opportunities to voice their radical demands. They continued to agitate for democratic 
reforms, but when it came to the independence and separate status of the duchies, they stood with 
the other liberals. Clearly, the first Schleswig-Holstein war was far from over, and continuation 
of the war would escalate the internal differences within Schleswig-Holstein and bring new 
diplomatic challenges. 
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Chapter Four 
 
First Schleswig-Holstein War: 
Crushed by Great Power Diplomacy 
The first five months of the Schleswig-Holstein uprising had been characterized by 
misunderstandings developed over the past two decades, and which would continue to define the 
conflicts to come. While Schleiden had left behind his civil service career to become a diplomat, 
his efforts to gain support for the duchies would be checked by the European powers. The 
radicals, including Olshausen and Claussen, had shown their cards in discussion about political 
reform, but they had not yet broken with the nationalists. As the first Schleswig-Holstein war 
entered its next stage, the conflicts within the separatist-nationalist camp grew. The radicals were 
increasingly willing to challenge the government of the duchies and risk international war 
despite the consequences. Other nationalists, such as Schleiden, continued to support the 
government of the duchies, but the increasingly bleak situation and deteriorating war effort made 
success seem unlikely. The resilience of Schleswig-Holstein forced the continuation of the 
conflict until early 1851, when international and German pressure forced the duchies to give up 
the separatist struggle. The separatists were willing to fight until the bitter end; their nationalist 
sympathies were strong. However, they faced obstacles too large to overcome. 
In September 1848, the duchies were faced with the unpleasant task of implementing the 
hated ceasefire. However, the composition of the interim government continued to cause 
problems. The Danes insisted on the leadership of Carl Graf von Moltke-Nütschau, who was 
unable to take over because of resistance in Schleswig-Holstein. The Danes demanded that 
Prussia should act more forcefully to implement the ceasefire.1 At the same time, Frankfurt 
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demanded the replacement of the Prussian commissioner in the duchies be an imperial 
commissioner. In the ensuing diplomatic crisis, Schleiden was again called on to help find a 
settlement. 
On September 25, the new Prussian foreign minister August Heinrich Hermann Graf von 
Dönhoff called on Schleiden to suggest possible leaders for the new government. The two men 
also thought about how to satisfy the Danish demands and make sure future Danish requests for 
revisions or adjustments were not detrimental. On September 27, the Prussian government 
acknowledged the difficulty of implementing the ceasefire in respect to a new government. 
Prussia decided to pick five men to direct governmental affairs.2 For the moment, Prussian 
support, while tenuous, seemed still in favor of the duchies. 
Back in Rendsburg, Schleiden and the leaders of the provisional government debated 
how they should proceed. In a decision by the diet, Adolph von Moltke, Alexander Friedrich 
Wilhelm Preusser, Theodor Graf von Reventlow-Jersbeck, Paul Johann Boysen, and Ernst 
Freiherr von Heintze were selected as the five officials who would oversee government affairs 
once the ceasefire took effect.3 The new government demanded that the legal code worked out 
by the diet in the preceding months should remain at least partially in effect.4 
The duchies had started to draft a constitution during the ceasefire talks in Malmö and 
intended to sever their ties with Denmark. The constitutional assembly offered an opportunity for 
the radicals to voice their opinion. In one of his speeches, Claussen used rather provocative 
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language to indicate that the ties between the duchies and Denmark had been cut. Only upon 
direct invitation by the duchies could the Danish king reassume his duties as duke. However, 
Claussen’s radical suggestion, which would have lifted the uprising to a completely new level, 
was dismissed for a less sternly worded compromise. Other members attacked Claussen for 
suggesting the end of the personal union and questioned his nationalism. Some men even thought 
Claussen a dangerous troublemaker.5 The radicals were starting to move challenge the moderate 
nationalist of the duchies. 
In contrast to other radicals, Claussen was pragmatic enough to realize that at times 
compromise was necessary. As a result, he abandoned his radical viewpoints by stepping back 
from his support for a bicameral legislature, which would have provided more stability, in favor 
of a unicameral system.6 Despite the radical challenges in the drafting process, on September 15, 
the constitutional assembly finished its work on the legal code. The code soon became law of the 
land and would remain so until abrogated by the Danish authorities after the war.7 
Schleswig-Holstein entered the second phase of the first Schleswig-Holstein war with a 
new legal code and both Prussian and German support. Despite the radical challenges, their 
views remained checked. Things looked promising. Schleiden was able to gain Prussian 
acceptance of the new government under Reventlow-Jersbeck.8 By October 12, all formalities in 
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respect to the new government had been accomplished.9 On October 19, the new government of 
the duchies assumed office.10  
As a result, Schleiden’s work in Berlin was done, although he was not immediately 
recalled,11 despite his requests.12 He was still thought to be essential to the duchies’ cause in 
Berlin, but his duties changed. In the following weeks, the government directed Schleiden to buy 
war material, allowing him half a million marks for the purchases. The duchies had to prepare in 
case war broke out again. He also had to manage large sums to pay for the trip to Schleswig-
Holstein of recently hired officers. This was an obligation he did not relish.13 Schleiden had 
turned from being a diplomat to being a purchasing and recruitment agent, although he did not 
have to wait long for new diplomatic challenges to arise. 
In the duchies, the new government had reinstituted almost all laws of the provisional 
government by decree on October 22, and in anticipation of Danish protests, it issued a memorial 
to explain the action. However, there were still many who were dissatisfied with the ceasefire 
agreement. Olshausen and his radical followers continued to protest the ceasefire and new 
government.14 The Danish monarchy was also angry at the blunt refusal to follow the ceasefire 
terms, even threatening to resume the war.15 However, the Danes were hardly innocent in this 
regard. They continued to occupy the islands of Alsen/Als and Aero/Ærø, which belonged to 
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Schleswig.16 While the Danes saw a reason to insist that the ceasefire had been violated, the 
Germans could claim that the Danes were purposefully trying to reignite the war.17 The 
nationalists continued to keep the Schleswig-Holstein question alive. 
With the government in the duchies unresponsive, resisting the ceasefire, and trying to 
find a way to interpret the treaty to the duchies’ benefit, the Danish government increased the 
pressure. The Danes announced that unless its requested changes were implemented, Schleswig-
Holstein’s governmental leaders would be considered “insurrectionists.” Much concerned by the 
threat, the government of the duchies again appealed to the imperial government in Frankfurt for 
assistance.18 However, Frankfurt, while still supportive of the cause of the duchies, remained 
ambivalent.19 
A slight breathing space opened for the duchies in mid-November. Much like the 
government in Prussia, Denmark faced a change in its government. On November 15, the Danish 
March ministry collapsed. Christian Albrecht Bluhme, Ditlev Gothard Monrad, Anton Frederik 
Tscherning, and Orla Lehman joined the already retired Lauritz Nicolai Hvidt. The king asked 
August Adam Wilhelm Lensgreve Moltke to form a new government, which was a relatively 
easy task. In respect to the duchies, no policy change occurred; the influence of Danish 
nationalism remained strong.20 The new government continued to insist on the full 
implementation of the ceasefire and threatened to declare Schleswig-Holstein in insurrection. 
With Denmark willing to call on the population of Schleswig to resist the German separatist-
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nationalists, civil war loomed. The duchies, concerned about these pronouncements, continued to 
appeal to the imperial government in Frankfurt.21 Luckily, the Danes undermined the ceasefire 
agreement themselves by placing additional troops on the contested islands of Alsen/Als and 
Aero/Ærø, thus allowing the German states to do likewise along the southern border of 
Holstein.22 At this point, the duchies still enjoyed the full support of the German states; but it 
was not to last. 
By November 29, Schleiden had returned from Berlin, but was sent back within a few 
days. New orders from Prussia questioned the continued service of the Prussian officers in the 
Schleswig-Holstein army. Schleiden’s diplomatic skills were needed again. Schleiden requested 
that the government should allow the officers to stay with the army of the duchies until a 
permanent peace had been negotiated. Prussia could not ignore that these officers were essential 
if the army of the duchies was to remain intact.23 Furthermore, Schleiden requested that General 
Eduard Wilhelm Ludwig von Bonin, who had replaced Wrangel, remain in the duchies as well.24 
While these requests showed the military weakness of the duchies, they also showed that 
Prussian support still existed despite international pressure. It was, however, a question of how 
long the Prussians, and thus by default the duchies, would be able to maintain this position. 
Upon the conclusion of his latest mission, Schleiden once more requested an assignment 
closer to home. In Berlin, he was replaced by Eugen Graf von Reventlow-Altenhof and Rochus 
Wilhelm Traugott Heinrich Ferdinand Freiherr von Liliencron.25 On January 2, 1849, after a 
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brief vacation with his family, Schleiden arrived in Schleswig and assumed a position with the 
government of the duchies. He was assigned to Adolph von Harbou’s department on foreign, 
domestic, religious, and educational matters. Schleiden had finally returned to his Vor-März 
roots and the civil service, although was mainly consulted on foreign questions that needed his 
critical and knowledgeable input.26 In his new capacity, Schleiden would draft many of the 
letters to foreign governments and representatives abroad. He was still deeply involved with the 
future of the separatist struggle. 
Since the ceasefire was intended as a precursor to peace negotiations, Great Britain made 
a new attempt to negotiate. On December 12, 1848, Lord Palmerston proposed a plan that would 
prevent the incorporation of Schleswig into Denmark and maintain the territorial integrity of 
Denmark.27 In Frankfurt, Francke explained to the authorities that the inclusion of Schleswig 
into the German Bund and a resolution of the succession question were essential for a lasting 
peace. However, Francke had exceeded his instructions. While Schleiden made some effort to 
defend Francke, whom he knew personally and who had been his superior in Copenhagen, the 
government of the duchies could not allow Francke to make another mistake. The indivisible 
nature of the duchies, which Francke had downplayed, was reemphasized in the new instructions 
from Schleswig. In order to avoid further miscommunication, department chief von Harbou went 
to Frankfurt.28 The nationalists remained uncompromising when it came to the unity of the 
duchies. 
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Nevertheless, the new negotiations commenced in London under the auspicious of Lord 
Palmerston. The British reestablished themselves in their position as mediator. The pressure for 
success was enormous because the ceasefire would end on March 26.29 On February 3, 1849, the 
Germans accepted the British suggestion to use Schleswig’s independence as the basis for the 
peace talks. Officially, Bunsen was to work toward a relationship between Denmark and 
Schleswig that resembled the personal union that had existed between Denmark and Norway 
from 1536 to 1814.30 In the interest of peace, Bunsen downplayed the importance of the 
succession question. However, the Danes, with the frequent requests for instructions, slowed the 
proceedings. They did not act in good faith. 
Denmark gave notice that the ceasefire would end as agreed upon on March 24 and that 
no extension would be granted. War would resume before formal peace negotiations had 
commenced. The Germans negotiators called off the preliminary talks.31 The Danes justified 
their policy by claiming that their announcement was intended to speed up the peace negotiations 
and not to signal imminent war.32 The claim was in stark contrast to their actions. 
With the ceasefire ending, the Danish monarchy prepared to resume hostilities. The 
question would be whether Schleiden’s work in Berlin would pay off, with the German states 
continuing to support the duchies. On March 27, the blockade of the duchies’ coast resumed, 
much to the surprise of the European powers, which had been given assurances that it would be 
lifted.33 
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Since the second phase of the first Schleswig-Holstein war seemed imminent, the 
government of the duchies acknowledged the new political reality. If war broke out again, the 
ceasefire ministry would lose its legitimacy and would have to make room for a new 
government.34 Soon plans were in place for a new government. Wilhelm Hartwig Beseler and 
Friedrich Graf von Reventlow-Preetz, who had been part of the provisional government, 
assumed power as the Statthalterschaft but failed to agree on a third member. The two men 
would face the difficult task of both governing the duchies and conducting a war.35 The new 
government had 23,000 soldiers, but relied on foreign officers to lead the local recruits. Despite 
the relatively strong army, the threat of a foreign intervention remained.36 Separatist nationalism 
was increasingly under pressure in a Europe that was returning to conservative-monarchical rule. 
On April 3, Danish troops crossed the border into northern Schleswig. The second phase 
of the war had begun.37 On the following day, the Danish navy sent a seven-ship fleet against 
Eckernförde. The outcome of the land to sea artillery duel was nothing less than a total 
embarrassment for Denmark’s navy. The Danes lost the ship-of-the-line Christian VIII and 
another vessel, while three other ships sustained heavy damage. However, the Battle of 
Eckernförde was a pyrrhic victory for the duchies.38 At the same time, the armies of Denmark 
advanced from their position in Sonderburg/Sønderborg toward the German army of General von 
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Bonin near Flensburg.39 Luckily for the duchies, the Danes were unprepared for war. In the 
coming days, the Schleswig-Holstein armies and its German allies pushed the Danes back to the 
northern border of Schleswig. In early May, the combined forces advanced into Denmark itself, 
which had the undesirable effect of attracting European attention. 
By then, the German revolution had run its course. The Frankfurt parliament went out of 
business when the Prussian king refused a “crown from the gutter,” a decision that Claussen 
observed with satisfaction. He, as a member of the Frankfurt parliament, had opposed a 
constitutional monarchy. Instead, he had argued for a republic, with a president as head of state. 
In the end, the ideas of Claussen and his democratic friends were defeated. Claussen himself did 
not engage in the debates related to the head of state. Even more surprisingly, he voted with the 
majority to give the German crown to a German prince.40 Despite being a radical, he was 
moderate enough to understand the political reality of the day. 
The refusal of the Prussian king likely pushed Claussen to return to his democratic-
republican viewpoints. He joined the 104 die-hards radicals of the Rumpfparliament who had 
relocated to Baden to continue the work started in Frankfurt.41 However, by June 1849, 
radicalism was on the decline, and the princes were reasserting their authority. These changed 
did not bode well for Schleswig-Holstein. “With the disappearance of the national assembly and 
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the shadow existence of the central power,” Schleiden observed, “the duchies lost their most 
important moral support.”42 They were at the mercy of Berlin and Europe. 
Meanwhile, the armies of the duchies and their German allies had penetrated deep into 
Jutland. Operating in enemy territory had its logistical difficulties, and the hostile population 
kept the Danish army well-informed. While the Danes of Olaf Rye retreated to Fünen/Fyn by 
way of Århus, General von Bülow’s Schleswig-Holstein army laid siege to Fredericia on May 7, 
1849. However, with no naval force to cut off access to Fredericia from the sea, reinforcements 
soon poured into the city. After two months under siege, the Danes broke out of Fredericia on 
July 6 and forced the Schleswig-Holstein army into full retreat.43 The incursion into Jutland had 
placed the duchies’ German supporters under tremendous international pressure.44 
A new ceasefire was immediately contemplated. Graf von Schleinitz, Prussia’s new 
foreign minister, and Holger Christian von Reedtz, the Danish minister in Berlin, met on June 4 
in Berlin under the auspicious of Great Britain’s representative Earl John F. Westmoreland to 
discuss the possible terms for a new armistice and final peace.45 By mid-June, the Prussian 
government had made a proposal that would have left Schleswig independent. The plan appealed 
to the Danish representative, who immediately dispatched his secretary, Mr. von Quaade, to 
Copenhagen to present it.46 
The biggest problem was Prussia’s insistence on coupling the ceasefire with an 
agreement on preliminary peace terms. When the Danes provided terms, Prussia found them 
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unacceptable.47 However, on July 8, two days after the siege of Fredericia ended, both ministers 
worked out a deal, with Westmoreland overseeing negotiations. Prussia accepted the fact that 
Holstein and Schleswig were not connected. Thus, the main reason for the conflict was discarded 
and the door opened for future peace talks.48 However, while the Danes were allowed to retain 
troops on Alsen/Als and Aero/Ærø, the Germans had to withdraw their troops and officers from 
the duchies.49 Overall, the deal looked like a sell out.50 Schleiden had harsh words for this 
ceasefire agreement. He suspected that Prussia wished to withdraw from the conflict altogether, 
leaving the duchies to standalone.51 Antagonism toward Prussia was building, but since a 
continuation of the war in defiance of the ceasefire was impossible, the duchies had to accept the 
terms.52 
Since the duchies had been unaware of the dealings between Prussia and Denmark, the 
news of the ceasefire “hit like a lightning out of the blue” in the duchies. Prussia had completely 
misled the duchies’ representatives in Berlin. On July 12, Freiherr Otto Theodor von Manteuffel 
officially notified the government of the duchies of the ceasefire. All attempts to renegotiate its 
terms came to nothing.53 Especially offensive was the fact that pro-Danish Swedish troops would 
be stationed in northern Schleswig to enforce the ceasefire.54 The separatists were losing 
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influence among the German states, which desired a return to normalcy and end of revolutionary 
upheaval. 
On July 24, the retreat of the German troops started, and all attempts to convince the 
officers, commanding general, and soldiers to remain failed.55 The nationalists were angry, and 
many of them would long remember this “desertion.” In his memoirs, Schleiden commented that 
he hoped history would condemn General von Bonin for abandoning the duchies in their moment 
of greatest trial and need.56 Seeing the troops depart had a negative impact on the morale of the 
duchies. People started to think about leaving their homes. Kammerherr Lucius Carl von 
Neergaard-Oevelgönne confessed to Schleiden that the ceasefire decision had robbed him of all 
hope for future victory and that he intended to leave. Schleiden admitted that he, too, was 
thinking about flight, but not if he appeared to be “running away from a breach.”57 As a 
nationalist, Schleiden would stand with the duchies until the very end. 
With Schleswig neutralized, the government had to evacuate the duchy. Faced with the 
situation, the radicals started to mount their first major attack on the Statthalterschaft. 
Olshausen’s radicals suggested that south Schleswig should not be abandoned. Since such 
defiance would mean war, the Statthalterschaft countered the radicals’ demands by threatening to 
resign if the radicals prevailed.58 The radicals failed to realize that all of Europe had turned 
against them and that the ceasefire was the only thing that kept the Statthalterschaft, and thus the 
nominal independence Schleswig-Holstein, alive. 
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As if the Statthalterschaft had not already enough problems, the radical challenged 
continued after the election for a new legislative body. Claussen, who had only recently returned 
from Stuttgart and the Rumpfparliament, won a seat in the new diet, which held its first meeting 
on August 10, 1849.59 The radicals immediately addressed the military defeat, which they 
blamed on the war ministry. Claussen proposed an investigation into its alleged 
mismanagement,60 although he was soon under attack because other members of the diet 
believed his suggestions were politically, not militarily, motivated.61 In fact, Claussen’s real 
target was the chaotic political system in the duchies, which he blamed on the war minister, Carl 
Friedrich Jacobsen. Other radical representatives, including Hedde, endorsed Claussen’s 
position. Claussen’s old nemesis Lempfert countered that to blame one person in the small, 
weak, and dependent duchies was unrealistic. The duchies, on their own, could do nothing 
against Russian and British pressure.62 Considering the events in other parts of Europe at the 
time, it was easy to challenge Claussen’s political views.63 In the end, the majority prevented his 
proposal from going through.64 The radicals had finally come out of hiding and attacked the 
political system of the duchies. At the most trying time, when political infighting was the last 
thing the duchies needed, radicals like Olshausen and Claussen not only suggested a detrimental 
continuation of the war, but also sought major political changes. 
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On August 10, a representative from Saxony, Mr. von Bonin, arrived in Schleswig to 
assume administrative authority in the duchy of Schleswig. He would be complemented by a 
Danish counterpart. Bonin explained that there was no intention to create a separate 
administration for Schleswig. The two officials were to govern the duchy in the same way it had 
been governed thus far. They were to do so in the name of the king of Denmark, but in his role as 
duke of Schleswig.65 Unfortunately, the new commission was unable to overcome all suspicions, 
and their official announcements did not make clear that they governed in the name of the duke 
and not king.66 It was not until late August that the administrators assumed their official duties.67 
The creation of a new government for Schleswig raised the question of what the 
Statthalterschaft should do. They could, like the radicals suggested, openly resist, but that would 
have been suicidal. Neither could they remain in Schleswig. They decided to move the seat of 
government to Kiel.68 After the previous confrontation with the radicals, their new challenge to 
this change came as no surprise. Among the leading voices against the decision to leave 
Schleswig were again those on the political left, although for the moment, they remained unable 
to force their program. Olshausen and most of his followers temporarily accepted defeat.69 
National liberals, such as Schleiden, were sad that the situation had deteriorated to such a degree. 
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Schleiden was unsure if he would ever see Schleswig again. To his diary he confessed, “The 
future lay so dark ahead that it was impossible to tell what the next few days would bring.”70 
Despite the hope that many of the local officials would remain loyal to the 
Statthalterschaft, many of them accepted the new situation and worked with the new commission 
for the best of the duchy.71 The future prospects for the separatists looked bad; Denmark had 
reasserted control in Schleswig without any checks by German authorities. The changes 
implemented included for the first time instructions to officials in northern Schleswig written in 
Danish, rather than in the official language of German.72 The disagreements between the 
commission in Schleswig and the Statthalterschaft continued for quite some time. 
The Statthalterschaft appealed to the Prussians for assistance, but their requests were 
dismissed. To Prussia, no further changes were necessary. Even more, the Prussians suggested 
that a strongly worded proclamation by the Statthalterschaft could end the resistance in 
Schleswig and help restore peace in the region.73 Violence and mob actions made it difficult for 
the commission to control Schleswig.74 The Statthalterschaft even encouraged civil 
disobedience, such as telling people to mail letters to Holstein without postage to insure postage 
was paid to the authorities in Holstein and not Schleswig.75 These actions left their mark. By 
early October, the Prussian authorities were clearly siding with the commission in Schleswig and 
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thus the Danes. Pressure on the Statthalterschaft to make a clear declaration concerning 
Schleswig increased.76 The separatists had lost their most important supporter and were left 
alone in their struggle for independence. 
On November 1, 1849, the diet of the two duchies reassembled. This was another 
opportunity for the radicals to voice their opinions. Unhappy with the situation, the diet increased 
its pressure on the Statthalterschaft to do something about the “anarchical” situation in Schleswig 
and the “violent rule” there.77 During the session, a series of petitions arrived. All of them called 
for an end to foreign rule in Schleswig and indicated the willingness of the petitioners to resume 
the war if an honorable peace was impossible, even if that meant fighting Denmark alone. Since 
these were arguments close to the radicals’ line of thought, Schleiden wondered if the opinions 
voiced in the petitions reflected the people’s will. The Statthalterschaft was in the precarious 
position of addressing these questions and avoiding war.78 Under pressure, it prepared for war.79 
The third phase of the first Schleswig-Holstein war was coming closer. 
As a result of the violent spirit in the diet and the precarious military situation, the 
Statthalterschaft decided to engage in direct negotiations with the Danish monarchy.80 Since the 
official peace negotiations had not yet commenced, the Statthalterschaft suggested that the king 
appoint prominent members of both states to find solutions to their conflict.81 The offer was 
well-received in Copenhagen and greeted as a sign of change. While the Danes were willing to 
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engage in direct negotiations, they would only accept one location, the royal palace in 
Copenhagen. They also explained that the negotiations with Prussia would not be delayed.82 In 
the interested of peace, Graf Otto zu Rantzau, Friedrich Mommsen, and Christian M. Steindorff 
went to Copenhagen.83 
While the duchies awaited the response from Copenhagen, the Prussian negotiator, Karl 
Georg Ludwig Guido Graf von Usedom, was on his way to the duchies for an inspection. Since 
Schleiden had been personally acquainted with von Usedom, the Statthalterschaft asked him to 
meet with the Prussian and impress upon him the duchies’ viewpoints. Schleiden claimed in his 
memoir that he staged his meeting to make it look like a coincidence. He had two lengthy 
conversations with the Prussian representative. They discussed how Schleswig should be 
governed in the future, the possibility of dividing Schleswig, and the independence of the 
duchies. However, von Usedom warned that a failure of the negotiations could leave the duchies 
isolated in their fight against Denmark. Even worse, the German Bund might be forced occupy 
Holstein under a federal execution. He was concerned that a failure could bring war and inquired 
in detail about the military capabilities of the duchies.84 
Despite the temporary optimism for a peaceful reconciliation, the hope was smashed by 
mid-January 1850. The three representatives in Copenhagen were unable to gain access to the 
king. The impasse between the two sides remained.85 With the three-man commission on its way 
back to Holstein, people asked if Denmark had only given the impression of desiring peace in 
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order to avoid an attack by the duchies during the winter.86 In any event, both sides again 
prepared for conflict. Denmark appointed a new commanding officer for Jutland and issued a 
call to arms for all men of military age, even in Schleswig.87 
Meanwhile, peace negotiations resumed in Berlin. Usedom’s sickness had delayed the 
start, as did the insistence by the Danish representatives, Friedrich Christian Ferdinand 
Rigsfriherre von Pechlin, von Reedtz, and Ludvig Nicolaus von Scheele, that Prussia should also 
have authority to negotiate for the German Bund.88 The Bund, which had resumed its power in 
late December 1849, quickly granted Prussia the necessary authority. However, progress 
remained slow as the end of the six months armistice approached in mid-February.89 In Great 
Britain, Lord Palmerston suggested a renewal of the ceasefire for another six months, which was 
rejected by Prussia.90 As a result, attention focused on the men in Berlin and their work. The 
duchies were completely shut out of the discussion surrounding their fate and future. 
While negotiations for peace continued in Berlin, the diet of the duchies debated the new 
budget and the situation in Schleswig. The radicals around Claussen and Olshausen again were 
defeated when they suggested legal reforms. Frustrated by their impotency, Olshausen called on 
his supporters to abstain from other votes, which would have immobilized the Statthalterschaft 
and resulted in its collapse. The delaying tactic was, nonetheless, unsuccessful, and still other 
radical suggestions debated in the diet, including the invitation of foreign officers to serve in the 
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army of the duchies and the immediate reoccupation of Schleswig, were rejected.91 The radicals, 
in their stubborn insistence on reform, endangered the government of the duchies and, with it, the 
future of the separatist movement. 
During this political in fight in the duchies, Schleiden embarked on another diplomatic 
mission, this one more complicated than any of his previous ventures. Schleiden had become 
interested in French opinion and its opposition to the cause of the duchies. Inquisitive as always, 
he investigated the historical relations between France and Schleswig-Holstein. As a result of his 
research, the Statthalterschaft decided to send him to Paris and stimulate support for their 
cause.92 Schleiden was under no illusion about gaining French support, but he was willing to do 
his best to change French public opinion.93 As it turned out, France, preoccupied with the rise of 
Louis Napoleon and the Roman Republic, was not a major player in the first Schleswig-Holstein 
war.94 Nevertheless, Schleiden had some major obstacles to overcome. 
Schleiden did not initially use the press in Paris to achieve his goals, but relied instead on 
pamphleteering. His first pamphlet, “L’Intérêst de la France dans la Question du Schleswig-
Holstein,” appeared in early April 1850. An official meeting with Louis Napoleon or a member 
of his cabinet was not possible because the Danish minister had blocked access.95 However, the 
pamphlet did open some doors for Schleiden, and he was able to meet with such influential 
Frenchmen as François Pierre Guillaume Guizot, Alphonse Marie Louis de Prat de Lamartine, 
and Marie Joseph Louis Adolphe Thiers. Despite the political setback, Schleiden continued to 
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oversee the translation and publication of other important works on the Schleswig-Holstein 
question, including books by Johann Gustav Droysen and Karl Samwer.96 
On the newspaper front, Schleiden found it difficult to locate a respectable paper that did 
not support the Danes until, on May 1, 1850, he was able to work out a contract with the 
Orleanist Assemblee Nationale and Courrier Français. For 3000 francs, he could publish four 
major articles on the duchies each month, daily news reports, and other small references to 
events in Schleswig-Holstein. The first article so infuriated the Danish minister that he went 
personally to the editors to complain.97 The newspapers would not win French help, but they 
were another noble effort to reverse the fortune of Schleswig-Holstein. Schleiden’s ability as a 
diplomat had again borne fruit, but it remained to be seen if the efforts would make any 
difference in the outcome of the first Schleswig-Holstein war. 
While Schleiden was away in Paris, Prussia warned the Statthalterschaft that a 
reoccupation of Schleswig would be an act of war.98 The Statthalterschaft faced additional 
problems with an inadequate military budget that made conducting a war nearly impossible. The 
diet was overwhelmingly in support of intervention in Schleswig but unaware of the disastrous 
consequences such an intervention would bring.99 The radical left, meanwhile, insisted on 
intervention. Eventually, after two unsuccessful attempts, the Statthalterschaft was able on April 
4 to get some funds for the military, but the relationship between diet and government was at a 
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low point.100 With the radical challenges to its authority, the governing of the duchies had 
become so difficult that a collapse of the government was possible. 
In mid-April, a new attempt to communicate directly with Denmark was made. On April 
18, Ernst Graf von Reventlow-Farve, Ludwig Gustav Heinzelmann, and Friedrich Christian 
Prehn arrived in Copenhagen to talk with the king. As part of the new offer, the Statthalterschaft 
gave up its demand to incorporate Schleswig into the German Bund. It was even willing to 
accept the status quo ante-bellum.101 However, the three representatives encountered intense 
hostility in Copenhagen and mistrust toward the Statthalterschaft. The Danes would not even 
engage in official negotiations, although they let it be known that at the very least, the 
Statthalterschaft had to reduce its army and stay out of southern Schleswig. The new peace 
mission failed.102 The separatist demand for an independent Schleswig-Holstein would be settled 
on the battlefield and not with diplomacy. 
In face of such foreign resistance and domestic pressure, the Statthalterschaft buckled. In 
late May, the minister for foreign affairs, von Harbou, resigned. Francke succeeded him. 
Schleiden was sad to see von Harbou depart.103 He had worked under both men and thought 
Francke’s foreign policy was disastrous.104 By this point, the duchies had few choices left, in 
terms of either personnel or policy. The separatists were isolated. 
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Left to fend for themselves, the duchies decided to go to war against Denmark for a third 
time, this time, however, without German support.105 By July 18, the Statthalterschaft had news 
that Danish troops had crossed the border into Schleswig. They occupied Flensburg the 
following day.106 The army of the duchies moved out to meet them. At the Battle of Idstedt, the 
largest land battle in the Nordic countries,107 on July 25, Schleswig-Holstein’s army suffered a 
resounding defeat. The commanding general withdrew to Rendsburg.108 The army of the duchies 
was falling apart. General Karl Wilhelm Freiherr von Willisen was unsure if he would be able to 
defend Kiel, the seat of government.109 However, the Danish army did not intend to attack or 
invade Holstein, but only wait for the enemy to strike them. Willisen obliged with small, badly 
managed excursions against Mysunde and Friedrichstadt. As a result of the three defeats, 
Willisen resigned, to be replaced by General Ulrich Angelbert Freiherr von den Horst.110 The 
duchies had failed dismally against the Danes, and their separatist attempt to bring independence 
to the duchies was all but lost by August 1850. 
With the deteriorating military situation, diplomatic support was more important than 
ever before.111 The duchies again looked to Berlin and debated who to send as diplomatic 
representative. In late September, Francke suggested that Schleiden should return to Berlin and 
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take over from Liliencron. Knowing that he and Schleinitz did not get along, Schleiden doubted 
that he would be able to accomplish much, but he did accept the assignment.112 Schleiden was 
pragmatic enough to understand that the game was lost, but he was unwilling to let down his 
homeland in its hour of greatest need. 
On October 12, 1850, Schleiden departed Kiel for another tour of the German capitals to 
gather last minute support. He was to visit Frankfurt, Brussels, and Paris.113 However, when he 
was unable to contact the British representative Henry Richard Charles Wellesley, Earl Cowley 
in Frankfurt, Schleiden decided to returned to Kiel.114 In November and December, he went once 
more to Hanover and Braunschweig to ask that Austrian troops be prevented from crossing 
through their territory, a concession that would have delayed the Austrian occupation of Holstein 
under the authority of the Bund.115 His mission failed. The defeat on the battlefield had made 
diplomatic measures useless, and it became necessary to find a graceful and honorable way to 
end the struggle.116 
The German states were moving to put the regrettable Schleswig-Holstein episode behind 
them and restore peace to Jutland. On November 6, Schleiden confessed the latest rumors to his 
diary: the Prussian troops in Holstein would soon be replaced by Austrian soldiers under the 
authority of the Bund. Schleiden was ashamed of the Prussian weakness.117 The two German 
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powers and the Bund had agreed on a new commission for Holstein.118 On January 6, 1851, 
General Wilhelm von Thümen and General Alexander Graf von Mensdorff arrived and prepared 
to take over the government.119 In the meeting between the two commissioners and the 
Statthalterschaft, in which Francke as minister for foreign affairs and Schleiden participated, the 
commissioners made the mistake of urging the Statthalterschaft to ask the people to disband the 
army. The wording of their request gave the impression that the people had risen up against their 
lord. The Statthalterschaft immediately corrected the commissioner by insisting that they had 
rebelled against Denmark, not their duke.120 The separatists were still concerned about the legacy 
of their cause and clothed it in national terms to give the impression of legitimacy. 
A short time after the federal commissioners took over in the duchies, the Austrian troops 
authorized by the federal execution approached Holstein. For a short time, the Statthalterschaft 
had contemplated a two-front war against the Danes and the German troops. However, with 
victory against the Danes unlikely, and most of the officers reluctant to engage the Austrian, 
Prussian, or other German troops, all resistance died.121 On February 1, 1851, the 
Statthalterschaft announced to the people of the duchies that it had handed over the powers of 
government to the commission of the German Bund.122 The first Schleswig-Holstein war was 
over, or almost. 
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Following the end of Holstein’s occupation by Austrian troops,123 new negotiations 
commenced in London involving the European principle powers. These negotiations culminated 
in the Protocol of London of 1852, signed by Prussia, Great Britain, Denmark, Sweden, and 
Russia, Denmark. In the protocol, Denmark promised to maintain Schleswig’s independence. 
Unfortunately, this return to the status quo ante-bellum was to nobody’s liking, and it only 
increased the bitterness on both sides of the nationality divide. In addition, the Augustenburg 
pretenders were formally but inadequately removed from the succession question. A door for 
future claims by the family remained open. The Schleswig-Holstein question was not solved, but 
the conflict surrounding the duchies had temporarily ended. 
The second and third phase of the first Schleswig-Holstein war had offered more 
opportunities for Schleiden to test his diplomatic skills. However, in coming up against the 
foreign political power pressure on Prussia, there was little even a man with Schleiden’s skills 
could accomplish. Dissatisfied with the lack of success, Schleiden returned to his civil service 
job in the administration of the duchies, although, as before, he would continue to be used for 
temporary diplomatic assignments. 
Meanwhile, the radicals around Olshausen and Claussen openly challenged the politics of 
the Statthalterschaft, and some of their reform and policy suggestions made it difficult for the 
Statthalterschaft to conduct the war. They were more than willing to wage war against both the 
German and Danish armies. The pressure exerted by the European powers, the unprepared state 
of the army of the duchies, and the diplomatic isolation of the duchies doomed the separatist-
nationalist experiment. 
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It was a turbulent half century in the duchies of Schleswig-Holstein and for the three men 
featured in this part of the story. They had gained valuable experiences, learned important 
lessons, and formulated their political and personal views as they and their homeland suffered 
under oppressive Danish policies that violated the independence and constitutional rights of the 
duchies. Olshausen had early on come into conflict with the law and the reactionary governments 
and experienced exile and repression. He had become a radial nationalist, and over time, he was 
ready not only to take his homeland out of the Danish purview, but also to fight anyone who 
stood in the way of a democratic, independent Schleswig-Holstein. Claussen was less radical 
than Olshausen but not far behind him. While he had fewer conflicts with the law, he had 
experienced the encrusted administration. As a worshiper of the democratic system of the United 
States, Claussen was a radical who never failed to promote his ideas. As well, he gained valuable 
parliamentary experience in two legislative bodies. However like Olshausen, he was also ready 
to fight for the independence of a democratic homeland. Both men had taken their radicalism to a 
higher level in the course of the first Schleswig-Holstein war, when they opposed the 
government and were even willing to risk its demise in the face of a growing number of foreign 
enemies. Moreover, Olshausen and Claussen would maintain their radical, separatist views, even 
after their defeat in the duchies. 
In contrast to these two radicals was the much more moderate but no less separatist-
minded Schleiden. Having early in his life experienced the unfair Danish policies toward its 
German subjects, Schleiden, nevertheless, returned to Holstein and a Danish civil service career. 
He continued to see Danish oppression and worked against it whenever his work in the commerz 
collegium in Copenhagen allowed him to do so. Transformed from a Danish civil servant, he 
became a revolutionary diplomat in 1848 and made every effort to assist his home country in 
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gaining much needed foreign support. However, despite his abilities and resilience, Schleiden 
could do little when faced with the combined opposition of Great Britain, Russia, and Sweden, 
and with the European and Austrian pressure on Prussia to end its embrace of revolutionary 
ideas. 
All three men had been strong-minded separatist-nationalists; they had fought against 
Danish oppression and constitutional challenges. With the defeat of their cause, they searched for 
new opportunities, and all three turned to the United States. While the Schleswig-Holstein 
question temporarily moved into the background of European politics, overshadowed by the 
Crimean War and Italian unification, the three men’s experiences in the United States would tell 
much about the legacies they carried with them. At heart, they would always be separatist 
nationalists from Schleswig-Holstein. 
106 
 
Chapter Five 
No Amnesty and Uncertain Future 
When in February 1851, the Statthalterschaft handed over power to the German 
representatives in Holstein, the first Schleswig-Holstein war ended. The failed revolutionaries 
faced a bleak future. They were traitors to the Danish state and could face prosecution and, like 
some Hungarians, end up in front of firing squads. Many searched for a new home. Some went to 
other German states, some went into temporary exile in London, and some embarked on the long 
crossing of the Atlantic. In the baggage of those who crossed to the United States were the ideas 
they had stood for in Schleswig-Holstein, namely, radicalism, liberalism, nationalism, and 
secessionism. They entered a heated arena of sectional conflict when they arrived after 1851, and 
they would play a role in the escalation of the sectional tension while also posing challenges to 
the government at a time of crisis. The next four chapters are devoted to the experiences of 
Claussen, Olshausen, and Schleiden in the United States and their unique and vastly different 
experiences there. This chapter will briefly chronicle their migration to and early impressions of 
the United States. 
In April 1852, the Danes announced the names of twenty-two men not included in the 
armistice granted to Holstein rebels. The list was the who-is-who of the Schleswig-Holstein 
uprising. First were the Fürst Christian Carl Frederik August von Schleswig-Holstein-
Sonderburg-Augustenburg and Prinz Friedrich Emil August von Schleswig-Holstein-
Sonderburg-Augustenburg. Next came all the prominent members of the Schleswig-Holstein 
government, including Wilhelm Hartwig Beseler, Friedrich Graf von Reventlow-Preetz, M. 
Andreas Paul Adolph von Harbou, Georg Friedrich von Krogh, Karl Philipp Francke, Freiherr 
Friedrich Nicolaus, and Adam Ludwig von Liliencron. Lesser political figures on the list 
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included Theodor Olshausen, Rudolph Schleiden, and Hans Reimer Claussen.1 As a result, these 
twenty-two men would join an array of lesser leaders and economic migrants in exile. Some of 
them had already, during the conflict, chosen to leave the embattled duchies, but all had to make 
difficult decisions regarding their future.2 
Theodor Olshausen had experience with political exile. He had already, following the 
Danish investigation in the Burschenschaft in Jena, sough refugee in Paris, Switzerland, and in 
the south German states. Therefore, he was much better prepared than many of his countrymen 
for the difficult transition to exile. Olshausen was the first of the three principals in this story to 
leave Europe. Apparently, he had wanted to leave with Claussen, but that idea did not work out 
for some unknown reason.3 On July 14, Olshausen boarded a ship in Hamburg bound that night 
for New York. His departure was kept secret in order to prevent a last minute arrest. Even a letter 
to his brother announcing his departure was cryptic.4 For the second time in his life, Olshausen 
was running from the authorities. Upon reaching New York, he decided to leave the city and 
move west. 
Little is known of why he settled in St. Louis, Missouri, but the presence of a large 
German population, among them many Forty-Eighters, likely contributed to the decision to 
remain in the town on the Mississippi. Olshausen had, like many liberals, read about the United 
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States. Four months after his arrival, he had come to realize that most of the travel reports had 
been accurate. The people in the East, Olshausen wrote, were preoccupied with “material 
interests and a puritanical way of life.” In the new territories of the West, he observed a more 
welcoming atmosphere.5 
St. Louis felt like home to Olshausen, due to its large German population. He estimated 
that about half the city was German-born. As other parts of the country, the German-Americans 
immigrants and native residents were at odds with one another. Even after four years in the 
United States, Olshausen still mused about the informal separation between Germans and the 
native population. He divided the natives into two distinct groups, either dignified and formal or 
nasty and rude.6 A side effect of the large German population in St. Louis was that Olshausen 
was able to communicate in his native tongue. He did not seem happy about that since its 
prevented him from improving his spoken English. Professionally, Olshausen wondered what he 
could do for a living. Temporarily, he decided to write a series of books about the geography, 
economics, and culture of the United States for the German immigrant market.7 
Like many travelers to the United States, Olshausen was impressed by his new home 
country. He was appalled by how easily and frequently accidents happened. Somebody could be 
crushed by a train with no measure taken to improve safety. In other parts of the country, people 
faced lynch justice instead of a regular court. Regardless, Olshausen believed that the freedom, 
security, and openness of life in the United States made it superior to Europe.8 Olshausen 
certainly had his own experiences. Never subjected to lynching, Olshausen was one of only a 
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few uninjured survivors when a newly-constructed railroad bridge collapsed on the opening run.9 
Despite its many drawbacks, Olshausen still perceived the United States a better place. 
Another thing to which Olshausen and others had difficulty adjusting was the oppressive 
summer heat in America. He frequently and at length complained about the high temperatures. 
The twenty degree Celsius difference during the day were startling and he noted that the 
thermostat could climb as high as thirty degrees. As a result, Olshausen required at least three to 
four suits a day. Interestingly, the heat did not seem to depress his spirit.10 Overall, Olshausen 
adjusted well to his new situation in the United States. 
In St. Louis, Olshausen was soon joined by friend and fellow radical revolutionary Hans 
R. Claussen and his family. It is unknown when Claussen arrived in the United States. He must 
have reached the country shortly after Olshausen, and like him, went first to St. Louis. However, 
Claussen did not find the opportunities in that city to his liking.11 From the start, he worked hard 
to get acquainted with his new home. He spent much time learning the language and studying the 
legal and constitutional system of the United States. His studies strained the family’s finances. 
Claussen could not earn a sufficient income. He was not happy about this inability to provide for 
his family, but he considered it a necessary evil. In contrast to Olshausen, who seems to have 
accepted St. Louis as a permanent residence, Claussen intended to stay only briefly in the city. 
He visited Illinois and other neighboring states before deciding to settle in Iowa. Building on his 
background in law, Claussen took up residence in Davenport, first as a farmer, later, and more 
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successfully, as a notary public.12 
Since Davenport had been the destination of many immigrants from Holstein, Claussen 
likely found a number of familiar faces, or at least people who knew of him as a radical leader in 
the duchies, and so brought their business to him. Claussen estimated that well over forty percent 
of the population of Davenport was German, and they would need a notary for contracts and 
other legal documents. After only about two month in business, Claussen was very satisfied with 
the income. He claimed that he and his family would have a good life if business continued as it 
had done. It certainly helped that his partner, a Mr. Corbie, was also a respected member of the 
community.13 However, in 1855, Claussen, for unknown reasons, left Davenport for Lyon, where 
he became involved in a corn milling business.14 His agricultural roots had returned in this new 
world environment. 
Even though Claussen seems to have adjusted well to life in the United States and his 
new occupation, he still loathed his European lifestyle. As a result, he seemed rather 
unimpressed by the architectural and construction styles of the United States, and decided that 
his family’s house would be constructed in a European style. He could rely on European 
expertise for its construction since there was a large immigrant population. Claussen selected 
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what he claimed to be a beautiful location on high ground overlooking the Mississippi River, but 
it is unclear, whether, the house was ever built.15 Nevertheless, Claussen, like many exiled 
revolutionaries, was still more European than American. 
Having arrived in the United States at the time of the 1852 presidential election 
campaign, Claussen witnessed the American political system, which he so admired, at first hand. 
He was fortunate to see various speakers in person. Most impressive to him was the civilized 
manner in which political debates were conducted. Audiences even granted the opposition 
speaker the benefit of the doubt. Initially, Claussen was drawn to the Democratic party, which 
presented itself to immigrants as the party of progress while stigmatizing the Whigs as 
conservative, even reactionary. Most impressive to Claussen were the possibilities for personal 
success offered by a constitutional and democratic system. He wrote of Stephen Douglas, “In 
Europe, he would have made it only to a good mastercraftsmen, but here he has the bright future 
of one day being an equal of a crowned head, he might even be able to crush them to dust. Here 
you see the power of a constitution, which fosters the development of strength and does not 
hinder it.”16 
Of the three men, Schleiden was an exception in many respects. Only he had previous 
personal contact with the Atlantic world, if only indirectly. His father and brother Emil had 
worked in Mexico, and his brother had taken up residence there in 1850. His two sisters and 
mother, to whom Schleiden was very close, created a strong bound that would not allow him 
permanently to leave the European continent.17 Still, after 1851, Schleiden, too, searched for new 
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opportunities and relied on his first Schleswig-Holstein war experiences in diplomacy to find 
them. 
Schleiden looked to Bremen for a possible diplomatic assignment. Two months after the 
amnesty proclamation, on June 8, 1852, he visited Bremen and made contact with the governing 
oligarchy, some of whom, Arnold Duckwitz and Johann Smidt, he knew from his days in 
Frankfurt. While unsuccessful in his quest, he intended to return in the fall to continue lobbying 
for a foreign post.18 Meantime, Schleiden returned to his sister’s residence at Nette-Hammer, 
where he read about Bremen’s trade, politics, and international relations in order to prepare for 
any opportunity.19 Also eager to know more about the economy and politics of the United States, 
Schleiden devoured issues of the Economist.20 
Bremen’s trade with the United States had grown over the past decades, to such an extend 
that about a quarter of Bremen’s trade went or came from the United States. Because of these 
trade interests, a desire for better communication, and a perception that the Prussian 
representative in Washington could no longer adequately represent Bremen the city 
contemplated sending a representative of its own. There was also a need to support the often 
unreliable merchant-consuls. 
A candidate for public office always had to be cautious. While continuing to lobby for a 
diplomatic position, Schleiden wrote newspaper articles for various North German newspapers, 
among them the Hamburger Nachrichten and the Weserzeitung. Most of his articles dealt with 
recent events in Europe. In February 1853, Duckwitz warned Schleiden that he needed to be 
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careful. It was well-known that Prussia had an espionage group in Bremen, and Denmark still 
wanted Schleiden in prison. Duckwitz warned that if the Berlin government filed a complaint 
against him, the Senate of Bremen would not to approve his appointment.21 
Meanwhile, Schleiden’s friends and acquaintances started the bureaucratic work to create 
a new position for him in Washington. On February 22, Gröning informed Schleiden that 
Kulenkampff, a wealthy merchant and senator, had requested that the senate debate subject.22 
The next day, Schleiden learned that the senate would, indeed discuss the issue that evening. In 
the afternoon, shrewd politician that he was, Schleiden went to Smidt, who would preside over 
that evening’s debate. Smidt asked Schleiden if he was still interested in the position.23 Schleiden 
reiterates his interest in the post. 
On March 11, the senate agreed to the creation of a new mission. That evening, Duckwitz 
informed Schleiden that the committee of foreign affairs had decided to recommend Schleiden 
for the mission to Washington. The senate of Bremen unanimously confirmed his appointment 
on April 4. Schleiden rejoiced. The mission would not start immediately. The senate wanted 
Schleiden to read and master the documents related to his post before leaving for Washington.24 
The next day, after meeting Smidt, Schleiden accompanied him to the senate archives and started 
to look through what he described as mountains of documents. Of special interest to Schleiden 
were documents related to the negotiations on steamship lines, with which his predecessors, 
Rumpff and Gevekohl, had been involved.25 
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Smidt told Schleiden that he would receive $4,000, a thousand dollars more than the 
previous temporary envoy.26 That was peanuts compared with the salaries of the other 
representative at Washington but a substantial salary for Bremen.27 However, there remained the 
issue of citizenship, since Schleiden needed to be a citizen of Bremen in order to assume the 
post. On the evening of the following day, Smidt moved that the senate confer Bremen 
citizenship on Schleiden, which was done.28 His appointment secured, Schleiden was ready to 
depart. As things turned out, he would be the first and last permanent minister resident of the 
Hanseatic City of Bremen in Washington, D.C. 
In late April, Schleiden delayed his departure in order to better familiarize himself with 
the bureaucracy he would encounter.29 He met with the U.S. consul in Bremen, Ralph King, 
which was Schleiden’s first exposure to the spoken English language.30 These meetings would 
soon become a daily routine for him in Washington. Having departed from Liverpool, Schleiden 
reached New York on June 21, 1853. His first impression of the city was not favorable. The 
temperature was hot, and he was kept waiting in the summer sun for two hours before being 
allowed to leave the docks. The first thing he did upon reaching his hotel was to bath and change 
into lighter summer clothes. Workaholic that he was, he then started to look into the steamship 
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line to Bremen. He also met with the Prussian consul-general, Johann Wilhelm Schmidt. 
Schleiden wondered if Schmidt’s vanity could be put to good use for Bremen’s purpose. All the 
while, he continued to complain about the temperatures, which for him were depressingly hot. 
The high humidity only increased his suffering.31 
On June 28, a week after his arrival, Schleiden was on his way to Washington. He could 
not help but think of his father’s grave in Mexico, which was closer than ever but a visit had to 
wait another four years. For the moment, his diplomatic work had priority.32 Spending a day in 
Baltimore, Schleiden met with the consul general of Bremen, Albert Schumacher. He inquired 
about the people with whom he would deal in Washington, especially the Prussian minister, 
Friedrich Karl Joseph Freiherr von Gerolt, Assistant Secretary of State A. Dudley Mann, and 
First Assistant Postmaster General Selah R. Hobbie.33 
On June 30, 1853, Schleiden arrived in Washington by train from Baltimore. He intended 
to stay at Willard’s Hotel, to where he had directed his mail, but finding it closed, took lodgings 
in the National Hotel. He went that same day to meet with Gerolt at his residence in Georgetown. 
Unfortunately, the Prussian minister was not at home, but his wife invited Schleiden for dinner 
that evening. In the interim, Schleiden stopped at the State Department to meet with Mann, who 
had been consul in Bremen from 1842 to 1847.34 
On the following day, Schleiden again visited Gerolt and went with himto the Capitol. 
Schleiden was impressed and wrote prophetically, “I will probably visit this proud building many 
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times in the future.” 35 On the next day, he returned to the State Department where he was 
introduced to Secretary of State William L. Marcy. The meeting was cut short when President 
Franklin Pierce walked in to inquire about a cabinet meeting later that day.  From there, 
Schleiden went to Attorney General Caleb Cushing. He was again warmly welcomed, in no 
small part because of his letters of introduction and greetings from Friedrich von Rönne, the 
temporary all-German minister to the United States between 1848 and 1849. Schleiden also went 
to the General Post Office to talk with First Assistant Postmaster General Hobbie. The two men 
discussed the idea of a new postal treaty and the possibility of a contract for a steamship line 
between the United States and Bremen. 36 Schleiden’s work had started. He had transitioned 
from a stateless former revolutionary diplomat to a respectable diplomat. 
What is striking is that after only a week in the country, Schleiden was already aware and 
critical of the political corruption in the United States. He wrote, almost in disillusionment, “It is 
not all gold that shines.” 37 Further disillusionment set in when he encountered the rude manners 
of some government officials. He was appalled that the postmaster general and the secretary of 
state propped their feet up on their desks while talking with him. When Schleiden vented about 
this inappropriate behavior to a fellow diplomat, the minister of Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and 
Honduras, Luis Molina, he was told that it was normal behavior. Molina told Schleiden that in a 
recent interview Secretary of State Marcy had appeared to pay no attention to him, although he 
later acted according to Molina’s wishes.38 The well-mannered European gentleman had 
difficulty fitting in with rude Yankees 
                                                 
35 July 1, 1853, p 287, book 15, LBSH. 
36 July 2, 1853, p 288, book 15, LBSH. 
37 June 29, 1853, p 285, book 15, LBSH. 
 117 
And so all three Schleswig-Holsteiners, forced from their homeland for participating in 
the recent uprising, had arrived in the United States. While Olshausen was the first to arrive, he 
was slow to settle down. His temporary home in St. Louis offered him a chance to acclimatize 
and to earn some money writing books. Claussen was quick to adjust and integrate into his new 
home. He shifted between his agricultural family roots and his legal education. In the first three 
years after his arrival, his only interest in politics was to observe U.S. democracy, which he so 
admired. Schleiden continued to built on his experience as diplomat and the connections he had 
made in Frankfurt to obtain a diplomatic post in Washington. Bremen had picked an able man 
who had experience in wartime diplomacy. While all three men took issues with aspects of 
American life, they had settled in rather well by the  end of their first year. The biggest 
challenges were still to come in a country where competing nationalism and sectional differences 
centered around the institution of slavery and its territorial expansion. 
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Chapter Six 
Schleswig-Holsteiner in the Antebellum United States 
The three Schleswig-Holstein revolutionaries entered a United States torn by sectional 
tensions. The competing nationalism of North and South exasperated the conflict over the 
expansion of slavery and increasingly made compromise impossible. While both sides 
complained about the impossibility of being able to have a civilized discussion with the other, 
the South increasingly believed that it suffered under an oppressive northern political desire to 
alter the southern way of life. While the language used by southerners to describe the oppression 
mirrored that of the nationalists in Schleswig-Holstein, the newcomers from Europe had little 
sympathy for the slave-holding South. Instead, like many Forty-Eighters, the secessionist-
nationalists from Schleswig-Holstein were just as ready to stand against the secessionists of the 
South. 
In the antebellum years, Olshausen rediscovered his professional calling and returned to 
his own roots as a newspaper editor. His work in Davenport, Iowa, and St. Louis, like the work 
of many Forty-Eighters, contributed, with its anti-slavery language, to the escalation of sectional 
tensions. After his legal and agricultural experiences, Claussen, in the latter part of the 1850s, 
returned to politics and became a founding member of the newly created Republican party. Both 
men had determined to establish new careers in America. It remained to be seen how much their 
radical political ideology would affect their work. In contrast to these westerners, Rudolph M. 
Schleiden remained in Washington at his diplomatic post and, as in Schleswig-Holstein, tried to 
navigate the difficult terrain of international relations. All three men would become more and 
more involved in the tensions caused by the sectional differences in the United States. 
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The start of the most recent outbreak of sectional tensions dated to the war with Mexico 
and was part of the Atlantic world’s 1848 revolutionary upheavals. While the war added a huge 
amount of new territory, the gains also raised the question of slavery in these new territories. As 
long as the war was conducted, the question lay relatively dormant. However, the election of 
1848 and California Gold Rush stoked a smoldering sectional conflict when California applied 
for statehood as a free state. Despite these events not being comparable to those in Europe in 
1848, the United States experiences with the “free-soil” revolt experienced its own 1848.1 Much 
like the complex Schleswig-Holstein question, the territorial question was not solved until the 
passage of the Compromise of 1850. Under that agreement, California entered the Union as a 
free state, but the doctrine of “popular sovereignty” would decide the future of slavery in the 
remaining territory of the Mexican Cession. The territorial question was settled prudently by not 
allowing it to escalate. 
However, the United States had its fair share of rabble-rousers and radicals, comparable 
to Uwe J. Lornsen, Theodor Olshausen, and Orla Lehman. For the most part, their influence had 
been muted. Despite the tireless efforts of William L. Garrison and others, abolitionism had 
remained a fringe movement. There had been an attempt to politicize it, but neither the Liberty 
nor Free Soil parties became a serious challenger to the established parties. Fire-eaters in the 
South had thus far met the same fate. Playing up perceptions of northern oppression and the 
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minority status of the South, something that sounded very similar to the arguments made by the 
duchies, they made a bold, but ultimately failed, attempt to create a united front at the Nashville 
Convention in 1850. Much like the “extremism” of Lornsen in the 1830s, these efforts were not 
yet finding fertile ground. However, the political landscape of the United States was shifting, 
and, as in the duchies, the more extremist voices were gaining strength.2 
As a result, an anti-immigration party arose out of the many reform movements that had 
developed over the previous two decades. The arrival of hundreds of thousands of Irish refugees 
and political exiles from Europe had inspired fears that unruly foreign elements would overrun 
the United States. The economic and social tensions created by the influx of so much cheap 
labor, much of it Catholic in allegiance, gave additional ammunition to the nativists. The 
American, or Know Nothing party, grew in the first half of the 1850s to such proportions that it 
helped to supplant the declining Whig party.3 Forty-Eighters looked with suspicion and revulsion 
on this party. 
However, 1848 also cast another long shadow over the United States. In his search for 
support, the exiled Hungarian leader Lajos Kossuth had visited the United States from December 
1851 to July 1852. While Kossuth was warmly welcomed in the North and by the “Young 
Americans” of the Democratic party, the South looked with concern at this revolutionary, as did 
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the Austrians. When Kossuth gave a speech before Congress, it caused such a rupture in the 
relations with Austria that the Austrian minister, Dr. Johann Georg Ritter von Hülsemann, left 
Washington in protest.4 But it was not the Kossuth but the Koszta affair that would raise difficult 
questions for the newly appointed minister from Bremen. 
The Koszta affair developed in June 1853 when the Hungarian refugee Martin Koszta 
was abducted by the Austrian authorities in Smyrna, Ottoman Empire. Since Koszta had declared 
his intention to become a citizen of the United States, the U.S. consul and the commander of the 
U.S.S. St. Louis gave him protection. While Captain Duncan N. Ingraham almost created an 
international incident by trying to force Koszta from an Austrian warship, the ministers of 
Austria and the United States in Constantinople were able to agree on a compromise.5 The 
incident happened at an inopportune time, since Hülsemann had just returned to the United 
States. 
As a member of the diplomatic corps and former revolutionary and fugitive, Schleiden 
paid close attention to the case, but he apparently never felt much sympathy for Koszta or his 
possible fate in Austrian hands. Schleiden was concerned about the implications of the incident 
and the illegal action of the U.S. naval captain. Schleiden believed that only an apology by the 
United States could rectify the damage done to international law.6 While Schleiden did not join 
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the Prussian and Russian protests in support of Austria,7 he was appalled by the support 
Ingraham received from knowledgeable men, such as Robert Walker and Edward Everett.8 
Schleiden’s reaction indicated his deep-rooted belief in international and maritime law, which 
dated back to his university days. Based on his past experiences, he held that politicians should 
only support actions that were in line with the principle of law, and not those designed to foster 
national prestige. One has to wonder why Schleiden, who could easily face a similar fate as a 
Danish fugitive and would not be able to rely on Bremen’s nonexistent navy for protection 
placed international law above the well being of a fellow Forty-Eighter. It may have been an 
aspect of nationalism that prevents even those people united in a revolutionary, separatist 
struggle against monarchy from cooperating with one another, perhaps it was an early indication 
that revolutionaries in the Atlantic world were not willing to join forces. 
However, while the diplomatic legacies of 1848 were important, the focus in the United 
States was on the escalating tensions over slavery’s expansion westward and into the Caribbean. 
The leader of the Compromise of 1850, Stephen A. Douglas reopened the territorial question 
when he proposed to organize the northern half of the Louisiana Purchase into territories. This 
organization would have benefitted Chicago, in his state of Illinois, as the eastern terminus of a 
proposed transcontinental railroad. The political wrangling concluded on May 30, 1854, with the 
Kansas-Nebraska Act, which altered the Missouri Compromise by potentially opening the two 
new territories to slavery, based on popular sovereignty. The North was outraged, and opponents 
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of slavery pushed ahead with plans to form a new political party, the Republican party.9 The 
separatist tensions increased, much as they had done in the 1840s in Schleswig-Holstein. 
However, the Forty-Eighters from Schleswig-Holstein looked no more favorably on southern 
separatists than they did on northern nativist. 
As the issue of slavery in the western territories became the dominant question in U.S. 
politics, the nativist movement lost momentum, but it never disappeared. In 1855, Olshausen 
observed that the “Know Nothings had lost all of their power” as the Republican party gained in 
strength. His animosity for nativism caused him to see the process of party realignment in favor 
of the Republicans proceeding more rapidly than it did in fact, but this may be attributed to his 
disappointment, as a political radical, in the generally conservative nature of America, especially 
of its upper classes. Olshausen would have his own problem in dealing with this more 
conservative political system.10 
Regardless of their political differences with the conservative leanings of the native 
populations, radical Forty-Eighters were all too happy to assist the new Republican party. 
Especially in the western territories, where many Forty-Eighters had settled, the ideology of 
“free men, free soil, free labor” was making great strides. Iowa was an important state for the 
young party, and there it would oust the Democratic party from most political offices between 
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1854 and 1856. Immigrants and their leaders, including Claussen and Olshausen, played a major 
role in this change.11 
Like Claussen, many Holsteiners had left St. Louis for parts of the country where new 
opportunities existed. Many went to Iowa.12 Olshausen was anxious to see Iowa and Davenport, 
where so many former friends, acquaintances, and colleagues had gone.13 In mid-April 1856, he 
moved from St. Louis to Davenport. His old friend and political colleague Claussen had by then 
moved to Lyon, Iowa. Olshausen’s move was stimulated by an offer to take over Der Demokrat, 
a local German newspaper. As editor of a daily publication, Olshausen became deeply involved 
in the nation’s political discourse. Like most major newspapers and virtually all local and 
regional newspapers, Der Demokrat had a political affiliation, in its case, Republican.14 
Olshausen’s job was not an easy one. In contrast to his days as an editor in Europe, he had few 
reliable assistants. The depression of 1857 also hurt the newspaper. People had to spend more 
money on food and other basic necessaries, leaving little for newspaper subscriptions.15 Like 
some Forty-Eighters, who continued to migrate without ever permanently settling down, 
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Olshausen wanted to improve his position. In 1860, the independent-minded Holsteiner was in 
negotiations to take over a paper in Chicago, but he found the terms not to his liking.16 
Claussen was much more ready to make the United States his new home, likely because 
of his family. He became Americanized and engaged in some of the speculative activities that the 
Kansas-Nebraska Act and the construction of the transcontinental railroad offered. Claussen was 
well aware of the future possibilities of Davenport as a railroad town. As a result, he bought 
additional plots of land for speculative purposes.17 He knew that cheap land in the right location 
could be worth a lot more once the railroad arrived. He bought a plot of 320 acres for $400 in 
1852. Two years later, he sold 80 of those acres for $480. It was certainly not a bad investment 
for a person without much personal wealth.18 For the moment, though, he remained politically 
inactive. 
Schleiden, too, was more concerned with proving his worth to Bremen, and less with the 
escalation of political tensions in the United States. His main task was to negotiate a new postal 
treaty that would lower postage between Bremen and the United States and subsidize a regular 
steamship line between Bremen and New York.19 He had experience with this type of dialogue. 
In Copenhagen, he had dealt with a variety of trade-related questions. Even during the uprising, 
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he had negotiated treaties that included postal issues with Hamburg and Lübeck in April and 
May 1849.20 Schleiden thus directly built on his Old World experience. 
The negotiations were not easy and Schleiden frequently communicated with first 
assistant postmaster general Selah R. Hobbie.21 When Schleiden assured Hobbie that a company 
in Bremen stood ready with two steamers to start a line between there and New York, 
negotiations progressed swiftly.22 The treaty was signed on August 4, 1853. Postage rates were 
lowered to 10 cents, and New York and Bremen were designated as entrepots. Bremen could 
offer the same rate to the rest of the German states, thus gaining an advantage over its European 
competitors. The treaty also stipulated the transport of mail on steamships. Schleiden’s first 
major diplomatic negotiation was a success. The positive impact of the treaty was soon realized. 
Olshausen, unaware of his countryman’s role in the changes, commented on how easy sending 
mail had become.23 
Initially, the partly German-owned Ocean Steam Navigation Company (OSNC), 
headquartered in New York operated the new line. However, the OSNC was plagued by 
inefficiency and financial woes, which eventually forced the company out of business. Later, as 
new ships became available, a company from Bremen, the North German Lloyd, took over the 
mail runs. In 1857, the Lloyd suffered from accidents that made the regular runs difficult to 
conduct. Knowing the importance of the line, Schleiden urged his superiors to insure runs; 
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otherwise, the line’s reputation would suffer. To further strengthen the Lloyd’s financial basis, 
Schleiden negotiated a revision of the postal contract. The Lloyd would twice a month carry the 
Southampton mail to and from New York. The new contract required an adjustment to the mail 
schedule.24 Schleiden’s diplomatic work had laid the foundation for a successful north Atlantic 
shipping business that would endure for decades to come. He had shown himself worthy of 
Bremen’s trust.25 
Despite settling in the United States, Olshausen and Schleiden remained European at 
heart, and so paid close attention to the disputes between the maritime powers and Russia that 
resulted in the Crimean War.26 As a consequence of the war, the old wounds of 1848 were 
reopened for the Schleswig-Holstein Forty-Eighters, who still felt betrayed by Prussia’s desertion 
of them in the first Schleswig-Holstein war. Nevertheless, they did not wish Prussia any ill will, 
in as much as that kingdom was the most liberal among the German states and likely to 
accomplish their future unification. Faced with the prospect of war in central Europe, Olshausen 
worried that Prussia might become a target when it declared neutrality in the Crimean War.27 He 
hoped that Prussia, if forced to pick a side, would be smart enough to go along with the Western 
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allies.28 Radical that he was, Olshausen hated the autocratic Russians and was not ready to 
embrace the idea circulating in the United States that U.S. support for Russia could 
counterbalance Great Britain.29 
While Olshausen debated the implications of the Crimean War, southern expansionism 
and the possible acquisition of Cuba gained ground. The opportunity arose when on February 28, 
1854, the Spanish-Cuban authorities in Havana sized the Black Warrior, a U.S. merchant vessel 
that had violated local mercantile laws by not declaring its transit cargo. The case created 
tensions in relations with Spain.30 Some expansionists saw an opportunity to press for the 
purchase of Cuba. War was also considered a possibility, but the eventuality of Great Britain and 
France joining forces with Spain made that undesirable.31 Still, talk of a filibuster expedition 
remained. 
While Schleiden was concerned about the warmongering that surrounded the Black 
Warrior affair, and suggestions by the U.S. government to revise the neutrality law,32 his legal 
presentations at the State Department had little impact.33 In order to gain a better understanding 
of Cuban affairs, he determined, without prior approval from Bremen, to visit the Spanish 
colony. In November 1854, Schleiden toured the island. He observed that Cubans were favorably 
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disposed to a peaceful annexation by the United States. However, all of them were willing to 
take up arms and defend the island against an invasion by adventurers or the U.S. army. 
Schleiden, who had just three years earlier been part of a revolutionary movement bound to 
defend his homeland against Danish invasions, could sympathize with such a nationalist attitude. 
What he could not understand was how the Cuban creoles could be so naïve as to provide money 
to filibuster activities in the United States, which they were ready to fight against.34 Schleiden’s 
Cuban trip offered the diplomat important insights into Caribbean expansionism and the reaction 
to it by the local population. 
While he did not comment on another aspect of the reasons behind the U.S. expansionism 
in his correspondence during the trip, Schleiden was fully aware of the changes within Cuban 
slavery. The pressure for emancipation, even in Cuba, was growing. With war between the 
United States and Spain a possibility, rumors appeared that indicated Spain had plans to 
emancipate the slaves on the island. The idea was universally condemned in the United States. 
Southern slaveholders opposed emancipation in general because it would challenge the 
foundation of their society. Northerners, with their significant trade interests and the substantial 
investments in the island’s slave-based cash crop plantations, feared a decline in Cuba’s 
economic well-being and thus their own investments.35 Even though Schleiden did not say 
anything, he likely saw and privately criticized this hypocrisy. 
Recent diplomatic events had not ingratiated the United States to Schleiden. For the 
gentlemanly European with his high ethical standards, the undiplomatic behavior illustrated by 
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members of the foreign service of these United States in the handling of the Black Warrior affair 
was appalling. In light of the events, Schleiden assumed that the Democratic administration of 
Franklin Pierce utilized the war scare to gain political popularity. Since many members of the 
administration had gained their laurels and early political experience during the Mexican War, 
Schleiden considered men like Pierce, Cushing, Marcy, and Mason to be warmongers. Some of 
them belonged to the expansionist-minded “Young America” movement.36 Schleiden singled out 
Marcy for particular criticism. Marcy was too quiet, and his personality made it difficult to 
discuss serious, urgent, and complex questions. In the previous twelve months, Schleiden had 
found it difficult to get anything out of Marcy. As a result, Schleiden had communicated mostly 
with the undersecretary.37 As a revolutionary diplomat who had faced major challenges in 
Europe, Schleiden was not afraid to hand out bad marks. 
Schleiden did not say if the personalities reminded him of any of the diplomats or 
politicians he had dealt with in Europe. He was probably more concerned with the impact that 
changes to the navigation act or a war could have on Bremen’s trade interests in the region. East 
coast merchants had similar fears about the disruptions a war could cause. Similarly, some 
politicians had opposed the idea of a war and stood up to the southern desire for empire and 
expansion.38 The southern dreams did not go away easily, no more so than Schleswig-Holstein’s 
dreams of independence. Louisiana’s Senator Judah P. Benjamin stated during a party in honor 
of Queen Victoria’s birthday at the British legation that he would be upset if Spain accepted all 
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of the demands made by the United States. He wanted war and Cuba.39 Despite the bellicose 
language of some politicians in Washington, the desire for peace prevailed in Washington, much 
as it had done in the years before 1848 in the duchies. 
Schleiden soon had another opportunity to try his diplomatic skills, but here he would 
face challenges similar to those like in the second phase of the Schleswig-Holstein war. On May 
16, 1855, the Routh, one of the steamers of the Accessory Transit Company, ran into a smaller 
vessel on the San Juan River, in Nicaragua. When the dark skinned captain of the damaged 
vessel protested, the captain of the Routh, T. T. Smith, shot him. Once the Routh reached 
Greytown, a vessel with armed men came along side to arrest the captain. At this point, the 
former U.S. minister to the Central American Republics, Solon Borland, intervened and drove 
the arresting party away. Later that day, when Borland visited the U.S. consul, Joseph W. 
Fabens, an armed mob tried to arrest Borland. In the ensuing chaos, Borland was injured. The 
U.S. government sent the U.S.S. Cyane and Captain George Hollins on a punitive mission to 
Greytown. Hollins burned down the town and with it the property of the consul of the Hanseatic 
City of Hamburg.40 
It was another gross violation of international law, but it required that Schleiden deal with 
the U.S. government in the matter of compensation. Hollins had clearly exceeded his 
instructions, which did not authorize him to burn the city, but the government appeared willing 
to sanction his actions.41 This complicated the compensation demands of injured residents of 
Greytown. In early October, the British minister in Washington, Sir John Fiennes Twisleton 
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Crampton, who had criticized the destruction of Greytown, communicated the demands of 
British subjects for compensation to Marcy and was told that anybody living in as lawless a town 
as Greytown had no right to compensation. Schleiden got a similar answer when he informed 
Marcy that he also would file claims.42 Schleiden must have felt almost as powerless as he had 
done in 1848, when faced with international pressure against the duchies. 
His frustration increased when he presented one of the aggrieved residents of Greytown 
to the U.S. government. In February 1855, Henry Wiedemann, who was Hamburg’s consul in 
Greytown, visited Washington. Schleiden took him to Marcy, who felt uncomfortable with this 
confrontation. Refusing to discuss the matter of compensation, the secretary of state asked, 
instead, for a written statement of Wiedemann’s grievances. The two Hanseatic representatives 
then went across the street to the Navy Department, followed by a trip to the executive mansion. 
President Pierce reiterated Marcy’s theory that all habitants of Greytown were responsible for the 
actions of a few. 
As appeals to international law were getting them nowhere, Schleiden and Wiedemann 
unveiled their trump card. Wiedemann explained to the president events from his perspective, 
and said that he had done everything in his power to correct the insult to Borland. He had also 
asked that the consular building be spared from the naval bombardment, only to have it burned 
by U.S. marines. This break with international custom made some impression on Pierce, who 
assured his visitors that he would look favorably on the request for compensation, although he 
cautioned that he would have to verify their report with the agents in Nicaragua.43 The 
correspondence does not indicate how the issue was resolved, but it is unlikely that 
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compensation was ever paid. While Schleiden had a solid case, he could do little when faced 
with such stubborn resistance, no more than he could do against European powers in 1848. 
The events in the Caribbean and their connection to the Crimean War were not lost on 
observers. Schleiden assumed that the U.S. warships off Greytown were intended to exploit 
European preoccupation with the Crimea.44 In Iowa, Olshausen thought that British 
reinforcements signaled a possible conflict but, like Schleiden, he also thought the United States 
totally unprepared for war, even if some Americans believed they could “conquer the entire 
world if they so wanted.” 45 Here he was a critical observer who realistically assessed the 
military situation of the United States, but five years earlier, he would have been willing to fight 
all of Europe. Perhaps he had learned from that previous experiences; more likely, he did not 
believe as strongly in a conflict to expand the United States. By the spring of 1856, Olshausen 
assumed that war with both Great Britain and France to be possible. He assumed Great Britain 
wanted war. “But the English Cabinet will force a war because it treats the United States like 
dirt,” he observed, “and regardless of how the wretched Pierce tries to escape, he will eventually 
have to pick up the glove.”46 The analogy could have just as well described the Vor-März 
relationship between the duchies and Denmark, where the duchies eventually, in 1848, picked up 
the glove. The Pierce government wisely never did so. 
Meantime, sectional tensions continued to escalate. By 1856, the South was losing its 
parity in the Senate, with fifteen slave states versus sixteen free states and two more free states, 
Oregon and Minnesota to join shortly. With the northern perception of a conspiratorial slave 
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power emanating from the South, and a southern perception of an anti-slavery, even abolitionist, 
North trying to undermine the southern way of life, politics became hostile. The Whig party had 
already disintegrated because of its inability to maintain unity between its northern and southern 
constituencies. The Democracy, too, faced a rift between its northern and southern wings. 
Northern Democrats had to defend themselves against accusations of being part of a slave power 
conspiracy. Southern Democrats increased their demands for protection of their way of life and 
their peculiar institution. It was increasingly clear that the Republicans, a sectional party based 
on the prevention of an expansion of slavery into the western territories, would succeed the 
Whigs.47 As in Schleswig-Holstein in the second half of the 1840s, the future looked dark and 
uncertain. 
The inaugural of James Buchanan on March 4, 1857, brought many changes to 
Washington. On April 2, Schleiden had his first interview with the new secretary of state, Lewis 
Cass, whom Schleiden found more friendly, cordial, and accommodating than Marcy.48 
However, there lingered the question of whether Buchanan would implement the Ostend 
Manifesto, which he had authored with Pierre Soulé and John Y. Mason in 1854 in response to 
the Black Warrior incident. The manifesto declared, “Cuba is as necessary to the North 
American republic as any of its present members, and that it belongs naturally to that great 
family of states of which the Union is the Providential Nursery.”49 The concern was misplaced. 
When in 1855, William Walker invaded Nicaragua on the invitation of the Nicaraguan 
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Democratic party, the United States did not provide military aid to the filibuster. Later, the 
Buchanan government even made efforts to enforce its neutrality laws. 
It was, however, not the filibustering Walker who drew the country’s attention in 1857, 
but rather Kansas and the debates surrounding the constitution of the future state of Kansas. The 
violence in that territory had grabbed national headlines.50 Always the pacifist and opponent of 
mob violence, Schleiden was not pleased with the situation. In a private conversation with 
Governor Robert J. Walker, the governor intimidated that Buchanan had violated the powers of 
his office in Kansas.51 Schleiden’s official report does not indicate which side he favored in the 
dispute, but his diary betrays a free-soil sentiment. He was glad when the House of 
Representatives voted down the bill to incorporate Kansas under the pro-slavery Lecompton 
Constitution on April 1, 1858.52 Since the free soilers in Kansas fought against efforts to force 
slavery on the people of Kansas, Schleiden’s choice of sides makes sense in light of his 
background. After all, Schleswig-Holstein had stood against Danish oppression when Denmark 
forced its ways on the German population in Holstein. 
Further evidence of Schleiden’s sympathy for the anti-slavery elements in government 
came in his response to William H. Seward’s speech concerning the Kansas question on April 
30. Schleiden thought that the speech was aggressive, and seemed to signal both Seward’s and 
the Republican party’s ambitions to win the White House in the next election.53 While Schleiden 
felt sympathy for the North, he clearly was not as involved in the conflict emotionally and 
                                                 
50 Etcheson, Bleeding Kansas; Thomas Goodrich, War to the Knife: Bleeding Kansas, 
1854-1861 (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1998). 
51 Schleiden to Senats-Commission für die auswärtigen Angelegenheiten, April 24, 1860, 
2-B.13.b.1.a.2.b.II, SAB. 
52 April 2, 1858, p 150, book 18, LBSH. 
53 April 30, 1858, p 150, book 18, LBSH. 
 136 
personally as he had been in 1848. 
The same was not true for his fellow Forty-Eighters out West. In Iowa, Hans R. Claussen 
returned to politics in 1858. Since the Republican party had to carefully maneuver between its 
strong immigrant constituency and its nativist supporters, it was not unusual that candidates 
backed anti-immigration or anti-immigrant laws.54 The Republican congressional candidate, 
William Vandever, faced this dilemma. Running in a state with a large foreign-born population, 
Vandever would not be able to rely on nativist voters and an anti-immigrant campaign to carry 
him to victory, especially not since many immigrants were naturally attracted to the more open 
Democratic party. Nevertheless, because of the strength of nativism, candidates like Vandever 
could not ignore anti-immigrant sentiments. 
The immigration-related debate that Claussen participated in with Vandever symbolized 
the conflict that still plagued the Republican party at the time. The Holstein radical asked 
Vandever publically how he would deal with proposed laws to make immigration more difficult 
and the right to vote harder for immigrants to obtain. Obviously, Claussen had his own and the 
immigrant community’s interest in mind. Despite having been absent for politics since his 
arrival, he apparently had come to see himself as a community leader, and so was returning 
naturally to his political roots. Fellow radical Olshausen seconded Claussen’s inquiry. Vandever 
indicated in his response that he was not inclined to support any changes to naturalization or 
voting rights.55 Vandever had succumbed to the political power of the German vote in Iowa. As a 
result, there was no need for the two radicals to inquire further.56 In any event, the slavery 
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question had gained irresistible attention by that time. 
The slavery question’s prominence and divisiveness was equivalent to the succession and 
constitutional questions that drove a wedge between Danes and Germans in Schleswig-Holstein. 
Many newly arrived immigrants did not understand the political dilemma associated with 
slavery. The country had previously been able to solve controversies surrounding slavery and its 
territorial expansion through compromise, but the radical political background of many leading 
immigrants was more in tune with the hardening lines of the 1850s. Among the Holsteiners, 
Olshausen and Schleiden left detailed remarks of their hostility towards slavery. While Schleiden 
kept his views private, Olshausen published his opposition in books and newspapers, and thus 
contributed to the escalation of the issue. 
Olshausen viewed slavery as a major problem for the United States. Shortly after his 
arrival, Olshausen started to work on historical, geographical, and statistical handbooks for four 
western states, which he intended for the German market. Even though, he did not say as much, 
they were likely for immigrants who wished to gain a better understanding of where they were 
headed.57 In his first book, Mississippi Thales, Olshausen offered a general description of the 
Mississippi Valley and the states surrounding it.58 Some New York papers had reviewed the 
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book and praised its critical opinion of slavery, but Olshausen knew that a translation would not 
sell in the United States, certainly not the South, unless he made major changes.59 
In Mississippi Thales, Olshausen called slavery a “shocking institution” that should have 
long since been eradicated.60 There was, he declared, no widespread support for slavery, even in 
the South. Olshausen pointed to how slaveholders hypocritically prohibited the education of 
slaves while, at the same time, insisting that educating slaves would be impossible. Slaveholders 
feared, he said, that education would instill a desire for freedom and thus undermine the 
institution. 
Olshausen further dismissed claims that slaves were treated well, by pointing to this same 
lack of education. In addition, slaves and free people of color had limited legal rights. Olshausen 
did not go so far as to say that slavery was holding back the South, but his book implied as much. 
During his days as a “Neuholsteiner” and editor of the Correspondenz-Blatt, Olshausen had 
voiced similar criticisms of Denmark and the Danes when German was replaced as the language 
of instruction in northern Schleswig. 
Olshausen understood the racial and economic fears of whites when having to compete 
with emancipated slaves for work. There were also concerns over vagrancy and African-
Americans not being ready for freedom. Olshausen, as a democratic radical, saw no reason for 
further compromise, which only protected an inhumane and unjust institution. The Compromise 
of 1850 drew particular criticism. Similarly offensive was the idea that a party would call itself 
“Democratic” and yet support slavery. As a result, Olshausen supported the idea of a free soil 
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party. 61 Based on these arguments, he continued to stand against oppression and for the spread 
of democracy to all people. 
As in Europe, the crisis in the United States eventually forced people to pick sides. A 
disillusioned and radical-minded Olshausen saw the U.S. system of government drifting 
backwards, with civil war the inevitable result. Olshausen knew that abolitionists were in a 
minority. He further argued that free-soilers were also a small group. For the moment, western 
expansion was the nation’s primary focus. However, Olshausen cautioned that a foreign war or 
the question of emancipation could easily stir up trouble and slow down the western 
movement.62 He had seen similar problems in the years leading up to 1848 in Schleswig-
Holstein. The core issue was slavery and the constitution’s inability to deal with it. In 
Olshausen’s opinion, democrats and slaveholders were institutionally so at odds that they could 
no longer form a united nation. “The question is of separation or of emancipation,” he insisted.63 
Again, the situation was reminiscent of his Schleswig-Holstein years, when he and others had 
argued for a separation from Denmark. He and his fellow Holsteiners never realized how close 
they were to southerners in argument and spirit. The European radical sensed conflict and was 
ready to help bring it about, much as he had done in the 1840s.64The only difference was that in 
1848 he had fought for a separate nation against Danish oppression; in the United States, he 
stood opposed to a secessionist movement that argued against northern oppression. 
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The fear in North and South that Kansas would join the other side had precipitated 
violence in the territory. Free-soil and pro-slavery settlers, both supported by their respective 
section, engaged in guerrilla warfare, murder, arson, and intimidation. The political tone in the 
country as a whole had changed, much as it had in the 1840s in the Danish helstat. The 
divisiveness even reached Congress, where Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts was 
brutally beaten by Representative Preston Brooks of South Carolina after the New Englander had 
made comments about a relative of Brooks’ in the Senate.65 While the escalation of tensions in 
Schleswig-Holstein had not involved violence, except for minor and isolated mob actions, the 
tone leading up to 1848 had been just as emotionally charged. The Danes had even arrested 
Olshausen for treasonous talk. Interestingly, based on their anti-slavery attitudes, the Holsteiners, 
who in 1848 had rebelled against foreign oppression and the undermining of Schleswig-
Holstein’s state rights by Denmark, now looked down on state rights and thus drew 
comparatively closer to the arguments of the hated Danes. Apparently, human liberty mattered 
more than the protection of constitutional rights or the right to separate from an oppressive 
union. 
Olshausen could not shake the feeling that a civil war was coming. He predicted that the 
slavery question would present the next Congress with major difficulties. “It is very likely,” he 
said, “that in the near future an attempt be made will to separate the free and slave states. It will 
likely remain only an attempt because I do not think that the slave states will maintain 
themselves alone because a war over slavery would occur.” With the country’s attention focused 
on slavery, all other issues had lost importance. Olshausen believed that a civil war was already 
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being fought on a small scale in Kansas, and that it was only a question of time until the rest of 
the country would be drawn into war as well.66 
In contrast to Olshausen, Schleiden had been in earlier and much closer contact with 
slavery. In the late 1840s, Denmark had abolished slavery in its Caribbean colonies. Schleiden’s 
government department had not been directly involved in the debates, but “he [had] paid lively 
attention and studied the history of emancipation in the English colonies.” While he 
acknowledged the wealth generated by the colonies, Schleiden feared that “the curse of slavery” 
laid heavily on them. The remedy adopted by the Danes was one of gradual emancipation, 
although, in contrast to Great Britain, Denmark did not provide financial incentives to the 
planters. Slavery officially ended in its colonies on July 28, 1847. Schleiden, despite knowing 
that gradual emancipation was not perfect, countersigned the law.67 However, he was still far 
removed from slavery during Denmark’s emancipation debates; contrastingly, he would be 
constantly surrounded by it in Washington. 
While Olshausen probably saw few slave auctions, Schleiden found them all around him 
outside of Washington and during his trips into the South. During a stay at the St. Louis 
Exchange Hotel in New Orleans in 1854, he observed an auction of slaves in the hotel’s rotunda. 
Remembering one of the first books he had read in his recent study of English, Schleiden found 
the tumultuous scene very much in agreement with the descriptions in Uncle Tom’s Cabin. The 
sight must have been memorable, seeing a mother and baby auctioned off for $700 while an old 
man went for only $60. Schleiden could not fail but notice the sadness in slaves’ faces. He 
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regretted being a poor man; otherwise, he would have bought at least two slaves, set them free, 
and provided for their futures. Schleiden visited other auctions during his stay in New Orleans. 
He found them “interesting but gruesome.” That the experience left a mark on him may be seen 
by the inclusion of four newspaper clippings from New Orleans related to slave auctions and 
searches for runaway slaves in his diary.68 
In early July 1857, Schleiden again came in contact with slavery. He had learned that a 
thirteen-year-old slave boy named Bob who brought Schleiden his food at his Washington house 
was to be sold. He speculated that Bob’s owner needed the money for a trip. Schleiden found out 
that in order to get a higher price, the boy was to be sold in Richmond, Virginia, and not in the 
Washington area. Schleiden felt sorry for the boy, and regretted that he did not have enough 
money to set him free.69 These experiences with slavery were repulsive. However, Schleiden’s 
remarks about slavery remained confined to his diary and private correspondence. Olshausen 
commented on slavery in his newspaper, and thus had a much broader audience for his 
predictions of a coming civil war. 
As the election of 1860 drew closer, tensions continued to escalate, and in 1859, yet 
another event gave southerners the impression that the northern states stood ready to use violence 
to overthrow slavery. Much like Christian VIII’s open letter of 1846, John Brown’s raid on 
Harper’s Ferry served as a turning point, in this instance, by escalating tensions over the slavery 
issue. After unsuccessfully soliciting northern abolitionist support, Brown tried to instigate a 
slave uprising in Virginia on the evening of October 16. From the start, the raid was a disaster. 
By the evening of the next day, U.S. marines under Lieutenant Colonel Robert E. Lee and his 
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aide Lieutenant J.E.B. Stuart had taken Brown prisoner. After a swift trial, Brown was executed 
and became a martyr to northern abolitionists. For the South, he was a symbol of northern 
fanaticism.70 While no violence followed Christian’s open letter, the arrest of Olshausen and 
others for treasonous language did represent a similar hardening of the lines in the duchies. In the 
same way that the Danish helstat drifted toward conflict in 1847, so did the United States seem to 
be moving toward civil war. 
Despite his own anti-slavery feelings, Olshausen called John Brown’s raid an 
insurrection. Nevertheless, Olshausen saw the raid as a precursor to a civil war that would finally 
solve the impasse between the northern and southern states. He even saw connections to his own 
experiences in Europe. “The large slaveholders are reckless and brutal, similar to the Junkers of 
Mecklenburg,” he observed, “and unwilling to give in to any point of contention, of which many 
exist in politics.”71 It was a rather one-sided view, and indicated how much this separatist was 
willing to fight a secessionist doctrine was based on slavery. Yet, one could argue that 
Olshausen, with his distaste for slavery, had unintentionally assumed the position of Denmark 
and the oppressor. 
The Forty-Eighters from Schleswig-Holstein had put down roots in the United States. 
Olshausen and Claussen were slow to engage in the political conflict of the 1850s, but they kept 
a keen eye on national developments. Olshausen again engaged in the newspaper business as he 
had done in the duchies, and his arguments had changed little since those years. He still stood 
against oppression, in this case, against the institution of slavery. He still stood for radical 
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principles, but could not abide southern separatism. Claussen reentered politics in the last years 
of the 1850s. He, too, was still a radical, but he also tried to become a respected member of the 
Iowa German community. As a result, he picked the issues he fought over more carefully. 
Schleiden continued to built on his diplomatic experiences from 1848, although, as had been true 
in the first Schleswig-Holstein war, his negotiating skill failed when confronted by issues 
involving national prestige or international power. All three men showed how important their 
European experiences were to their new lives in America. Just as he had seen the conflict 
between the duchies and Denmark coming, so did he assume a conflict between North and South 
was imminent. 
In addition, their experiences in the United States and the Danish helstat were strikingly 
similar. In each case, they faced sectional tensions that had developed from the oppression of one 
people by another. Like the German population in the duchies, the southern population perceived 
itself as being under attack. With the expansion of slavery prevented in both the West and South, 
the southern states had feared they had nowhere to expand, and that they would soon be in a 
permanent minority, at the mercy of an oppressive and hostile North. Similarly, the duchies had 
believed that the Danes were trying to divide the duchies and impose Danish rule on Schleswig 
at the expense of their constitutional rights. In their eyes, separatism had taken a similar form on 
both sides of the Atlantic Ocean, be it in their native duchies or the American South. 
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Chapter Seven 
Secession: 
A Revolutionary’s Dilemma 
On December 20, 1860, South Carolina seceded from the Union and precipitated the 
American Civil War. Forty-Eighters stood united behind the North and the incoming Abraham 
Lincoln administration. Historians, by presenting Forty-Eighters and German-Americans as one 
large mass, have never questioned if one group might have faced a dilemma when secession 
occurred in the United States.1 The one group that should have faced a serious dilemma was the 
Schleswig-Holstein Forty-Eighters, whose revolution in 1848 had been a separatist one, and 
whose language against Danish oppression had been similar to that used by southerners against 
the North.2 Of course, the slavery issue was a serious difference between the two secessionist 
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movements, and the Schleswig-Holstein Forty-Eighters were willing to overlook the perception 
of constitutional and legal oppression, which they had risen up against, to emphasize the human 
oppression of slavery in the South. Nevertheless, even if they were not fully aware of it 
themselves, the Forty-Eighters from Schleswig-Holstein faced a dilemma in secession. Would 
they be willing to fight just as hard against a secessionist movement as they had fought for one? 
Some historians have argued that the southern revolution was built on a distinctive 
southern nationalism. While this nationalism was centered on the institution of slavery, it was 
also a separatist nationalism. Southern separatism had much in common with the secessionism of 
places like Yucatan (Mexico), Rio Grande de Sol (Brazil), Sicily (Italy), or Hungary. Like the 
divided Border South, Schleswig had been divided between Germans and Danes. As in the first 
Schleswig-Holstein war, these border regions would witness most of the fighting. The reactions 
of the three Schleswig-Holsteiner during the secession year (defined here as April 1860 to May 
1861) would be heavily influenced by their experiences in Europe during their own separatist 
uprising.3 
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Theodor Olshausen had several times indicated that he thought war was likely between 
North and South. He even claimed that an undeclared war already existed in Kansas territory. 
Olshausen believed that the election of Stephen A. Douglas or of a southern candidate as 
president could cause war. Conflict was less likely, he believed, if a northern radical, such as 
William H. Seward, were elected. Olshausen’s personal choice for the Republican nomination 
was John C. Frémont,4 little suspecting that it would be the election of another northern sectional 
candidate from the Republican party that would prompt southern secession. 
A more optimistic Rudolph M. Schleiden ended his traditional New Year’s Eve diary 
entry for 1859 by commenting on the quietness on the streets of Washington that night. He 
wished “to see this quietness as a sign that the New Year would maintain and foster the just 
recreated peace in the nation.”5 Schleiden doubted that either section would be so foolish as to 
allow an election to cause conflict. He hoped that moderates would force the extremist to back 
down.6 He did anticipate that the coming year would bring major political conflict that might 
escalate beyond mere debate, but he thought that mutual material interests made a splintering of 
the nation unlikely.7 Apparently, he had forgotten the origins of the conflict between his home 
state and Denmark, when moderation had been pushed aside and conflict started regardless of 
material interests. 
                                                 
4 T Olshausen to J Olshausen, March 18, 1860, reprinted in Theodor Olshausen, Theodor 
Olshausen 1802 - 1869: Briefe an den Bruder Justus, ed. Joachim Reppmann (Wyk, Germany: 
Verlag fu�r Amerikanistik, 2003), 198. 
5 December 31, 1859, p 47, book 19, LBSH. 
6 Schleiden to Senats-Commission für die auswärtigen Angelegenheiten, December 16, 
1859, 2-B.13.b.1.a.2.b.II, SAB. 
7 Schleiden to Senats-Commission für die auswärtigen Angelegenheiten, January 20, 
1860, 2-B.13.b.1.a.2.b.II, SAB. 
 148 
Under these dark clouds, the parties selected their candidates for the highest office. As 
was the tradition, the Democratic party met first. On April 23, its convention assembled in 
Charleston, South Carolina. The convention immediately ran into problems when the platform 
committee could not agree on the inclusion of a clause protecting slavery. As southern 
delegations departed in protest and the convention unraveled, the party failed to nominate a 
presidential candidate. The party decided to reconvene six weeks later in Baltimore. In the 
intervening weeks, supporters of the Democratic front-runner, Stephen A. Douglas, tried to 
replace the seceded southern delegations and southern Democrats continued to demand a 
platform plank in regard to slavery. 
The second convention at Baltimore witnessed its own controversy when southern 
delegates who had walked out of the Charleston convention were denied credentials. They 
continued their secession. Sympathizers from other state delegations joined them and the two 
groups formed a separate convention. The Democratic party split along sectional lines. The 
northern Democrats nominated Stephen Douglas; the southern Democrats selected John C. 
Breckenridge on a pro-slavery platform. The only national party had thus broken apart.8 One 
thing seemed certain to Schleiden: “The election campaign will be more bitter and hard fought 
than ever before, ‘sectionalism,’ by way of the slavery question sharply increased visibility of the 
different interests of North and South, will manifest in the use of abominable methods for 
certain.”9 The future of the Union was uncertain. 
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On May 16, the Republican party opened its convention in Chicago, Illinois. While 
Seward was considered the party’s front-runner, things would not go in his favor. The party 
searched for a moderate candidate with a broader platform who could build on Frémont’s 1856 
success. However, some delegates thought neither man would do. 
In Iowa, the Republican party had long debated whom to support in Chicago. The two 
Schleswig-Holstein radicals, Olshausen and Claussen, had their own ideas about who the party’s 
candidate should be. In March 1860, the time had came for the Republican party in Iowa to 
select a presidential candidate and agree on a platform. In the process of these debates, Claussen 
and Olshausen showed how much they failed to understand American political realities. They 
agreed that a further expansion of slavery should be opposed, which would be the party’s main 
plank for the upcoming election. When it came to the nomination of a presidential candidate, 
they took a different route. They opposed Edward Bates because he seemed not Republican 
enough. They criticized him for staying in the race in 1856 and for supporting the Know-Nothing 
Millard Fillmore in order to hurt the Frémont ticket. His support for the enforcement of the 
Fugitive Slave Law further irritated the Schleswig-Holstein radicals.10 This debate among the 
German immigrant community resulted in the Davenport resolutions, which other German 
groups adopted.11 The Holstein radical made a major impact on the development of a German-
American bloc within the Republican party. 
                                                 
10 Marhencke, Hans Reimer Claussen, 317-321. Due to the awkward organization of the 
book it is unclear how the author can claim Claussen’s entry into politics in both 1858 and 1856. 
Marhencke also presents a rather one-sided narrative. 
11 Marhencke, Hans Reimer Claussen, 323. For the German role in the Republican party 
convention of 1860 also see James M. Bergquist, “The Forty-Eighters and the Republican 
Convention of 1860,” in The German Forty-Eighters in the United States, 141-156. 
 150 
While Seward remained the leading candidate because of his strong opposition to slavery, 
some Iowans apparently considered Abraham Lincoln the party’s best choice.12 How this is 
possible is unclear, since Lincoln’s managers had prevented his name from being included in the 
list of possible candidates.13 It might be an assumption made in hindsight by later historians.14 
As long as the candidate had a strong anti-slavery record, the Holstein radicals would be 
satisfied. However, the party was unwilling to risk a repetition of 1856 by selecting an outspoken 
anti-slavery candidate. This eliminated both Seward and Salmon P. Chase from the running, and 
opened the door for the more moderate Lincoln. Lincoln emerged as a moderate candidate who 
could carry the party into the executive mansion. The party platform did not abandon the party’s 
opposition to the expansion of slavery, but the Republicans found it necessary to broaden their 
appeal by also adopting such issues as a homestead act, internal improvements, the construction 
of a transcontinental railroad, and lower tariffs.15 The idea was to gain additional support from 
moderate northerners with old Whig leanings and disgruntled northern Democrats. 
In contrast to many contemporaries, Schleiden had a relatively positive opinion about the 
Republican presidential candidate. When he reported the selection to the government in Bremen, 
Schleiden gave a brief biographical sketch that was remarkably neutral. He highlighted Lincoln’s 
southern origins and return to politics after the Kansas-Nebraska Act. He also lauded Lincoln’s 
“agility, honesty, and energy” during the debates with Douglas in 1858. The debates had made 
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Lincoln famous, Schleiden reported, but large parts of the country were still unfamiliar with him. 
Schleiden quoted an unidentified member of Lincoln’s party, though it was likely his friend 
Charles Sumner, saying that Lincoln was, “a man of fair ability, thoroughly pure and honest, but 
rather rustic and rude, and without the slightest knowledge of the world and of foreign affairs.”16 
After the former Whigs and American party supporters nominated John Bell of 
Tennessee and Edward Everett of Massachusetts as presidential candidates of the Constitutional 
Union party, the race for president took shape. In effect, the election campaign consisted of two 
separate contests, Douglas competing against Lincoln in the North and Bell competing against 
Breckenridge in the South. The sectional division of the electoral process made a sectional break 
that much more likely. 
By late October, after news from several northern states indicated Republican victories, 
Lincoln’s election victory was beyond any doubt for Schleiden.17 He was still not convinced that 
Lincoln’s election would bring about secession; however, he could foresee problems with the 
enforcement of federal laws in the southern states. He continued to believe that economic 
interests would keep the two sections together.18 He was a little worried about the southern 
reaction. He knew that some states, like Mississippi, prepared to call conventions in case Lincoln 
was elected. Schleiden was hopeful that calmer voices, such as that of James H. Hammond of 
South Carolina, would prevent an irrational reaction. After all, the Republicans had only 
campaigned to prevent the expansion of slavery. The South, Schleiden believed, had exaggerated 
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the Republican threat to slavery. “The south had unknowingly played with fire,” he reasoned. “It 
is more the agitation about the slavery question in the South than the one in the North which has 
created the feeling among slaves that it was their freedom that has penetrated here and there 
among the slave population.”19 Unfortunately, the ties that bound them were not as close as 
Schleiden had expected, and men like Hammond were silenced or pushed aside. Schleiden could 
have looked at the events in Schleswig-Holstein to predict events in the winter of 1860-61. 
Lincoln’s election victory triggered a shockwave among fire-eating southerners, with 
South Carolinians taking immediate steps to leave the Union. As a former revolutionary, and 
being concerned with the respectability of revolutions, as he had been in 1848, Schleiden 
criticized the undue haste of the secession movement. He saw no genuine political threats to the 
South. Knowing how long he had waited before deciding to join in the uprising in the duchies, 
one can easily understand his response, and why he would refuse to support this separatist-
nationalist revolution. However, the Schleswig-Holstein uprising had also started as a reaction to 
perceived threats, so Schleiden was, in fact, consistent. He had been critical in 1848 of Friedrich 
Hecker and Gustav von Struve because they had not waited on events and had acted rashly. He 
had even accused them of not being good republicans.20 The same criticism would apply to the 
South, for despite the surge in political agitation, Schleiden continued to doubt the possibility of 
a final and permanent division of the Union.21 
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The 1848 legacy also appeared in Schleiden’s continued emphasis on the importance of 
compromise. Compromise had not been high on the agenda of the duchies during their uprising. 
In his memoirs, Schleiden mentioned how the Statthalterschaft had given way on many issues, 
only to have Denmark abuse the compromise spirit by making additional demands.22 At the same 
time, the duchies had been unyielding on the Schleswig issue. Regardless, the representatives of 
the duchies, Schleiden claimed, had tried to avoid illegal actions until forced to do so by 
Denmark.23 While there is room for Schleiden to claim that a preemptive secession by the South 
was not acceptable, one can also see how Schleswig-Holstein’s cause and the southern cause 
were similar. After all, Schleiden justified the action of the provisional government by saying, 
“Not opposition or indignation caused the proclamation of the provisional government but a 
desire for self-preservation.”24 No southern fire-eater could have said it better. 
Nonetheless, the Union was breaking apart. On December 20, a convention dominated by 
large planters and slave-owners declared South Carolina independent. Schleiden commented on 
the decision of the South Carolina convention by saying, “The union is with this decision in 
effect gone and it is now only a question if it will be possible to reestablish it or if this is just the 
first step in its disintegration.”25 Following the secession of South Carolina, six more states left 
the Union. In February 1861, leaders of the seven rebellious states came together in 
Montgomery, Alabama, to form the Confederate States of America. Appointed to the highest 
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office was a moderate U.S. senator from Mississippi who had opposed secession, Jefferson 
Davis.26 The decision to appoint a moderate, rather then a fire-eater as president mirrored the 
decision of the provisional government in Schleswig-Holstein to appoint a broad group of 
similarly moderate leaders. Both rebellions, as is often the case, replaced the radicals who had 
precipitated the separation with more cautious leadership. 
While Schleiden had sought sympathy and support in 1848, he could not grant the same 
to the southerners in Washington. On January 26, news arrived in Washington that Louisiana had 
seceded. Schleiden visited John Slidell, a U.S. senator from the state, shortly after he received 
the news. Supposedly, Slidell’s wife was rather upset about their departure from Washington, 
and even Slidell appeared upset that it had come to this. He had apparently hoped that the North 
would again surrender to southern threats. Schleiden did not feel much sympathy for the senator, 
who, in Schleiden’s mind, had contributed his fair share to escalate the situation.27 When, in 
1848, the constitutional controversy escalated over Schleswig and Denmark finally moved to 
incorporate the duchy, Schleiden, too, had probably hoped that Denmark would once again back 
down, as it had done in the past. The episode indicated how different the situation looked when 
the secessionist did not favor secession. 
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With his many contacts in Washington, especially to Charles Sumner, Schleiden was 
soon aware that Lincoln would offer no compromise that undermined the Republican platform.28 
However, one means for reunion apparently remained in play. In private conversations, the 
congressional leader of the Republican party, William H. Seward, suggested that a foreign war 
could bring unity to the United States. The idea was not far fetched, as many divided nations 
searched for a foreign “other” to restore unity at home. On some level, the first Schleswig-
Holstein war had provided just such a means for the German experiment in 1848. That war had 
been a dramatic failure, accomplishing neither internal unity or independence for the duchies, but 
that made Seward’s threat no less real. 
It was Schleiden who recorded Seward’s most famous mention of instigating a foreign 
war as a panacea for the Union’s ills. “If the Lord would only give the United States an excuse 
for a war with England, France, or Spain,” Seward supposedly said, “that would be the best 
means of reestablishing internal peace.” This is probably one of the most widely quoted remarks 
in Civil War diplomatic history.29 In addition to his April Fools Day memoranda to President 
Lincoln, it provides the basis for believing Seward might try to reunite the country in that way. 
However, he built his plan on an underestimation of secessionist sentiments in the South and an 
overestimation of Unionist strength. 
There is no denying that Seward was something of a lose canon, or that he used anti-
British feelings among the electorate for his own political gains. Thus, when Schleiden recorded 
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Seward’s thoughts about a foreign war, they were nothing new. However, because few historians 
have consulted Schleiden’s original January 29 letter, in which he quotes Seward, they have not 
realized that they are actually quoting Schleiden and not Seward himself.30 At the start of the 
paragraph, Schleiden explained that Seward still believed that the Union could be reestablished, 
even without a compromise. Seward supposedly saw secession as just another form of the party 
conflict, though an unpredictable potential to turn violent. A desire for peace and union, he was 
convinced, would reunite the people soon after inaugural day. Schleiden then mentioned the 
famous sentence. There are no quotation marks around it, which indicates that Schleiden, not 
Seward, is speaking, and that the words placed in Seward’s mouth are actually those of Bremen’s 
minister resident.31 The meticulous Schleiden would not have forgotten to add quotation marks if 
the words were directly from Seward, something he did routinely in other letters and diary 
entries. 
Even though Schleiden and Seward disagreed on the means, they both believed it 
expedient to maintain peace in the United States. Seward’s foreign war panacea was an 
outgrowth of this desire.32 While Seward remained committed to the idea of preserving the 
Union, Schleiden believed that his own diplomatic experience could help the secretary of state 
achieve that end. Of course, Schleiden had to be cautious. His diplomatic post did not give him 
immunity, and he was not interested in repeating his Schleswig-Holstein experience, when he 
was refused amnesty and considered disloyal to the Danish state. 
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However, before Schleiden would apply his talents to the American Crisis, the two sides 
made their own efforts. The Lincoln administration faced the difficult task of what to do about 
the two remaining federal installations in the Confederacy, Fort Sumter in Charleston and Fort 
Pickens in Pensacola Bay. Should the government maintain them in order to maintain at least 
some semblance of Union, or passively relinquish the last two U.S. flags flying in the seceded 
states? The Confederates also seemed to want a peaceful resolution of the issue, and so sent 
Andre B. Roman, Martin J. Crawford, and John Forsyth as envoys to Washington. 33 Like their 
five counterparts in Copenhagen in 1848, these three men sat in a hostile capital, trying to find a 
basis for peaceful coexistence. They also dealt with a government that had still not defined its 
policy. 
The Confederate emissaries were as unsuccessful as their Schleswig-Holstein 
counterparts were in 1848. The government in Washington had determined not to surrender 
either fort, and instead prepared for conflict. After a March 16 cabinet meeting, it was still not 
clear if Lincoln would be willing to risk war to maintain both forts. Only Seward was in 
communication with the three commissioners through Supreme Court justices John A. Campbell 
and Samuel Nelson. Being unaware of the president’s plans, Seward gave the erroneous 
impression that the fort’s evacuation was imminent. The Schleswig-Holsteiners in Copenhagen 
in 1848 had fared little better, although they had at least been able to talk with the king. Until the 
very end, Seward continued to support evacuation.34 He delayed the inevitable because he did 
not consider Lincoln up to the challenges of the presidency.35 
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By late March, the escalation was increasingly obvious. Schleiden had come into contact 
with Crawford, one of the Confederate commissioners who, like Schleiden, knew that Seward 
worked within the cabinet to prevent an outbreak of hostilities. Crawford did not agree with 
Seward that a delay would allow Unionists in the South time to take back control. 36 He though it 
was to make the people in the North accept the inevitability of separation.37 Schleiden knew that 
secessionists were making inroads in the upper South, which undermined Unionists and thus 
Seward’s hope for southern allies.38 As war became more likely, Seward became more reluctant 
to give new information to the Confederate commissioners.39 The uncertainty that had plagued 
Washington since the secession crisis was reminiscent of the uncertainty faced by both Danes 
and Schleswig-Holsteiners in Copenhagen in the first three month of 1848. Similarly, as in 1848, 
clarity would soon come with violent force. 
By early April, Lincoln had to make a decision. No news had arrived in Washington from 
the Fort Pickens relieve mission and it was unclear if the fort could be maintained. The president 
determined not to surrender Fort Sumter.40 When Lincoln informed South Carolina’s Governor 
Charles Pickens that he intended to resupply Fort Sumter, the governor asked the government in 
Montgomery for advice. President Davis ordered the capture of Fort Sumter and with the first 
shot on April 12, the American Civil War commenced. On April 15, Lincoln called for 75,000 
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ninety-day volunteers to serve in the Union army. The population of the free states flocked in 
overwhelming numbers to the colors.41 The difficulties the early arrivals in Washington 
encountered on their way and the prospect of an attack on Washington, gave Schleiden a reason 
to pursue his peace mission, which would also benefit the trade interests of Bremen. 
On April 19, the Sixth Massachusetts passed through Baltimore on its way to 
Washington. The sympathetic southern population of the city pelted the soldiers with rocks and a 
fight ensued. Four soldiers and twelve residence of Baltimore were killed, with many more 
wound on both sides. The incident of mob action raised fears about Washington’s security, 
defended by only 3,500 soldiers. In addition, secessionist cut the telegraph line between 
Washington and the North. The foreign ministers in Washington prepared for the eventuality of a 
Confederate attack. The Prussian minister was of faint heart, and on April 19, Schleiden caught 
him packing his belongings for a speedy evacuation.42 Some of Schleiden’s colleagues put out 
their national flags to distinguish their houses as the residences of foreign ministers and thus 
protect their property in case of an invasion.43 Schleiden had to send his aid Johannes Rösing to 
the Navy Yard to obtain a national flag.44 The Lincoln administration faced a situation similar to 
that in the duchies when Danish troops invaded and approached the capital. 
Faced with bloodshed and the carnage of war, Schleiden’s humanitarianism reemerged. 
There had been talk about the diplomatic corps mediating the conflict, but neither the French nor 
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the British minister was ready to engage in such a delicate and potentially dangerous 
undertaking. 
As a former rebel, Schleiden approved of the right to revolution. In contrast to 1848, he 
believed that southerners had acted preemptively. All the perceived threats that had led to 
secession were in the future, and thus no violation of the rights of southerners had yet occurred. 
Schleiden claimed later that he had only resigned from his position in the Danish government 
when he had confirmation of a violation of Schleswig-Holstein’s rights.45 But the early stages of 
the insurrection in 1848 had been based on perceptions. On a personal level, Schleiden would fit 
with some of the moderate southerners, like Jefferson Davis, who had either waited for their 
states to act or worked against secession. It is understandable that Schleiden looked down upon 
the fire-eaters, as he had on the radicals in 1848. 
In addition, Schleiden knew from his experience in Schleswig-Holstein how difficult it 
could be for a state to survive against larger, more powerful foes if the international situation was 
against that state. Schleswig-Holstein in 1848 had relied heavily on the support of the German 
states.46 However, European pressure on the most important ally, Prussia, had ended the support 
and placed Schleswig-Holstein at the mercy of the Danish monarchy.47 
Another issue that Schleiden explicitly refers to in his diary and correspondence is the 
prevention of bloodshed. While he had not witnessed the recent carnage of the Crimean War, 
which had given rise to a humanitarian movement, and had never been a soldier, he had seen the 
Battle of Eckernförde during the first Schleswig-Holstein war. Even than, the Danish ships and 
Schleswig-Holstein’s artillery had engaged in a relatively bloodless firefight, but the experience 
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touched a humanitarian impulse in Schleiden that was laced with pacifism.48 By 1861, he 
genuinely wanted to prevent any war if possible. 
Despite having said in the past that the time for compromise had passed, Schleiden 
continued to believe that it should be possible to mediate some kind of truce between North and 
South. He determined to throw all his ambitions and strength into the matter. He wanted to 
propose a three-month ceasefire, which would allow Congress to meet in extraordinary session 
on July 4 and determine a policy that could govern the conflict. At the same time, the maritime 
war would also be delayed, thus benefitting trade. Bremen’s weakness might allow Schleiden to 
undertake this risky enterprise.49 Before officially suggesting the plan to the U.S. government, 
Schleiden talked with the Prussian minister Friedrich Freiherr von Gerolt, who likely responded 
cautiously to the idea.50 While laying the groundwork for his attempt, he could not expect any 
backing from his government until after the fact. 
Schleiden’s desire to protect Bremen’s interests is not without importance. The United 
States was an important trade partner for Bremen, and the closure of the southern ports and likely 
other disruptions due to the war could have a negative impact on the city’s trade. Seward had 
acknowledged the importance of Bremen’s trade when on the afternoon of April 18, he had 
called both Schleiden and Lyons to the State Department for a conference. The conference 
followed Davis’ announcement the day before that the Confederacy would issue letters of 
marquee and reprisal.51 The purpose of the meeting was to consult the two ministers about the 
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legal ramification of a blockade of southern ports. Schleiden had already dealt with blockades 
and belligerent threats to merchant vessels during the first Schleswig-Holstein war, when 
Denmark engaged in both activities. He saw an opportunity and hoped that his presentation 
would benefit the commercial classes. Schleiden warned about the ramifications of a blockade. 
He felt better able to do so because of the physical size and military weakness of his state. He 
assumed that had Lyons made the same comments, they would have appeared as threats.52 
Seward had initially intended to keep the meeting totally secret but had to allow confidential 
letters to be sent to the home governments. The two ministers conceded that the United States 
had the right to close its ports without falling under the international rule of blockades. However, 
the ministers also suggested that if the government decided on such a measure, an effective 
blockade would be the best means to avoid legal questions. With the escalation of secession into 
war, Schleiden again wondered what he could do to restore peace. 
On the morning of April 24, 1861, Schleiden had word that the vice president of the 
Confederacy, Alexander Stephens, was in Richmond. Knowing Stephens from the Georgian’s 
time in Congress, when the two had resided in the same house, Schleiden saw an opportunity to 
communicate with one of the highest officials in the Confederacy.53 That morning, he secretly 
suggested to Chase and Seward that he be allowed to speak with Stephens.54 Chase declined to 
comment on the proposal.55 Not so Seward. Schleiden knew that Seward was unlikely to 
comment until he had consulted with the president, although the secretary assured him that were 
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he to make contact with Stephens it would not be held against him. Nevertheless, Seward 
cautioned him that the president and the government could not publicly acknowledge such 
negotiations, or give Schleiden specific terms, and he decided that before going any further, 
Schleiden should present his ideas to Lincoln himself. Schleiden was well aware of the 
tremendous responsibility he was taking on, and hoped that the proposal would not be to 
Bremen’s detriment. Gerolt and Rösing were the only foreign officials that Schleiden took into 
his confidence.56 
In the afternoon, Seward took Schleiden to see Lincoln. Like Seward, Lincoln thanked 
Schleiden for his willingness to help prevent bloodshed. The president confessed that he was still 
not acquainted with diplomatic protocol and, therefore, “very apt to commit great blunders.” He 
expressed a certain regret that Schleiden had not gone to Richmond on his own, without 
consulting him or Seward. Schleiden countered that it would have been incorrect for him to do so 
because it would have exposed him and the Danish government to accusations of conspiring with 
the enemy against the U.S. government. Lincoln accepted that explanation.57 Obviously, 
Schleiden was painfully aware of why he was in the United States. His participation in an 
insurgency had made him an outcast once, but there was no need to reprise that role for a cause 
in which he did not believe. 
Lincoln continued that his peaceful intentions, which he had expressed more than once in 
official proclamations and conversations with citizens from the seceded states, had too often 
been misinterpreted. He no longer intended to give credence to the rumors of his weakness and 
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timorousness. Lincoln insisted, therefore, that the conversation be kept completely confidential. 
He stressed, in addition, that his military preparations were not aggressive in nature and carried 
out only for the defense of Washington. The president believed that he could not give any 
authority “to enter into negotiations or to invite propositions,” but he promised to consider “with 
equal respect and care” all propositions he received from Schleiden. Schleiden gained the 
impression that Seward and Lincoln wished that he would unofficially consult with Stephens to 
reach an agreement prevented bloodshed. He tried to find out if an offer of a three-month truce 
were acceptable, but Lincoln maintained his silence on specific terms.58 
Schleiden had accomplished less than he had hoped to do, but he remained undeterred, 
and based on his assumption that both Seward and Lincoln wished him to see Stephens, he 
decided to take the gamble.59 He held one last conference with Gerolt and gave instructions to 
Rösing to tell everybody that he had gone to Baltimore, where a ship under Bremen’s flag was 
held.60 That evening, Schleiden and his loyal servant Bernhard Bätjer went to Alexandria, where 
they boarded the morning train to Richmond. One has to wonder if, as Schleiden crossed the 
bridge to Alexandria, his mind wandered back to his departure from Copenhagen thirteen years 
earlier. Both ventures were similar in the uncertainty that awaited Schleiden at the end of the trip. 
In contrast to Kiel in 1848, Schleiden found Richmond more of an army camp, due to all 
the troops that were arriving from across the South.61 The railroad stations he passed had been 
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filled with young volunteers eager to fight. The newspapers also had a belligerent tone. 
Richmond itself appeared even more excited. In the lobby of the Spotwood Hotel, Schleiden 
found Senator Robert M. T. Hunter and other prominent southerners who were anxious to find 
out what had brought Schleiden to Richmond and to give their opinions about recent 
developments.62 
Schleiden immediately contacted Stephens, and the two had a three-hour long 
conversation. Stephens was willing to help foster peace, but he saw little prospects for success. 
Reminding Schleiden of the treatment the southern commissioners had received in Washington, 
Stephens argued that the Confederacy would not renew steps toward peace. Seward’s intentions 
were fully discredited because he had countersigned Lincoln “war proclamation.” Even Judge 
Campbell, who had been an intermediary between Seward and the southern commissioners, had 
sent an outraged letter to Jefferson Davis to protest the Lincoln government’s intentions. 
Stephens believed that the attack on Fort Sumter could have been avoided. He also thought 
Lincoln had used the rumors that the Confederate army was about to attack Washington to draw 
troops to the capital, even though the government of neither the Confederacy nor Virginia had 
shown any inclination to attack. 
Distrust of the federal government had only increased due to the reinforcement to Fort 
Pickens and Fortress Monroe, and the destruction of the arsenals at Harper’s Ferry and the 
Norfolk Navy Yard. The recent events in Baltimore, according to Stephens, placed Maryland in 
the secessionist camp, and the Confederacy was honor bound to come to the state’s assistance if 
requested. Thus, one aspect of the cease-fire had to be either Maryland’s inclusion in the 
Confederacy or the end of troop movements thought the state. In addition, the high spirit of the 
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population would not allow for a ceasefire. The final and gravest problem was that Stephens had 
no authority to negotiate. At the end of the three-hour conversation, he requested time to think 
about the offer.63 
Schleiden requested a formal written statement of whatever terms Stephens thought 
appropriate to foster peace. He discovered that Stephen’s terms were almost word for word what 
Davis had told the Confederate Congress on March 29.64 The vice president regretted the 
“threatening prospect of a general war,” and stressed that it was not the intention of the 
Confederacy to provoke a war with the Union. However, peace without independence was not 
acceptable. The bombardment of Fort Sumter had occurred only after all possibilities for peace 
had been exhausted. The main point, which would never be acceptable to Seward or Lincoln, 
was the following: “From all evidence and manifestations of their design which have reached 
me, it seems to be their policy to wage a war for the recapture of former possessions looking to 
the ultimate coercion and subjugation of the people of the Confederate States to their former 
dominion. With such an object on their part possessed in no power on Earth can arrest or prevent 
a most bloody conflict.” Stephens then left it up to the Lincoln government to offer.65 
With this letter as a basis for negotiations, Stephens and Schleiden debated for another 
two hours, during which time Schleiden was able to impress upon Stephens the need to modify 
some passages. Most significantly, he told Stephens that “a significant amount of mistrust shined 
through the letter coupled with, in his opinion, a substantial amount of misplaced honor which 
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threatened the impact of the letter because in Washington the letter would meet a similar mistrust 
and false, misplaced honor that shied away from making the first step.” At the end of their 
conversation, both men agreed to keep their talks confidential for the moment.66 Schleiden did 
not record a second conversation with Stephens in his diary, perhaps because he had lost hope of 
an agreement. Instead, he only mentioned his cold, the meeting with a Mr. Garnett (likely 
Muscoe R. H. Garnett), Matthew Fontaine Maury, and Bremen’s consul in Richmond Edward 
William de Voss, to whom he gave a few instructions about how the changed situation would 
influence commerce and international law.67 
After the final conversation, Schleiden could do little but return to Washington on April 
27.68 Upon his return, he immediately set to work to make a copy of the correspondence with 
Stephens and prepare a cover letter for Lincoln, which he then personally delivered to Seward. 
The secretary of state listened attentively to his verbal report, but his reserved attitude signaled 
that the attempt would be unsuccessful.69 Conveying Lincoln’s reaction to the terms, Seward 
assured the diplomat that his position with the government was not compromised “The President 
desires you to be fully assured not only that he finds no cause for disapproving of your 
intervention in the civil contention which you so justly deplore, but that on the contrary he 
respects your proceedings as eminently friendly towards the government and People of the 
United States,” Seward reported. “The Republic of Bremen is entitled to thanks for the good 
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offices of its Minister in so important a matter.” Beyond these reassurances, Seward confirmed 
that restoration of the Union was the primary goal of the government. Consequently, Lincoln saw 
no use in pursuing the matter any further.70 The only thing left for Schleiden to do was inform 
Stephens of the failure. Saddened, Schleiden wrote, “I have therefore to abandon the endeavor 
towards attaining a truce at this time but I cannot abandon the hope that peace will be observed 
de facto until the sober second thought renders a definite peaceful understanding between the 
United States government and the dissatisfied people of he South possible.”71 
In the course of these conversations and negotiations, one has once more to wonder if 
Schleiden ever noticed how his roles had changed. In 1848, he had been on the insurgent side of 
the talks, much like Stephens. Seward and Lincoln were closest to King Frederik VII and men 
like Orla Lehmann. Schleiden himself, as the go between, would hold the position that Great 
Britain, Sweden, and Russia had occupied, even to some degree Prussia. Remembering how 
much he despised the Prussians in 1851, and what critical words he had for some of the other 
intermediaries and diplomats, one wonders if he realized whose role he had assumed during his 
trip to Richmond in April. After all, the statements made by Stephens could just as well have 
come from a Schleswig-Holsteiner in 1848, who had similarly mistrusted Denmark after a series 
of broken promises. To dismiss the obvious similarities to 1848 would be to deny Schleiden’s 
background and present a shallow and skewed picture. 
A different situation developed in the West, particularly in St. Louis. Here the radical 
Olshausen illustrated how a separatist nationalist could fight a secessionist movement with the 
same ferocity. Being in St. Louis at the start of the war, Olshausen observed the turbulence 
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between the various immigrant communities in this rather complicated state. His radical ideals 
led him to believe that slavery was a major cause of the war and that everyone’s freedom was at 
stake. He was well aware of the torn political situation in Missouri, and claimed that most of the 
early unionists in that state were Germans. He associated the “freedom fighters” of 1848 with the 
defense of the Union. Based on his experiences, support for separatism would have made equal 
sense. Olshausen had harsh words for people who did not support the Union. Most people, he 
believed were disinterested, while those who took an interest were war speculators. For the 
South, Olshausen had even harsher words. He called secessionists a band of guerrillas, and 
believed that all people in the South were barbarians, worse than their Indian allies. He must 
have forgotten that he himself had been considered a barbarian at one time.72 
Secession in the United States witnessed Forty-Eighters flocking to the colors of the 
Union, but by grouping all German-American Forty-Eighters into one category, historians have 
overlooked the major differences in the backgrounds of these former revolutionaries. In the case 
of the separatist nationalists from Schleswig-Holstein, a unique legacy came into play. All three 
men featured in this chapter built on their European experiences in reacting to the secession 
crisis. Schleiden, as Bremen’s representative, drifted between humanitarian and pacifist 
impulses, his revolutionary and diplomatic experiences, and the trade interests of Bremen. 
Despite his opposition to slavery and preemptive nature of southern secession, Schleiden was 
still eager to prevent bloodshed. In the process, he faced probably the most difficult negotiations 
of his career and failed to overcome the mistrust of the two sides. He had dramatically changed 
sides in comparison to his diplomatic duties of 1848. 
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The radicals had again assumed an uncompromising position. They were willing to throw 
away the possibility of a Republican victory by suggesting a more radical presidential candidate 
and program. For the moment, their ambitions and political views were checked. As the nation 
broke apart and Olshausen in St. Louis was on the frontline of the guerrilla war in the Trans-
Mississippi theater, he continued to argue against southern nationalism. The radicals, who had 
been fighting for decades in Schleswig-Holstein for the separation from Denmark’s oppressive 
and unconstitutional actions, were ready to fight with the same commitment against what they 
perceived as an oppressive southern separatism. 
As in Schleswig-Holstein, battles and not words would determine the future of the United 
States. None of the Schleswig-Holstein Forty-Eighters seemed to have realized how close their 
own 1848 experiences were to that of the South. The final word in relation to this secessionist 
dilemma should go to Schleiden. In his memoirs, he recounted a conversation with Prussian 
negotiator Karl Georg Ludwig Guido von Usedom, who at the time had respected the rebellion in 
the duchies. As Schleiden recalled it, “He [Usedom] did not misunderstand that not the one who 
hits first starts a civil war, but the one who made the first strike necessary.”73 Confederates could 
not have said it any better. 
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Chapter Eight 
Civil War and Radicalism 
Once the Union and Confederate armies started to meet on the battlefields of North 
America, any potential dilemma the separatist nationalists might have faced in regard to southern 
secession disappeared. Like other Forty-Eighters, the men from Schleswig-Holstein stood by the 
Union. In the course of the war, the legacies of their experiences during the first Schleswig-
Holstein war reappeared. They still had no sympathy for the southern secessionists. While 
Rudolph M. Schleiden faithfully continued his diplomatic work and tried to advise Seward 
during the difficult decisions surrounding the Trent affair in December 1861, he also increasingly 
considered developments in Europe. He extracted many Germans helped them return to Europe. 
On the radical side, Hans R. Claussen and Theodor Olshausen, much as they had done during the 
first Schleswig-Holstein war, made the work of the Lincoln administration more difficult by 
challenging the government’s policies and trying to prevent the reelection of the president by 
supporting the candidacy of John C. Frémont. 
Upon the outbreak of war, the Lincoln administration stressed reunification over slavery 
as the main issue, much to the dismay of many abolitionists and to the detriment of the country’s 
foreign policy. Radical Forty-Eighters also took issue with the Union’s goal. However, Lincoln’s 
decision to avoid the slavery issue was necessary, considering that the slave states of Maryland, 
Missouri, and Kentucky remained half-heartedly in the Union. Emancipation early on in the war 
would have driven those states into the Confederacy. The policy made Olshausen a lasting 
enemy of the Lincoln administration. 
In Missouri, where the start of the conflict had already pitched the German and native 
populations against one another, the Union commander, John C. Frémont, imposed martial law 
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in August 1861 and issued an emancipation proclamation for the slaves of disloyal masters. 
Concerned about the impact of the proclamation, Lincoln countermanded the decree and was 
eventually forced to remove Frémont from command.1 Olshausen was outraged by Lincoln’s 
actions, and sympathized with the disgraced general. Having already observed that slavery was a 
major factor driving the sections apart, Olshausen looked favorably on Frémont’s attempt at 
emancipation. He called it, one of the most important gestures of the war, and he had expected 
the proclamation to expand beyond the state’s borders.2 It was regrettable, Olshausen thought, 
that the general’s effort had put him in such rough waters, for only the total end of slavery would 
restore peace and harmony to the United States.3 Olshausen had returned to a familiar posture, 
opposition to government policies during wartime. 
In Iowa, Claussen too was dissatisfied with the Lincoln administration’s decision to stress 
unification over slavery. Like Olshausen, he abhorred slavery and wanted nothing less than its 
complete abolition. As during the election campaign of 1860, no Republican was worthy of 
support, he said, who did not subscribe to abolition. For that reason, Claussen had worked 
against Bates and for Seward in 1860. He wanted slavery to be a much more prominent political 
and military issues. In a newspaper article reacting to the dismissal of Frémont and the end of his 
emancipation edict, Claussen made another one of his exaggerated claims that the vast majority 
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of northerners wanted the end of slavery.4 Claussen’s radicalism and narrow mindedness, which 
had made the radicals demand the continuation of the first Schleswig-Holstein war against all of 
Europe, had resurfaced.5 
The decision to emphasize union over slavery was a political necessity for Lincoln. The 
president had to placate slaveholders in the loyal slave states, but he also had a broader political 
purpose. He created a certain Burgfrieden. Democrats, who opposed emancipation, would 
support a war effort to end disunion. Despite the relative cooperative spirit in the North, 
opposition existed, and the government wasted little time in arresting opposition leaders, closing 
newspapers, and suspending the writ of habeas corpus.6 
Even in Missouri, the anti-Lincoln press was challenged. Frémont’s successor, Henry W. 
Halleck, notified Olshausen at the Westliche Post that unless the tone of the paper changed, the 
paper would be suspended.7 Later in the war, Olshausen complained to Lincoln about the 
censorship and policies undermining freedom of speech.8 He had done the same in Schleswig-
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Holstein. He was still the radical who was willing to challenge the government for undermining 
civil liberties.  
While Olshausen and Claussen contested wartime policies, the diplomatic corps in 
Washington had many other pressing worries. The European members of the diplomatic corps 
had frequent visits from European soldiers and officers seeking commissions in the Union army. 
In many cases, these men had letters of introduction or recommendations. If they were from the 
German states, their first stop upon arriving in Washington was to see either Schleiden or 
Friedrich Freiherr von Gerolt. The soldiers were then taken to Lincoln or Seward, who would 
recommend them to the War Department.9 Schleiden had a number of such cases, including an 
instance when his old friend Karl Georg Ludwig Guido von Usedom recommended an officer 
from Baden to him. Usedom acknowledged that he was not personally acquainted with the man, 
but a friend had recommended him to Usedom in glowing language. The officer had family 
problems, and desired a fresh start.10 Schleiden brought him to Seward’s attention, and the 
officer was likely in the field within a few weeks. A much more significant diplomatic challenge 
during which Schleiden took an active part occurred in the final month of 1861. 
Faced with the inability of the Confederate diplomats in Europe, Pierre Adolphe Rost, 
Ambrose Dudley Mann, and William Lowndes Yancey, to secure European support, the 
Confederate government decided to replace Rost and Yancey with James Mason of Virginia and 
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John Slidell of Louisiana.11 Like the duchies in 1848, so now did the South look for foreign aid 
in its fight against the Union. After finding their initial blockade running idea impossible to 
implement,12 the commissioners decided to slip out of Charleston and into the Caribbean to catch 
a British mail packet.13 After their escape from Charleston and a stop in Nassau, they awaited 
passage to Europe in Havana. On November 7, 1861, Mason, Slidell, and their entourage left 
Havana abroad the R.M.S. Trent for St. Thomas.14 
On November 8, at 11:40 a.m., the British vessel came in sight of the U.S.S. San Jacinto, 
which lay in waiting in the Bahama Canal. Things did not go as smoothly as the ship’s 
commander Charles Wilkes had anticipated, but he was able to achieve his goal of appending 
Mason, Slidell and their secretaries. However, he failed to search the Trent or put a prize crew on 
board to have the ship adjudicated by a court, he had skirted the requirements of international 
law.15 It would be up to others to resolve diplomatically the precarious situation Wilkes had 
created. 
                                                 
11 For debates about Confederate diplomacy see Charles M. Hubbard, The Burden of 
Confederate Diplomacy (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1998); Howard Jones, Blue 
and Gray Diplomacy: A History of Union and Confederate Foreign Relations (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2010); Frank L. Owsley, King Cotton Diplomacy; Foreign 
Relations of the Confederate States of America (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1931). 
12 Slidell and Mason to Hunter, October 3, 1861, printed in James D. Richardson, A 
Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Confederacy (Nashville, TN: United States 
Publishing Company, 1905), 2:96. 
13 Mason to Hunter, October 5, 1861, printed in Richardson, A Compilation of the 
Messages and Papers of the Confederacy, 2:97-99. 
14 Gordon H. Warren, Fountain of Discontent: The Trent Affair and the Freedom of the 
Seas (Boston, MA: Northeastern University Press, 1981), 10. 
15 Report of Captain Wilkes, U. S. Navy, of Capture of Messrs. Mason and Slidell, 
Confederate Commissioners on Board the British Mail Steamer Trent, November 15, 1861, 
Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion (Washington, 
DC: Government Printing Office, 1894), s. 1, 1:129-32 
 176 
News of the capture of Mason and Slidell soon reached Washington. As a former student 
of law, employee in the Danish commerce ministry, revolutionary diplomat at a time of war, and 
minister to the United States, Schleiden had lots of experience in questions of international law, 
and enough common sense to spot a weak legal case. On November 16, William H. Seward told 
him about the capture of Mason and Slidell and of their incarceration at Fort Warren as prisoners 
of the state. Schleiden speculated that the men had been taken by force. He immediately sensed 
problems. Seward listened to Schleiden’s concerns but remained largely indifferent. Aware of 
the workings of American democracy, Schleiden worried that the government would not have 
the courage to defy public opinion. He thought the best solution was to release the prisoners and 
apologize to London.16 
Schleiden talked with Seward again on the following day. He impressed on him the 
uniqueness of the incident, but Seward again brushed aside his concerns by telling Schleiden that 
neither the United States nor Great Britain wanted war and would, therefore, find a peaceful 
solution.17 Seward was correct. Despite the frequently presented story of Civil War diplomatic 
brinkmanship in the Trent affair, intervention by Great Britain was not a serious threat. 
The diplomatic representatives looked anxiously to the opening of Congress in early 
December for some clarity in the Trent affair. Congress approved resoundingly a congratulatory 
note to Captain Wilkes for his brave and patriotic service,18 but Lincoln’s annual message was 
surprisingly silent on the incident. Only Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles’s annual report 
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lauded Wilkes’ actions and tried to excuse his oversight in not bringing the vessel into port. 
Nevertheless, Wells cautioned, “It must by no means be permitted to constitute a precedent 
hereafter for the treatment of any case of similar infraction of neutral obligations by foreign 
vessels engaged in commerce or the carrying trade.”19 The United States was still uncertain 
about how to deal with the incident, not so the British. 
On November 28, the British cabinet met to discuss the Trent.20 Based on suggestions by 
the Law Officers of the Queen, who were present at the meeting, Lord Russell submitted to 
Queen Victoria a draft communiqué that demanded an apology and the release of the prisoners. 
A second dispatch ordered Lyons to leave Washington within seven days if the United States did 
not cooperate.21 On December 1, Queen Victoria returned Prince Albert’s edited version of these 
demands.22 The message remained largely unchanged, but the spirit was more conciliatory. 
Russell advised Lyons to seek an interview with Seward prior to delivering the demands. He also 
suggested that Lyons not tell Seward about the seven-day ultimatum.23 The note was soon on its 
way to Washington, where the final decision would be made. 
Before the demands arrived, Schleiden had another meeting with Seward about the Trent 
on December 17. Bremen’s representative again impressed upon the secretary the seriousness of 
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the situation. By then, news of the angry British reaction had arrived in Washington, and Seward 
complained that his peaceful policy had been called into doubt in Europe. He clarified once more 
that the government had not instructed Wilkes to capture Mason and Slidell; the captain had 
acted on his own. Schleiden pointed out that Welles’ statements cast doubt on that explanation. 
Seward replied angrily, “I don’t care a bit what Mr. Welles says.” It was he, the secretary of 
state, who made policies, and he asked Schleiden to communicate that fact to Lyons. Schleiden 
perceived that Seward was still interested in seeking a peaceful resolution of the affair. He was 
less certain that Great Britain could be pacified. The new secretary at the British legation, 
William Stuart, had on previous occasions in Brazil and Naples acted alone as temporary charge 
d’affaires and might do so again if relations broke down.24 As happened on his Richmond trip 
eight months earlier, Schleiden was again seeking international peace, this time by impressing 
upon the secretary the illegality of Wilkes’ action. 
On December 19, 1861, the British messenger, Conway Seymour, reached the legation in 
Washington and delivered the demands from London. It was up to Lyons and the government of 
the United States to handle the situation and resolve the question peacefully. That very afternoon, 
Lyons went to the State Department and talked with Seward. Lyons mentioned the arrival of the 
demands for a release of the prisoners and for a suitable apology. He indicated to Seward that he 
was flexible in dealing with the prisoner question and could delay the delivery of the 
communiqué. Seward asked Lyons for forty-eight hours in order to communicate with the 
president and consider the question.25 
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Despite trying to maintain secrecy, Schleiden, who had connections all over Washington, 
among them an unnamed source close to the secretary, knew by the evening that Great Britain 
had asked for a “reparation of this ill advised step.” Schleiden guessed that Great Britain was 
preparing to break with the United States, an impression reinforced when a British warship 
arrived at Annapolis, supposedly to take Lord Lyons away.26 There were two possible sources 
for Schleiden’s information, his friend Charles Sumner or Adam Gurowski, the translator at the 
State Department. Schleiden had met both men at Sumner’s residence on December 19. Despite 
disliking each other, and Gurowski making comments about the “rotten governments of Europe,” 
there was a possibility that either one of them mentioned the British demand during their 
conversation with Schleiden.27 Schleiden had always had good connections among influential 
policy makers, and this situation was no exception. 
On Monday, at 10 a.m., Lyons presented the demand to Seward, who promised to bring it 
immediately to the attention of the president and respond to it as soon as possible. Lyons also 
told Seward that he must have a formal reply within seven days. Seward feared that the 
ultimatum would make it more difficult for him to deal with the issue in the cabinet, but he 
preferred to keep that information to himself.28 Lyons confessed that he was not very hopeful 
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that the U.S. government would give in,29 although he was grateful that only Lincoln, Lyons, and 
Seward knew about the British request.30 
On Christmas Day, Lincoln’s cabinet met to discuss the British ultimatum. Lincoln had 
called Sumner to the meeting to read the letters from John Bright and Richard Cobden, Members 
of Parliament, who had expressed their outrage at the action of Captain Wilkes.31 Because of 
Sumner’s presence at the meeting, Schleiden knew about the details of the discussions.32 
However, the debate that day ended without a solution.33 On Lincoln’s request, Seward prepared 
an apology and on the next day, Seward convinced his colleagues that the prisoners had to be 
released.34 Four days later, Seward informed Lyons that the United States would release Mason, 
Slidell, and their secretaries.35 On January 1, 1862, the four men were transferred at 
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Provincetown, Massachusetts, to H.M.S. Rinaldo, which carried them to Canada.36 The Trent 
affair had been settled peacefully. 
While the crisis unfolded, France, Austria, and Prussia had sent notes in support of the 
British demands to the U.S. government. The notes from the two central European powers had 
been inspired by events in Europe, rather than those across the Atlantic. Initially, Seward 
received the Austrian and Prussian notes, which arrived well after the settlement of the Trent 
affair, as confirmation of each country’s support and friendship. However, that perspective 
quickly changed. At the end of January, Seward had become upset and bitter that Prussia “had 
been whipped” by England into sending its note. He told Schleiden that any such communiqué 
must be regarded as “ungracious” after a decision had been made.37 There is no evidence that 
Great Britain and France had “whipped” Prussian into sending its note. Rather, European issues 
had forced the Prussians response. 
After settling the Trent affair, Seward and the British continued to debate the finer details 
of international law, but the danger of a trans-Atlantic war had subsided, to be replaced by other, 
more pressing matters on both sides of the Atlantic. For Schleiden, these other issues involved a 
return to Europe, where he worked with the governments of the three Hanseatic Cities to expand 
his authority to represent them in Washington. Over the years, Hamburg had made inroads when 
it came to the lucrative transatlantic trade. The city had already requested Schleiden’s help in 
finding lost relatives or obtaining death certificates. Despite being in some commercial 
                                                 
36 Lyons to Russell, December 31, 1861, The American Civil War through British Eyes, 
1:258-59; Schleiden to Senats-Commission für die auswärtigen Angelegenheiten, January 6, 
1862, 2-B.13.b.1.a.2.c.I, SAB. 
37 It could be that this statement has a different reason. Schleiden cautioned later in the 
letter that he had observed that Seward had shown a bad mood. Rudolf Schleiden to Heinrich 
Smidt, January 24, 1862, 2-B.13.b.1.a.2.c.I, SAB. 
 182 
competition, with one another, the three cities did appreciate the benefits of a united 
representation in Washington.38 The talks were successful, and Schleiden returned to 
Washington with an expanded mandate. 
When Schleiden returned to Washington in the fall of 1862, he entered a political 
hornet’s nest. Much like the radicals in Schleswig-Holstein during the first Schleswig-Holstein 
war, with their outrageous and often counterproductive demands of the government, so, too, did 
radicals in the Republican party challenge the Lincoln administration. The so-called radical 
Republicans, including Sumner and Chase, had taken issue with the conduct of the war. 
Knowing they could not attack Lincoln directly, they picked on the man they mistakenly took to 
be the power behind the throne, Seward. Believing the secretary of state had grown too powerful, 
based on their information from Seward’s chief cabinet rival, Chase, the radicals wanted to gain 
influence by removing Seward from office.39 Early in 1862, Schleiden had already perceived that 
a reshuffling of the cabinet was likely to come, but he assumed that Seward was safe. To the 
contrary, Seward’s opponents were determined to undermine the secretary.40  
Schleiden’s accreditation as minister resident of the Hanseatic Cities was delayed 
because of a cabinet crisis, brought about by the radicals, in December 1862. Determine to end 
the radical challenge to Seward’s position, Lincoln cleverly discredited Chase at a meeting of his 
cabinet and select radical leaders. Both Seward and Chase submitted their resignations. Lincoln 
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as a result retained both men, and by December 22, 1862, with Chase and the radicals having 
been chastened, Schleiden could present his documents. The situation was reminiscent of the 
radicals attempt to remove the war minister in Schleswig-Holstein, even though, in this case, the 
radical Schleswig-Holstein radicals played no role. 
The new year of 1863 signaled not only the demise of slavery, but also an end of the 
Burgfrieden in the United States. The northern Democracy, which had been willing to support a 
war for the Union, was unwilling to support one for abolition. Interestingly, the same people who 
had seen slavery as a divisive factor also withheld their support for the “Great Emancipator.”41 
The conduct of the war and the limits on civil liberties drew criticism from radical Forty-Eighters 
like Olshausen. Olshausen called Lincoln’s government a “pitiful administration, the country 
overrun by corruption and fraud, and a miserable war effort.” He had equally harsh words for the 
Confederates, whom he called “barbarous rebels.”42 This came, again, from a separatist 
nationalist who himself had been a rebel only fifteen years earlier. 
As a result of his low opinion of Lincoln, which had only increased with the restrictions 
on freedom of speech and press, Olshausen became active in the political campaigns of 1864. He 
wanted the Republican party to adopt a radical program. If the party refused such a program, he 
was in favor of running a third presidential candidate against Lincoln. To foster these views, 
Olshausen attended the Louisville Freedom Convention of the Slave States in late February 
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1864.43 In the following months, he sought a radical candidate to challenge Lincoln. The choice 
was easy, since the radicals had already found their hero in 1861: John C. Frémont.44 He lauded 
Frémont as a “noble, educated, and reasonable man,” while casting Lincoln as a narrow-minded, 
finance political Illinois rural lawyer.45 In early May, the call went out for a radical nominating 
convention, separate from the general party convention. The radical Schleswig-Holstein Forty-
Eighter was doing the same thing he had done during the first Schleswig-Holstein war, 
challenging the government during a time of crisis. 
The radical Forty-Eighters in Iowa welcomed the call. Like Olshausen, Claussen had 
been critical of Lincoln’s polices. After their fight in 1861, he and the editor of Der Demokrat 
had made peace and together opposed Lincoln’s renomination. At a public meeting, which 
voiced the German opposition to Lincoln’s reelection, Claussen criticized Lincoln’s policies 
toward Missouri, which he did not explain further, and the non-acceptance of African-American 
recruits in Kentucky. This Schleswig-Holstein radical also gave Frémont his support.46 Der 
Demokrat continued until the election to carry a small notice promoting Frémont. Furthermore, 
Claussen criticized the Lincoln administration’s patronage, foreign policy, and military policy.47 
Like Olshausen, he had no good words for the president. He characterized Lincoln as a brakemen 
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who had prevented liberty from coming to terms.48 United in their opposition to Lincoln, the 
delegates went to the radical convention in Cleveland intending to nominate another candidate 
and provide him with a radical program. 
State conventions gave their delegates to Cleveland some guiding principles. The radicals 
in Missouri nominated Olshausen to represent them. The convention convened as the nominating 
convention of the Radical Democracy.49 The title was ill-advised because many moderate 
politicians in the United States already viewed the radical Forty-Eighters with suspicion, 
considering their background in Europe. In Olshausen’s case, that suspicion was not far from the 
truth.50 Olshausen was one of many Forty-Eighters present, although, with many non-German 
delegates also present, this wing was far from being a German opposition group.51 
The Cleveland Convention agreed to a diverse program that included the restoration of 
the Union, the suppression of secession, and the end of slavery, insured by a constitutional 
amendment. However, the delegates also voiced again their criticism of Lincoln’s attack on civil 
liberties by calling for a guarantee of freedom of speech and press except in areas under martial 
law. They also wanted to amendment the Constitution by limiting a president to a single term. In 
response to the French supported monarchical experiment in Mexico, the Radical Democracy 
supported a vigorous enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine against that un-republican regime. 
Looking toward the end of the war, the radicals also opposed Lincoln’s Ten Percent Plan and 
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wanted limits on executive power during reconstruction. Like Congressional radicals, they, too, 
wanted postwar reunion under the control of Congress.52 Having written its platform, the 
convention then nominated Frémont as its candidate, and waited to see what the Republicans 
would do in Baltimore, and if they would be able to sustain themselves. 
As in Schleswig-Holstein during the war, the moderates quickly checked the radicals. 
The Republican national convention adopted many of the Cleveland convention’s proposals. 
Since it was not advisable to split the party in the face of the strong Democratic challenge under 
George B. McClellan, Frémont reevaluated his position. As a result, the Frémont candidacy 
lasted only to September. Until then, however, Olshausen was an active supporter, giving 
speeches in support of the Radical Democracy candidate.53 Frémont’s decision to drop out of the 
race angered many radicals. One letter to the editor denigrated the radicals in Missouri as the 
“Olshausen Clique.”54 As in 1848, the radicals and their unwelcomed challenges were just as 
despised in the United States as they had been in Schleswig-Holstein. 
While Olshausen remained committed to the Frémont nomination until the end, Claussen 
was quick to explain the failure of the Radical Democracy and the renomination of Lincoln by 
the Republican party. He blamed the Cleveland convention for nominating Frémont instead of 
working toward a broader opposition to Lincoln and not selecting any candidate.55 Apparently, 
he, like many others, believed that the strong presence of Germans in Cleveland undermined the 
movement’s success. Der Demokrat even pointed to the hypocrisy of those German immigrants 
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who had opposed the nomination of Lincoln but than supported him in the election and ridiculed 
the radical elements of the party.56 
The election campaign between Lincoln, who by early September could rely on the fall of 
Atlanta and Philip H. Sheridan’s successes in the Shenandoah Valley to bolster his campaign, 
and his Democratic opponent, George B. McClellan, was hard fought. Lincoln carried the nation 
with a comfortable margin of the popular votes and an even stronger showing in the Electoral 
College.57 With the reelection of Lincoln, Olshausen faced a personal crisis. He despised the 
president and was unwilling to stay another four years in a country governed by him. In January 
1865, Olshausen believed that his time in the United States must come to an end. He informed 
his family that with the defeat of Frémont had supported since the start, there was nothing left for 
him in the United States. He sold his newspaper and prepared to return to Europe.58 Like many 
other radicals, Olshausen loved the concept of democracy but when democracy did not work in 
his favor, he ran or fought the results. 
He was not the only Forty-Eighter who longed for a return to Europe. Since 1860, and 
despite having been given an expanded responsibilities in Washington, Schleiden had been 
asking for a reassignment to Europe. He had no intentions of dying in the United States,59 and he 
wanted to be closer to his aging mother in Europe. London or Paris was his preferred new post.60 
Heinrich Smidt was rather supportive of Schleiden’s request but there were no vacancies for him 
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in Europe.61 The government of Bremen had sent Johannes Rösing to Washington in late 1860 to 
work as Schleiden’s charge d’affaires and thus prepare for the minister’s eventual departure,62 
but it had no desire to leave the position in Washington vacant.63 
The only place Schleiden could be reassigned was London. A vacancy had opened up in 
Paris in 1863, but experience had shown that a Schleswig-Holstein revolutionary would not be 
welcome at the court of Napoleon III.64 There was talk of reshuffling the small diplomatic corps 
of Bremen to allow Schleiden to return to Europe.65 Bremen even considered assigning Rösing 
to London and maintaining Schleiden in Washington.66 Schleiden himself suggested temporarily 
appointing Rösing to London until the war in the United States was settled, at which point 
Rösing would take over Schleiden’s position in Washington and Schleiden would assume the 
minister’s post in London.67 It would take another year before an opportunity would arise for 
Schleiden. 
During the American Civil War, the three Schleswig-Holsteiner continued what they had 
done during the first Schleswig-Holstein war. Schleiden continued his diplomatic work by 
advising Seward especially during the Trent affair. For the most part however, he was occupied 
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with the protection of German citizens and presenting Germans who wanted to fight for the 
Union to the U.S. government, duties similar to those he had carried out during the first 
Schleswig-Holstein war. In the western states, the radicals continued their habit of criticizing 
government policy. As a result of Olshausen criticisms of the Lincoln government, the 
commanding officer in Missouri threatened to shut down his paper, adding to the Forty-Eighter’s 
resentment of the government. Olshausen promoted a radical challenge to the government in the 
presidential election of 1864. Failing in that, he determined to leave the country. In contrast to 
the resentful Olshausen, Claussen tried to make the best of the situation. Schleiden looked back 
to Europe for a European assignment, but he did not seek to leave the United States for political 
reasons. 
After a turbulent revolutionary period in Europe, the Schleswig-Holstein rebels had come 
to the United States seeking a new homes and professional opportunities. They brought with 
them their old ideological and personal views, which resurfaced when they faced the 
deteriorating sectional conflict in the United States. The Schleswig-Holstein Forty-Eighters were 
a unique group; they were not only left leaning politically. They were also separatist-nationalists. 
However, as they embraced their 1848 legacy, the three men broke with it. Schleiden continued 
throughout this period to work as a diplomat and promote international peace. At times, as in the 
Greytown affair or during his Richmond trip of April 1861, he came up against hurdles as high 
as those faced in the first Schleswig-Holstein war, but and his diplomatic skills and experiences 
were unable to overcome them. The radicals continued their politic activism by opposing 
oppression, but they found its most virulent form not in northern challenges to southern rights, 
which they supported, but in the institution of slavery. 
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When, in 1860, the southern states determined that they had suffered enough oppression 
and would not risk further infringement on their constitutional rights by a sectional candidate, 
they did what Schleswig-Holstein had done in 1848: they started a revolution. In this conflict, the 
separatist-nationalists from Schleswig-Holstein refused to sympathize with or support the 
southern secessionists, despite the many similarities between their two movements. Instead, the 
Schleswig-Holstein Forty-Eighters fought just as hard against the secessionism of the South as 
they had fought in favor of their own right to secede. 
Similar to their roles during the first Schleswig-Holstein war, the radicals challenged the 
Lincoln government and its policies. Despite the wartime crisis in the North, the radicals 
believed that no infringement on civil liberties should occur. As these infringements continued, 
Olshausen joined other dissatisfied radicals in the Republican party to promote John C. Frémont 
as a challenger in the presidential election. 
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Chapter Nine 
The Second Schleswig-Holstein War and German Unification 
Having spent eleven years in the United States, Olshausen, for political, and Schleiden, 
for personal, reasons returned to Europe at a crucial time in the history of their home country. 
Few historians who have dealt with the Forty-Eighters have explored their lives in detail, and 
even fewer have looked at the return migration. Olshausen and Schleiden are not unique in their 
return to Europe; others, such as Friedrich Kapp, did the same.1 Yet, this return migration is an 
important aspect of the Forty-Eighters’ story, and shows both the continuity of European 
nationalism and how the immigrants’ years in the United States may have changed them. The 
separatist, or secessionist, tendencies of the Schleswig-Holstein rebels seemed to diminish during 
their American sojourn, but had their secessionist tendencies changed, or simply been altered by 
circumstances in the United States were it largely the circumstance in the United States. 
Olshausen and Schleiden had both personal and political reasons for returning to Europe. 
The Schleswig-Holstein issue had reemerged and caused new controversy in Europe. By 
November 1864, former revolutionary friends from Europe had reestablished contact and urged 
Schleiden and other former leaders of the first Schleswig-Holstein war to return and once more 
support their legitimate prince, Friedrich Christian August von Schleswig-Holstein-Sonderburg-
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Augustenburg (the future Herzog Friedrich VIII of Schleswig-Holstein).2 Olshausen, who had 
paid close attention to developments in Europe and the reemergence of the Schleswig-Holstein 
question, had even been invited in December 1863 to return to Europe and assume a position of 
leadership.3 In order to better understand the developments in Schleswig-Holstein a historical 
survey of events after 1852 is in order. 
Schleswig-Holstein, immediately after the war, started to case problems again. The 
Protocol of London of 1852 was supposed to have solved the Schleswig-Holstein question and 
end the claims by the Augustenburgs. However, the treaty left much to be desired especially in 
regard to the succession question in the duchies.4 Immediately, the new Danish constitution ran 
into opposition in Holstein because King Frederik VII promulgated it without legislative 
approval. In 1855, another constitution, the Common Constitution, was announced and submitted 
to the diets for support.5 Further problems emerged when Denmark tried to impose its currency 
on the duchies.6 The duchies, in turn, caused problems of their own. 
Increasingly, the German Bund took issue with Danish defiance of the Protocol of 
London. For Prussia and Austria, it was a national question worth their efforts.7 As a result, by 
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1856, the threat of a federal execution loomed over Jutland and Dano-German relations.8 The 
British believed the duchies had a legitimate grievance and that the new constitution should be 
abrogated. They also asked the Danes to end their provocative policies in Holstein and avoid a 
new conflict with the Bund. No one desired for another war.9 However, since the Schleswig-
Holstein question was in part an international one, the British remained involved in the 
discussions.10 The tensions in Jutland continued to escalate. 
During the summer 1857, the Danish government prepared a new constitution but limited 
the debate when submitting the document to the Holstein states.11 This was another infringement 
on the rights of Holstein. On February 11, 1858, the Bund appointed a commission to look into 
the concerns voiced by Holstein.12 Frederik VII, finding himself in a precarious position, 
pressured by the German Bund to implement the Protocol of London and Danish national 
demands to incorporate Schleswig, tried to solve some of the problems. On November 6, 1858, 
he announced a more conciliatory edict, but the Bund misinterpreted the document as a precursor 
to the incorporation of Schleswig.13 The old question, which had caused the first Schleswig-
Holstein war, had reemerged. 
By 1860, the threat to European peace had returned. A commission implemented by the 
German Bund reported on January 17, 1861 that both the Danish Patent of September 1859 and 
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the Finance Law of 1860 were illegal since they lacked the approval of the Holstein diet.14 The 
threat of a federal execution loomed again. The German governments fostered the perception of 
an imminent conflict.15 Denmark was reluctant to accept the terms of the Bund. Compared with 
the federal execution, convoking the Holstein diet was the lesser of two evils. However, for 
Denmark’s president of the council of ministers and foreign minister Carl C. Hall, convoking the 
Holstein estates was comparable to “a sort of tribunal of censure over the Danish Monarchy.” 
Hall believed incorrectly that the Bund’s demands would mean that every law passed by the 
Danish Rigsdag would have to be submitted to the Holstein diet. He feared that, “the result of 
this would be to give to Holstein, and through Holstein to Germany, a power of interference in 
the affairs of Denmark.”16 This was not the intention, but misunderstandings had often prevailed 
in the contested Dano-German borderland. 
While the British and Prussians talked about possible avenues out of the Schleswig-
Holstein dilemma,17 the Danish king unexpectedly convoked the Holstein diet to meet in an 
extraordinary session on March 6.18 However, the German states were not appeased easily. They 
had learned their lessons from the first Schleswig-Holstein war, when their weakness had made 
them susceptible to pressure from the great powers and prevented the accomplishment of 
national goals. As a result, Schleinitz asked Graf von Usedom, who had been involved in the 
negotiations at the end of the first Schleswig-Holstein war, to prepare a blueprint for a new 
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conflict. Usedom advised Schleinitz that events should develop as follows: first, the Bund would 
enact an execution and occupy Holstein; second, Denmark would declare a blockade; and third, 
lacking a strong navy, German troops would march into Schleswig. By that point, Denmark and 
the German states would be in a state of war. Usedom argued that it would be best for Denmark 
to break the Protocol of London of 1852 and allow the German states to blame her for the war.19 
In contrast to 1848, the German states would enter the second Schleswig-Holstein war with a 
more viable plan and more powerful leaders. 
When the Prussian king called on Otto Eduard Leopold von Bismarck-Schönhausen in 
the fall 1862 to solve the constitutional impasse in Prussia, a dramatic shift in foreign policy 
occurred. The conservative Junker immediately took the initative in the Schleswig-Holstein 
question.20 In late 1862, Bismarck suggested an abrogation of the Protocol of London and a 
return to the status quo antebellum. Not yet ready for war, he wondered how he could use the 
German Bund to get around Prussia’s obligations under the protocol.21 With Bismarck, a 
belligerent spirit had entered the Schleswig-Holstein question. 
In 1863, the tensions in the Dano-German relationship escalated. Influenced by Europe’s 
distraction with the Polish insurrection and its fallout, the Danish king attempted a new 
constitution that would incorporate Schleswig. Meanwhile, Bismarck was working to recruit 
Austrian support for an eventual conflict in the duchies. He wanted Austrian troops to be among 
the first to enter Holstein and so diffuse European concerns, prevent Austria from deserting 
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Prussia, and avoid a repetition of the first Schleswig-Holstein war.22 As a result of this 
escalation, Denmark attempted to appease the Bund by offering to suspend the normal budget of 
Holstein if Holstein paid its share of the national debt. Denmark was even willing to grant the 
Holstein diet more power. Bismarck was non-committal.23 
The tensions increased when, on November 15, King Frederick VII of Denmark died and 
left the proposed constitution to his successor. Initially, it was unclear whether the new 
constitution had already taken effect. The much bigger problem was that Christian IX had come 
to the throne through the female line of succession, which was not permitted in the duchies.24 
The old 1848 questions regarding succession had returned in force. 
With the succession question reopened, the Augustenburg pretender laid claim to the 
throne of the duchies and called on his followers to come to his assistance. From the United 
States, Schleiden watched the reopening of the Schleswig-Holstein question with growing 
interest.25 In February 1864, he wrote to Hermann von Roggenbach that he was “more in 
Europe” than with the events in the United States.26 Part of the distraction was because of letters, 
he received from fellow Augustenburg supporters who urged him to return and assist them. 
Schleiden was torn between his duty to the Hanseatic Cities and his duty to his home.27 Initially, 
                                                 
22 Karolyi to Rechberg, June 5, 1863, Promemoria des Auswärtigen Amtes, June 27, 
1863, APP,  3:606-607. 
23 Buchanan to Russell, November 7, 1863, APP, 4:119. 
24 Bernstorff to Bismarck, November 16, 1863, APP, 4:158-60. 
25 Schleiden to C.H. Merck, November 27, 1863, 7,116-1-2, SAB; Schleiden to Rösing, 
May 7, 1863, Rheinromantik and Civil War im Diplomatischen Dienst in den Vereinigten 
Staaten, ed. Norbert Klatt (Göttingen, Germany: Norbert Klatt Verlag, 2003), 56. 
26 Schleiden to Hermann von Roggenbach, February 4, 1864, Fasc 33, Nachlass 
Schleiden, SAB. 
27 Schleiden to Th. Curtius, February 15, 1864, 7,116-2-7, SAB. 
 197 
he obtained permission for a leave of absence, but he hoped to be reassigned to London and thus 
be closer to the events in Jutland. 
Knowing their minister’s torn interests, some politicians in the Hanseatic Cities worried 
that Schleiden was not serious about the London post. Rumors had appeared that he only wanted 
the position until the duchies had gained their independence and Augustenburg appointed him to 
London.28 In response, Schleiden told Heinrich Smidt and his supporters in Bremen, “I can only 
repeat that I have never thought about becoming minister for the duke and even today do not 
think about it.” Interestingly enough, Schleiden immediately qualified those words by saying that 
“only the combination of a dual representation of the Hanseatic Cities and Schleswig-Holstein” 
could alter the situation.29 Schleiden’s eleven years in Washington had done no damage to his 
separatist-nationalism. His opposition to southern secessionism had not indicated any change of 
heart. 
As a pacifist, Schleiden faced a dilemma with the possibility of a Dano-German war. He 
arrived in Europe too late to witness the initial escalation of the conflict. Around, Christmas 
1863, troops of the Bund had occupied Holstein, and when, on January 1, 1864, the new Danish 
constitution took effect, the Austrians and Prussians prepared to escalate the conflict. On January 
13, Bismarck sent an ultimatum to be delivered by his minister in Denmark, which, if not 
fulfilled within forty-eight hours, would mean war.30 The instructions to present the ultimatum 
came three days later, on January 16. The Dano-German War had started and Austrian and 
Prussian troops moved into Schleswig. 
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For Schleiden, the federal execution had already been a regrettable development. He did 
not say why but it likely related to his pacifist nature. He also was probably concerned that an 
escalation might bring the European powers into the conflict. Especially Napoleon III and his 
ambitious plans could especially complicate the Schleswig-Holstein question.31 It would be 
important to present a united front, move quickly, and not let opportunities slide as they had done 
in the first Schleswig-Holstein war. Schleiden hoped that the combined German forces would 
brush aside the Danish army, as Karl XII of Sweden had done a hundred and fifty years earlier. 
Success on the battlefield would allow the German states to dictate peace.32 He had learned from 
his own experiences and hoped the German states had learned from their own. 
The new war might even offer the opportunity to bring about German unification, which 
had failed in 1848. Schleiden could not help but compare the death of Frederik VII to that of 
Christian VIII twenty-four years earlier. However, the legacy and mistrust of Prussia was 
difficult for Schleiden to shake off. He confessed that the “oneness and willingness to sacrifice” 
might come to nothing because of the “weakness, half-heartedness, and slowness of the 
Prussians and Austrians.” Yet, Schleiden remained hopeful that the Schleswig-Holstein question 
might finally be solved and with it, the German question. Even if diplomacy failed, the unity of 
the German people and their united military power might accomplish things diplomacy could not 
achieve. Unlike most of his contemporaries, Schleiden believed that a division of Schleswig was 
the best way to create a permanent peace. Denmark should look toward a union with Norway and 
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Sweden, resembling the old idea of a Scandinavian union.33 Schleiden had still hoped for peace, 
but Bismarck’s politics had made that impossible. 
The war progressed swiftly, and despite the legacy of 1848, when the crossing into 
Jutland had brought international pressure, the Austrians and Prussians prepared for the invasion 
of Denmark.34 The invasion was temporarily delayed as the British, much as in 1848, suggested 
that peace talks to be held in London.35 With both sides agreeing, British foreign minster Lord 
John Russell, on April 8, sent a formal invitation to the belligerents. Bismarck delayed the start 
of the conference by insisting on the participation of the German Bund.36 His tactic benefitted 
the German side by giving them a stronger bargaining position following their victory at 
Düppeln/Dybbøl on April 18.37 
As in the first Schleswig-Holstein war, the initial goal of the meeting was to agree on a 
four weeks armistice.38 The two sides were at first unable to agree on the maritime questions, but 
on May 4, 1864, Great Britain proposed a new armistice plan,39 which found Bismarck’s 
approval40 and Denmark’s reluctant agreement. Hostilities ceased for four months starting on 
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May 12.41 The peace talks could start in earnest. It was at this point that the exiled Schleswig-
Holstein nationalists saw their opportunity to push for Augustenburg’s claim. 
Like a few other Schleswig-Holsteiners, Schleiden was in London for the conference. 
Having experienced the betrayal of the Prussians during the previous uprising, Schleiden 
watched their every step. He continued to believe that only a division of Schleswig would 
provide a lasting solution to the Schleswig-Holstein question. The contentious problem was 
where to draw the line.42 
Even though he was not in London in any official capacity, Schleiden was in frequent 
contact with the representative of the German Bund, Beust. Their similar views on Schleswig-
Holstein provided common ground. Beust had suggested that the Bund and Austria should 
immediately recognize Friedrich von Augustenburg as the legitimate ruler of the duchies.43 
Schleiden was adamant in his support for division of Schleswig and Augustenburg’s claim. His 
frequent reminders to the government in Bremen were likely intended to have them initiate a 
plan to achieve this with the German Bund. Schleiden suggested to Beust that he seek 
instructions for a recognition of Augustenburg’s claim and an agreement on the principal of 
division. Schleiden was well aware of the European diplomatic problems that played into the 
negotiations and war in southern Jutland. Schleiden mentioned that an annexation of one or both 
of the duchies, and thus territorial expansion, would most likely trigger a demand by France for 
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compensation along the Rhine River, especially in the Saar region.44 However, Schleiden knew 
that Prussia intended to forestall the Augustenburg succession.45 
While Schleiden was active supporting Augustenburg and the independence of the 
duchies, Olshausen remained reluctant to become involved. He was still a separatist but also a 
radical. He had been invited to return to the duchies and take a leadership role among his fellow 
democrats. However, Olshausen was not sure if he should follow this call from the homeland, 
since the ends did seem to favor democracy. He informed his brother, “It was clear to me from 
the start that the thing would take the same path as the events in 1848 had, because the 
Schleswig-Holstein elite had once more clung to the Duke of Augustenburg and the German 
princes.” Most importantly, Olshausen believed that “German politics were just obnoxious” to 
him.46 He admitted that Schleswig-Holstein had little pull on him when he determined to leave 
the United States. He was unhappy with the prospects of the Augustenburg succession, which 
was still supported by members of the Schleswig-Holstein expatriate community, but not enough 
to actively oppose it. In addition, as much as he wished the yoke of Danish rule removed, 
Prussian-Austrian rule was not much better.47 Despite his opposition to American-style 
secessionism, Olshausen was still a separatist, and he still stood for the radical views he had 
espoused on the 1848 uprising. 
Schleiden only slowly realized that his diplomatic tactic to cooperate with the 
representative of the Bund was as misplaced as was the diplomacy of the duchies in the first 
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Schleswig-Holstein war. The Bund did not make the decisions in the Schleswig-Holstein 
question; Bismarck made them. On May 28, the representatives of the Bund proposed the 
independence of the duchies and the appointment of Augustenburg to rule the duchies.48 
Bismarck replied that Schleswig-Holstein’s independence was acceptable but not the 
Augustenburg succession.49 Denmark was not ready to discuss any proposal that took away part 
of the kingdom.50 As the negotiations led, the resumption of war seemed likely. Such a fate 
would make the national desires of the duchies more difficult to achieve. 
Despite the two sides agreeing in early June to a two-week extension of the cease-fire, 
Schleiden knew that negotiations had failed. He had gained enough experience in the Schleswig-
Holstein question to know that war and not diplomacy would bring the final settlement.51 On 
June 26, the time for talks ran out, and the London Conference had failed to bring about a 
settlement. Since the diplomatic route had failed, Schleiden, reliving his 1848 experience in 
Prussia, was at a loss as to where to go next. He thought that the next logical place to assist the 
Augustenburg candidacy was Paris. However, Karl Friedrich Lucian Samwer, a fellow 
Augustenburg supporter, discouraged him. There was little Schleiden would be able to do in 
Paris, he explained. If he still decided to go, Samwer asked Schleiden to impress upon the 
Prussian minister in Paris, Robert Heinrich Ludwig Graf von der Goltz, that the duke of 
Augustenburg did not have a negative opinion of Prussia.52 Schleiden continued the nationalist 
struggle he had begun fifteen years earlier. 
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The resumption of the second Schleswig-Holstein war kept the hopes of the supporters of 
Augustenburg alive. Continuing his diplomatic work in the nationalist cause, Schleiden went to 
Gastein to meet with Bismarck. However much alike the circumstances of 1848 and 1861 may 
have been, he was going up against a politician whom even his diplomatic skills could not sway. 
His attempt to meet with the Prussian king was forestalled by Bismarck and Albrecht Theodor 
Emil Graf von Roon, who had incorrectly portrayed Schleiden as a member of the provisional 
government of 1848.53 Schleiden was impressed with but also concerned about Bismarck. He 
described the Prussian as a clever and smart man who was also dangerous and careless.54 
Schleiden noted that Bismarck had the same character flaw as Seward: “He understands it better 
to get out of embarrassing situations and to use the mistake of his opponents, instead of avoiding 
such situations in the first place.”55 
After Roon introduced Schleiden to Bismarck, the two had a conversation that lasted over 
three hours. Bismarck explained his view on the succession question in the duchies and his 
understanding of the complicated nature of the succession titles. However, with Denmark 
surrendering the claim to the duchies, the chancellor said, the two German powers would 
determine the future of the duchies. Bismarck further dismissed the German Bund, arguing that it 
no longer had a say in the duchies.56 In addition, Schleiden and Bismarck talked about the future 
of Germany. Bismarck mentioned that he had suggested to Austria a division of the country 
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along the Main River. Schleiden was not happy with that prospect, but did not indicate if he 
mentioned his disagreement to Bismarck.57 This would be the first but not last time the two men 
squared off over their visions for the duchies. 
Fears that Bismarck might squander the possibility of German victory and possible 
unification were misplaced.58 The resumption of the Dano-German War was a disaster for 
Denmark. On July 18, the Danes had to agree to a new armistice. On October 30, 1864, the final 
peace was ratified. Denmark ceded the three duchies, Schleswig, Holstein, and Lauenburg, to the 
German Bund. However, with their incorporation, the question of who should govern them 
arose. As Bismarck indicated in his conversation with Schleiden, the Prussians opposed both an 
Augustenburg take over and the involvement of the Bund. The Schleswig-Holstein question was 
far from settled. 
Following the peace with Denmark, the Austrians and Prussians agreed in the Convention 
of Gastein that the two duchies should be administered separately. The “up ewig ungedeelt” 
nationalism that had brought about the past two conflicts was abrogated in the treaty. Wisely, the 
Prussians took over Schleswig, the northern duchy, giving the southern duchy of Holstein to the 
Austrians. The Prussians, due to the disjointed territory, forced the Austrians to allow Prussian 
troops to cross Holstein freely. Gastein was a major sellout for the Austrians. More than that, 
Bismarck immediately set to work to isolate the Austrians and prepare for another conflict. This 
conflict would finally determine the leader of the new Germany. 
In the process of escalating the diplomatic relations with Austria, Bismarck relied on the 
Schleswig-Holstein question. With Prussian pressure mounting, the Austrians turned to the 
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German Bund. On June 1, 1866, the Austrians asked the Bund to step in and assist in the search 
for a final settlement of the Schleswig-Holstein question. Bismarck was offended and decided to 
use the incident to claim that Austria had violated the Convention of Gastein. Prussian troops 
marched into Holstein. In response to this open hostility by the Prussians, Austria asked for the 
mobilization of the army of the Bund. The Bund complied. In response, the Prussians on June 14, 
1866, declared war on the Bund. Only two years after fighting side by side in the Dano-German 
War, the Austrians and Prussians engaged in the Austro-Prussian War. 
This was not how liberals had envisioned German unification. The north-south division 
of the German states in the coming war smacked of the recently concluded American Civil War. 
Many Germans were not ready for a Prussianization of Germany that resembled Italian 
unification under Comte Camillo Benso de Cavour. Already in the summer 1862, Schleiden 
noticed that the south German states were not at all interested in having the north German states, 
or more precisely Prussia, dominate them. “[Ludwig Karl Heinrich Freiherr] von der Pfordten 
frankly said to me that a determined majority in south Germany and especially in Bavaria was 
more likely to follow the example of the American slave states and let it come to a war with the 
north than to subject themselves to Prussian hegemony,” he commented.59 Nationalism had its 
limits, and the Schleswig-Holstein nationalist would have agreed with the sentiment of the south 
Germans, having already experienced the unreliability and self-centeredness of Prussia in 1848. 
By the time tensions escalated between Austria and Prussia, Schleiden was in London, 
having assumed the post of minister to Great Britain. The sentiment in London was that Austria 
would again give way to Prussia at the last moment, thus preventing war. Despite this sentiment, 
Schleiden realized that this would be a much larger conflict. Austria was in a difficult position, 
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and its empire could unravel. The Austrians, Schleiden speculated, might have to buy the loyalty 
of Hungary at too high a price.60 What was clear to everyone was that the great powers would 
not intervene; after all it was a domestic conflict within the German states. That however, did not 
mean, the British looked favorably on events. Lord Clarendon hated Bismarck. He had called 
him “a public nuisance which must be abated.” 61 Schleiden’s most difficult and trying moment 
in regard to the escalation of the German question was still to come. 
As the tensions escalated, Prussia demanded that all states pick a side. Faced with the 
unthinkable, the Hanseatic Cities determined to side with Prussia. Bremen’s usual neutrality was 
no longer tenable in a divided Germany, where smaller north German states were already losing 
their independence under Prussian occupation. Bremen’s senate saw but one solution: join 
Prussia in its fight against Austria and its German allies and thus retain independence.62 For a 
proud and once powerful city, this was a bitter pill to swallow. 
Based on his many disagreements with the Prussians and Bismarck, Schleiden was 
angered and shocked when the Hanseatic Cities accepted the Prussian demands. After making his 
employers aware of his revulsion with Prussia and his inability to work for anyone who sided 
with them, he urged the cities to resist. He was willing, despite his small private wealth and the 
expensive London society, to continue his work even if the cities were occupied and thus unable 
to pay him.63 He was a loyal nationalist who stood on principle. One can see here how different 
the new European situation was from the one experienced by Forty-Eighters in the United States. 
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Professionally, Schleiden understood the precarious situation of Bremen. He even 
supported and justified the city’s decision in his meetings with British officials. However, 
personally, he was unable to do so.64 As a result, Schleiden tendered his resignation. He was glad 
the governments immediately accepted it and granted his pay until the end of the year, making 
his transition into private life much easier.65 Some of Schleiden’s friends from the duchies 
approved his decision. Agreeing with him politically, Samwer was pleased that Schleiden had 
not compromised his political honor by remaining in London. Friend and foe alike would have to 
respect him, said Samwer, and Schleiden agreed that Prussia’s politics were immoral and 
rapist.66 The idea of a unified Germany with a republican government and an independent 
Schleswig-Holstein was fading rapidly. Nevertheless, for the separatists from the duchies, 
personal principles still dominated. 
The Austro-Prussian war was swift and decisive. In quick succession, Prussian armies 
invaded and forced the surrender of Hanover, Saxony, and Hesse-Kassel. The Austrians, left 
without reliable allies, were attacked in the south by the Italians and quickly invaded by the 
Prussian armies. On July 3, 1866, the Prussians won the Battle of Königsgrätz/Sadowa. Austria 
was defeated and, while not surrendering any territory to Prussia, had to accept that Prussia was 
in control of Germany’s destiny. 
Following the conclusion of the Austro-Prussian War, Bismarck set to work on German 
unification. He consolidated the German states, except for Baden, Württemberg, and Bavaria, in 
the North German Confederation. Despite the long cherished liberal goal of unification, and with 
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many liberals jumping on the Bismarckian bandwagon, Schleiden remained skeptical. He 
wondered if the approach used by Bismarck was the right one. Loyalty toward the individual 
states was strong and a Prussian domination not desired.67 Schleiden had always disagreed with 
the use of war for the purpose of unification, although he favored the revolutionary creation of a 
new German state.68 He found himself in a position similar to that of the southern states after 
Lincoln’s election. Should he support the union of Germany, or stand on the principles of 
liberalism and the independence of the duchies against unification. 
Others faced similar questions. For the radical Olshausen, German unification under a 
monarchical principle was unacceptable. Nevertheless, Olshausen was again thinking about 
politics. He confessed to his brother that he would have liked to sit in the new North German 
parliament, but he had little interest in taking up residence in Holstein, and thus losing his U.S. 
citizenship.69 Nevertheless, Olshausen paid close attention to the first democratic election in 
Germany. He had critical words for some of his fellow former revolutionaries, including 
Schleiden.70 He was and remained the radical. Olshausen would unfortunately never witness the 
unification of Germany. After returning to Europe, he suffered severe health problems. On 
March 31, 1869, he died in Hamburg from the effects of a stroke.71 Schleswig-Holstein had lost 
an important radical supporter. 
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Schleiden was ready to take on a new challenge and built on his parliamentary experience 
from the Frankfurt Vor-Parlament. Having many contacts in the United States, he would have 
returned to North America in a heartbeat, but his aging mother kept him in Europe. Public 
service still attracted Schleiden, even if he was uncertain of what direction Prussia would take in 
the coming years. He was still not reconciled to the way in which the North German 
Confederation had come about, and the incompleteness of German unification, but he hoped to 
work in some capacity for the new entity.72  
In the end, his German nationalism won out, as he looked to his homeland for a 
possibility to serve in the North German parliament. He soon made contact with a party in 
Schleswig-Holstein that wished to nominate him for a parliamentary district, but they first had to 
oust the previous candidate. Peter Wilhelm Forchhammer cautioned that Schleiden should not 
raise his hopes too high. Some voters had already told Forchhammer that they would not vote for 
Schleiden. Regardless, Schleiden had the support of the merchant, artisan, and burgher groups of 
Altona, who asked, through the party, that he come immediately to Altona and present himself to 
the voters. Forchhammer corrected Schleiden’s misunderstanding that the party program had 
supported the implementation of the 1849 constitution by explaining that the party stood for 
strength in foreign policy and freedom at home. 73 
While Schleiden had parliamentary experience, seeking an elected position was a new 
experience for him. For the first time, he had to appeal directly to the voters. In February 1867, 
he gave a campaign speech, probably his first one, in Altona. The speech clearly indicated his 
nationalist hopes for Schleswig-Holstein. Schleiden emphasized that the new North German 
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Confederation could only be a temporary solution, and that, because Prussia regarded it as a 
replacement for the old German Bund, the southern German states would eventually have to be 
brought into the new entity. Aware that a strong military would be necessary to uphold the 
confederation, Schleiden emphasized that the new German parliament must have the same power 
in budget questions as the Prussian diet. He was not hopeful, however, that Prussia would allow 
such a limitation after the constitutional crisis of the early 1860s.74 
Schleiden had stronger words for what the Prussians had done to Schleswig-Holstein. He 
called the integration of the duchies into the Prussian state illegal. The people should at least 
have been asked their wishes in the matter, he insisted. Even worse was what had been done to 
Augustenburg, who for such a long time had been accepted as the representatives of the duchies. 
Despite an acknowledgement of Augustenburg’s rights, Prussia had “shuffed him aside.” Adding 
insult to injury, the Prussians had granted a foreign prince of the Oldenburg line a substantial 
piece of the duchies. Yet, despite his outrage, Schleiden urged his fellow Holsteiners to pay the 
same respect to the new monarch that they had granted the old.75 Despite being a separatist, anti-
Prussian, and loyal to Augustenburg, he was also a loyal and law-abiding subject. 
While Prussian rule was not desirable, Schleiden continued, the prosperity in Prussia 
gave hope for a better future. After all, Prussian rule and constitutional rights were far superior to 
those of Denmark, and notably better than those granted by Denmark in the 1854 constitution. 
He promised to keep the legal wrongs done to the duchies before the people and use every 
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opportunity in parliament to do the same, but he also trusted that Prussia would improve the 
political situation in the duchies.76 
Finally, Schleiden remained as independent minded, as he had been all his life. He 
concluded his speech by saying that he would be proud to represent a district of his homeland, 
but that he would only seek office if the voters fully agreed with his views. They should trust 
him to keep his promises but not question the means he might use to achieve them. His strong-
willed, direct way of speaking drew the applause of the 3,000 to 4,000 attendees. His party 
considered the rally a success, especially since Schleiden had been largely unknown before 
giving his speech.77 
Schleiden’s revolutionary past clouded the start of his parliamentary career. In the 
February 13, 1867 election, he received 3,587 out of 6,175 votes cast.78 Even five months after 
the election, his victory had not been officially confirmed. Amid rumors that the authorities 
intended to prevent him from receiving his appointment, he turned down the offer of a temporary 
position, for fear of giving the impression that he accepted the suspension of Altona’s election 
rights. Schleiden wondered if he had made the right decision to seek office, although now that he 
had been elected, he would not rest until he had served the people who had voted for him.79 After 
six months of waiting, Schleiden was confirmed.80 Legality still mattered more to Schleiden than 
mere victory. 
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Schleiden was never shy about standing up for his principles and especially not if those 
principles were to protect the duchies in the north. He soon showed his “natural” spirit when, in 
1867, he spoke for the first time in the North German Parliament. Taking issue with criticisms 
made by the president of the Bundes-Commissarien of the Augustenburg faction in the duchies, 
he challenged, “If the president of the Bundes-Commissarien, or if any other member of the 
assembly, at any time wishes to provoke me by making attacks against the land, in whose name I 
am standing here, or the noble prince, in whom the land until recently had vested and recognized 
the rights of legitimate rule, than they will find me at any time ready, to assume the defense, 
based on unquestionable facts and documents.” The exchange concerned events during the 
Dano-German War, and Schleiden still found it hard to hide his strong opposition to the 
annexation of territory by Prussia following the war with Austria.81 He was still a separatist 
nationalist. 
Schleiden’s liberal view appeared a few times during the debates concerning the new 
constitution of the North German Confederation. He was critical of the different titles used to 
refer to the King of Prussia in his capacity of leader of the North German Confederation. He also 
desired the integration of the states of south Germany.82 In another instance, Schleiden took issue 
with the word “colonization,” and wondered if it referred only to the establishment of coaling 
stations, or to the creation of colonies. He asked the commissioner of the Prussian government, 
whose constitution also had a reference to colonies, if there was a concrete plan by the Prussians 
to establish German colonies overseas. If no colonization projects were intended, than the word 
“colonies” could be erased from the document. The Prussian official confirmed that only naval 
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stations had been intended for the time being, though in the future that might change.83 These 
were the easier and less controversial challenges Schleiden would present. 
More important was the protection of the regional interests of Schleswig-Holstein. 
Schleiden was aware that the economic prosperity of Altona had decreased since the Prussian 
takeover, and that there was a danger the city would become a mere suburb of Hamburg.84 Like 
the Hanseatic Cities, Altona was a free port (with no or very small tariffs to encourage 
transshipment), but unlike those three cities, Altona was under pressure to join the German 
Zollverein. That would be a mistake, said Schleiden. He explained that Altona and Hamburg 
were located so close to each other that one hardly noticed where one of them started and the 
other ended. Their intimate connection was also represented in their united tariffs and ports, so 
that making Altona part of the Zollverein would create an impossible situation. Preventing the 
easy exchange of goods between the cities would be impossible, and patrolling a tariff border 
posed an insurmountable challenge.85 In the following years, Schleiden continued his defense of 
the tariff freedom of Altona.86 
Schleiden’s most important contribution during his first term as representative came on 
October 16, 1867, when he submitted a petition from former Schleswig-Holstein officers for 
pensions. Their request was grounded, Schleiden explained, in the acceptance of the Schleswig-
Holstein government by the Bund. The service of these veterans, he insisted, should be rewarded, 
not punished. As the successor of the Bund, the North German Confederation should honor the 
pensions of these devoted officers. 
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Bismarck became involved in the debate by answering Schleiden directly noting that the 
Prussian government had once supported the proposition of paying pensions to its officers, but 
that the Bund had not. He then raised the question of whether the obligation to take care of the 
officers rested with the North German Confederation or with Prussia, since Holstein belonged to 
Prussia. Personally, Bismarck sided with the military authorities of Prussia on the question and 
not with the finance minister. Other representatives, voicing their opinions, supported the notion 
that the officers should receive a pension regardless of who financed it. Schleiden was given the 
last word, and he used it primarily to defend himself against Bismarck’s accusation that he had 
misquoted him in the debates. It was finally decided that the North German Confederation would 
pay the pensions of the former Schleswig-Holstein officers.87 Schleiden had won two major 
concessions for the duchies. 
The next year, Schleiden, most likely due to his long tenure as minister resident in the 
United States, was the co-sponsor of a treaty between Prussia and the United States concerning 
immigration and citizenship. The issue had caused many controversies over the years because of 
disagreements between Prussia and the United States about the terms of citizenship. Could, for 
example, Prussian subjects who had not fulfilled their military obligations to the state be given 
U.S. citizenship? Schleiden could rely on his extensive diplomatic background and work in the 
United States to assess the treaty, after going over every article and pointing out its strengths and 
weaknesses, he recommended ratification. Bismarck immediately objected to Schleiden’s 
negative comments and confronted him in debate to say they were unnecessary. Schleiden let 
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this “seitenhieb,” or gibe, pass without comment. Their disagreement did not stand in the way of 
ratifing of the treaty.88  
In the next session, Schleiden once more defended the officers of the first Schleswig-
Holstein war, which would become a signature issue for him throughout his legislative career. 
He became the reporting member of the committee of pensions for Schleswig-Holstein 
officers.89 After some lengthy debate, he was displeased when the parliament rejected the 
suggestions made by the committee. He again urged the parliament to consider the desertion by 
Prussia in 1848, which still clearly angered him. Speaking as a nationalist, Schleiden told the 
representatives that the people of Schleswig-Holstein were already dissatisfied, by their union 
with Prussia, and that to refuse the pension amendments would only increase that discontent.90 
The debate continued when representative Karl Twesten offered a lengthy rebuttal that 
dismissed the need for the Prussians or any other German state to compensate officers who had 
served a failed revolution. Of course, Twesten was aware of the destitute condition of many of 
the officers and their urgent need for assistance. He also understood that the situation of veterans 
of the recent wars against Denmark and Austria was different from those who had fought in 
1848. The latter, having formed to repel an enemy on very short notice, would have some of the 
burdens of the Olmütz dictate lifted from their shoulders with the pension. There was, however, 
the problem of honoring the promise made by a failed revolutionary body. Twesten noted that 
the United States was unlikely to keep any promises made by the Confederate government to its 
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citizens. In the same way, the Danish monarchy was under no obligation to maintain the laws 
and promises made by the governments of the duchies during the revolution.91 
In referring to the similarities between the Schleswig-Holstein experience and that of the 
Confederate states, Twesten’s analogy was not far-fetched. However, to compare the former 
revolutionaries and their glorious cause in Schleswig-Holstein with the dehumanizing slave-
holder cause of the Confederacy was offensive to Schleiden, and he quickly opposed that 
particular line of Twesten’s speech. Schleiden emphasized that the Statthalterschaft was an 
internationally recognized government, although he did not say recognized by whom. Certainly 
not by the most important powers of Europe. In contrast, no international power had recognized 
the Confederacy, he said. Then, returning to the main question, Schleiden urged support for the 
suggestions made by the commission,92 which were finally accepted a few days later.93 
The following year, Schleiden again raised the question of pensions. Having been told 
that the pension payments had stopped, he asked Robert Viktor von Puttkamer for an 
explanation. The representative of the government explained that there had, indeed, been some 
irregularities, but that they were not due to an unwillingness to pay.94 A year later, Schleiden and 
Puttkamer engaged in another exchange over the amount of money being paid and the different 
classifications between the officers of the Bund and those of the army of Schleswig-Holstein. In 
contrast to the more personal debate between Bismarck and Schleiden, Puttkamer and Schleiden 
concentrated on the facts, which involved adding another category to the officer pension system 
and agreeing on the amount of money to be paid to the widows and orphans of officers. The 
                                                 
91 Bund 1868, 1:245-246 
92 Bund 1868, 1:248-249 
93 Bund 1868, 1:271-272 
94 Bund 1869, 2:940 
 217 
proposal made by Schleiden and Lorentzen was debated by the parliament despite Puttkamer’s 
concerns.95 
All such issues further aroused Schleiden’s anti-Prussian feelings. The more he 
experienced the operation of the Prussian state, the more he found in it to criticize, and the more 
his desire for change grew. He was realistic enough to understand that such a change would take 
a long time, but the Prussian takeover of the duchies, their integration into the Prussian state, and 
the establishment of Prussian law in the states irritated him. He complained that the Prussians 
were so set on forcing their system on all new provinces that they never realized that good laws 
and institutions were eliminated in favor of less useful Prussian ones. Even more, Prussia was 
unwilling to grant independence or autonomy to the duchies. The only positive change had been 
the separation of the justice system from the administration of the land.96 Schleiden now leveled 
the criticisms that had been leveled against Denmark against Prussia, he apparently did not think 
about another comparison, the southern states of the United States, which suffered a similar fate 
during this period. 
However, many internal problems the North German Confederation may have suffered, 
the unification of Germany was still incomplete. Bismarck was again beating the war drums, this 
time by directing the energy of the German nation against France. Pacifist Schleiden was not 
happy about a potential war with France, but the major question was how would the great powers 
react to such a conflict?97 In early 1867, a Franco-German conflict was narrowly averted when 
Bismarck indicated to Napoleon III that he would not oppose the French seizing of Luxemburg 
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but then changed his mind and opposed the acquisition. However, while not ready for war in 
1867, Bismarck was ready in 1870, when a new opportunity emerged. 
When a vacancy occurred on the Spanish throne, Bismarck promoted the candidacy of 
Leopold Stefan Karl Anton Gustav Eduard Tassilo von Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen. The 
Hohenzollern had initially refused to accept the volatile Spanish throne, but Bismarck pushed 
him to reconsider. Bismarck’s plan to present Europe with a fait accompli was dashed when 
news of the Hohenzollern candidacy leaked out. Napoleon immediately acted but made a 
strategic mistake. The French insisted on a declaration that the Hohenzollerns would not again 
seek the Spanish throne. The progression of events allowed Bismarck to turn the intended 
humiliation of Prussia into a humiliation of France. The French emperor had little choice but to 
declare war on July 15, 1870. After less than a year of fighting, during which the French 
overthrew the empire and declared the Third Republic, France had to surrender. Bismarck used 
the opportunity to bring the German princes together at Versailles and announce, on January 18, 
1871, the creation of the German Reich under Kaiser Wilhelm I. The dream of German 
nationalists was achieved. 
As member of the new Reichstag, Schleiden continued to support the policies that he had 
already been involved with in the North German parliament. When the question of Altona and 
the Zollverein once again emerged in 1872, he protested that Altona’s proximity to Hamburg 
would make it uncompetitive if new tariffs were forced on the city. As things stood, Altona had 
an advantage over Hamburg with a slightly lower import duty and better accommodations for 
unloading the ships. Schleiden blamed Prussia for not having maintained and fostered that 
advantage. The incorporation of Schleswig-Holstein, he explained, had imposed some ancient 
Prussian laws on the duchies that significantly undermined Altona’s position. As a result, 
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Schleiden opposed a suggestion that all import duties in Hamburg be abolished.98 Even with 
unification complete, Schleiden still maintained his anti-Prussian attitude and protected the 
national interests of the duchies. 
In the German Empire, politics started to change, and Schleiden’s national liberal views 
had to make way for new political ideologies. In 1873, he returned to Altona and gave a series of 
campaign speeches in his reelection bid. Under pressure from the Social Democrats, he faced a 
meeting of some 4,000 hostile voters. He described them as noisy and uncontrolled. It was 
impossible for him to speak. He threatened to leave, but the crowd still abused him, leading 
Schleiden to say they were unwilling to hear the truth. As usual during public meetings, the 
voters elected a “Bureau” to manage the meeting. Schleiden refused what he perceived as 
intolerable oversight and left. With the representative’s departure, the meeting was officially 
over, and the chief of police dispersed the crowd. Schleiden wondered if he should bother to seek 
reelection.99 His political views and style of politics were no longer working in a Germany 
dominated by social issues that had little in common with liberal nationalism. 
Friends convinced him to continue his reelection bid, but the campaign did not end well 
for Schleiden. He was defeated by a Social Democrat, 11,658 to 8,300 votes. Despite the loss, 
Schleiden claimed that he was glad to return to retirement.100 Yet, even with his political career 
over, he had not said the last word in his fight for Schleswig-Holstein. 
While Olshausen and Schleiden had seemingly lost their enthusiasm for separatist causes, 
those old passions were rekindled upon their return to Europe. The call of the duchies and its 
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ruler was too strong for Schleiden to ignore. He returned to Europe and immediately reassumed 
his old diplomatic role in fostering the interests of the duchies and Augustenburg. Much as in 
1848, when he came up against the interests of the great powers, he found that Bismarck’s long-
term schemes for Prussian greatness did not include a compromise on the Schleswig-Holstein 
question. Despite the many setbacks suffered and the exchange of Prussian autocracy for Danish 
rule, Schleiden remained loyal to the cause he had fought for in 1848. He aimed to protect the 
interests of the duchies and the men who had fought bravely during that conflict. Schleiden 
maintained his anti-Prussian and pacifist feelings even when the wars of Germany unification 
achieved their goal. While Schleiden continued to oppose any attempt to connect the failed 
Schleswig-Holstein uprising of 1848 to the southern Confederacy, Prussian rule in the duchies 
during the 1860s strongly resembled the Reconstruction governments imposed upon the 
postbellum South. In contrast to the active Schleiden, Olshausen’s return had not brought 
renewed labors on behalf of the duchies. However, he continued to stand by his radical 
democratic principles and, despite wanting the independence of Schleswig-Holstein, he would 
not support the monarchical pretender of Augustenburg. Olshausen and Schleiden had come full 
circle, their hiatus from the Schleswig-Holstein question having done their separatist-nationalism 
and political ideologies no harm. 
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Chapter Ten 
Memory and Memoirs 
After observing the separatist nationalists from Schleswig-Holstein through their Atlantic 
world migration and revolutionary, nationalist, separatist experiences, there remains one final 
aspect to consider in connecting the two separatist movements in Jutland and North America. 
Since both movements ended in failure at the hands of failed diplomacy and superior military 
forces, and since the oppression they had intended to end returned in slightly altered form, the 
leaders of the two movements engaged in one final battle to save their causes from historical 
obliteration. Like the arguments used against their respective oppressors, attempts to safeguard 
their historical legacies brought many shared commonalities. 
The writings of the Schleswig-Holstein nationalists can be grouped into three waves, 
which will be discussed in sequence below. Some early writings concerning the duchies and the 
role of certain participants appeared while the battles of the first Schleswig-Holstein war were 
still on going. Another outburst of analysis and explanations came around the time of the second 
Schleswig-Holstein war. A third and final wave appeared as the participants grew older and 
wished to correct misconceptions about their cause or the roles they had played in the fight. 
In the direct aftermath of the 1848 uprising, many participants wrote about their 
experiences. Many used their published memoirs or diaries to vindicate themselves and their 
cause. Schleiden took a special interest in these works. One of the earliest publications to catch 
his attention was the diary of Jacob Venedey. Schleiden lauded the good intentions of the author, 
but also took note of his “intellectual limitations” and “blind and inhibited” narrative. Schleiden 
disagreed with some of Venedey’s assessments of prominent rebels, and took particular offense 
at how Venedey talked about him. He never confronted Venedey about the errors, and instead 
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confessed to his own diary that he found the text amusing.1 Venedey’s diary was only one of 
many works published during or shortly after the first Schleswig-Holstein war. 
As in the Confederacy in the United States, where from the start of 1861, publications 
appeared to justify secession, so, too, did Schleswig-Holsteiners, the Danes, and the Germans 
attempt to justify their roles in the first Schleswig-Holstein war. The German perspective is 
particularly interesting because it came closest to duplicating the Southern experience. The 
writings of Wilhem Beseler and Christian Bunsen are representative. Wilhelm Beseler had been 
a member of the provisional government of the duchies in 1848 and again shared power during 
the Statthalterschaft. When Denmark refused to grant Beseler amnesty, he went into exile in the 
Duchy of Brunswick. Christian Freiherr von Bunsen was the Prussian representative in London 
from 1841 to 1854. He had been appointed to lead the negotiations by both Prussia and the 
authorities in Frankfurt. As a result, Beseler and Bunsen came at the Schleswig-Holstein 
question from different directions but with similar arguments. 
Bunsen was the first of the two to publish. His Denkschrift über die verfassungsmässigen 
Rechte der Herzogthümer Schleswig und Holstein appeared shortly after the uprising started. The 
work came out first in English and shortly after in German translation. It had been intended 
originally to explain the Schleswig-Holstein question to the British foreign minister Lord 
Palmerston. Bunsen differentiated between the succession question and the constitutional 
relationship between the duchies and Denmark. Delineating the relationships between the 
duchies and the one between Schleswig-Holstein and Denmark, he concluded that the Danes had 
been in the wrong when it came to the Schleswig-Holstein question. They had undermined the 
rights of the duchies, which were independent from Denmark. Furthermore, Bunsen insisted that 
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the duchies were “indissolubly connected,” and that if the parts of Schleswig, that had been 
governed by the Gottrop line opposed a female line of succession, they had a right to do so. 
While Bunsen claimed impartiality, the work smacked clearly of German nationalism.2 
The exiled Wilhelm Beseler introduced his 1856 work by saying that he intended to 
clarify some of the misunderstandings that existed in the German states. He started with the 
premise that the duchies in 1848 fought for their “freedom and independence,” and in describing 
their subsequent struggle, he lifted Uwe Jens Lornsen, Theodor Olshausen, and Friedrich Graf 
von Reventlou to hero status. In explaining the lead up to the events of 1848, Beseler condemned 
the Danes for undermining the duchies’ legal and political independence. He also made clear that 
all aggression was clearly on the Danish side, which had called for military measures well before 
1848 to force obedience in the duchies. Beseler illustrated that the uprising had been in defense 
of the rights of the duchies. He wrote bitterly about the withdrawal from Jutland in 1848 and 
Prussia’s desertion, although he remained hopeful that Germany would overcome the defeat of 
1851 and stand up once more for the duchies.3 
The years following the uprisings saw little activity on the propaganda front. However, 
when the Schleswig-Holstein question reappeared in its full ugliness in late 1863, a literal deluge 
of new justifications appeared, constituting the second wave of polemics. Many of them centered 
on the Protocol of London of 1852 and the succession question. Some prominent and already 
familiar Schleswig-Holsteiners engaged in this new debate. 
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Georg Beseler, the younger brother of Wilhelm Beseler, argued that a detailed 
examination of the protocol was long overdue. He concluded that the protocol was worthless 
because it had not made the claims of Christian of Glücksburg universally accepted, and because 
the German Bund, the duchies, and the other pretenders were not included in the agreement. 
Even worse, and making the protocol completely unsustainable, was the fact that it forced the 
Austrians and Prussians to break with much older treaties. Of course, there was no question in 
Beseler’s mind that, regardless of its legality, Denmark had violated the protocol and would have 
to suffer the consequences.4 
In a second defense of the German position, Georg Beseler believed that the guarantee 
Great Britain and France gave to the Danish monarchy in 1720 had to shown that the British had 
no legal claim to intervene in the question of who should be the next ruler of the duchies. The 
guarantee, according to Beseler, extended only to that part of Schleswig occupied in 1713, 
further insisting that the old succession laws, outside of the Gottrop parts of Schleswig then 
occupied, should remain in place. The guarantee, he claimed, had no legal basis, the treaties of 
1767 and 1773 having superseded it. While Beseler tried to keep the British and French out of 
the renewed conflict, he did emphasize that the duchies were historically united and should 
remain so.5 
Others followed Beseler’s lead in condemning the 1852 agreement. Karl Lorentzen took 
a slightly different approach, starting with the premise that the only long-term peaceful solution 
to the relationship between the duchies and Denmark was the complete separation of the two. He 
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called the helstat foundation of Denmark outdated and rotten to the core. While not as anti-
Danish as Beseler, Lorentzen noted that the idea of a Danish expansion all the way to the Eider, 
thus incorporating all of Schleswig, was unacceptable. He suggested that Denmark should seek a 
closer relationship with the other Scandinavian countries.6 
Friedrich Mommsen’s work on the protocol took the character of an appeal. He too 
denied that the protocol had created or recreated any legitimate relationship between the duchies 
and Denmark. He called on the German Bund to uphold the rights of the duchies and their 
legitimate ruler, who was not the Danish king.7 Mommsen denied the Glücksburgs’ claim to the 
Danish throne and thus the duchies. Others tackled the succession question as well. Some even 
made outrageous claims on behalf of the Hohenzollern or other Oldenburg dynasties.8 
Following the Dano-German War and the events leading up to German unification, the 
participants in the 1848 uprising entered the last stretches of their lives. Many determined, in 
looking back on those turbulent times, to write memoirs or autobiographies to justify and explain 
their actions. Others determined to write histories of Schleswig-Holstein to explain the duchies’ 
unique historical status. Many Schleswig-Holstein nationalists did not publish their memoirs and 
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histories of the conflict until the 1890s, but, as seen with Schleiden during his time in parliament, 
the intervening years had not dulled their memoires or lessened their zeal. 
In 1896, Werner Frölich published a history of the duchies up to the Treaty of Vienna of 
1864. Aware that few people knew about the history of the duchies, Frölich placed the conflict of 
1848, which he described as a justified war for independence, in the context of a long series of 
struggles for freedom and independence against an oppressive Denmark. Searching for blame 
outside of the duchies, he found it in the weakness of the German Bund, which was unable to 
support the duchies adequately in their fight. He used strong language when describing the 
suffering of Schleswig under Danish rule in the thirteen years before 1864, and he celebrated the 
duchies’ liberation. He blamed the Danes for losing the war, the peace, and, as a result, the 
duchies.9 While his revision of events was clearly anti-Danish, the author was not as critical of 
the Prussians as some Schleswig-Holstein nationalists would have been. 
Karl Jansen wrote a more narrowly defined history that dealt with the “liberation” of 
Schleswig-Holstein. The book’s agenda was clear from the first page, where the dedication to 
Friedrich of Schleswig-Holstein-Sonderburg-Augustenburg appeared. Karl Samwer, who had 
edited the work posthumously, added in his foreword that the duchies had always given their 
support to the duke of Augustenburg. The duke was not to blame for the situation in the duchies. 
Samwer sounded as though he not only supported the close ties between the duchies and 
Germany, but also supported their incorporation into Prussia. He seemed to have adjusted his 
opinion during the thirty years since the second Schleswig-Holstein war. The work implied that 
the defeat in 1851 and the Protocol of London were equivalent to a military occupation, from 
which the duchies needed to be liberated. Similarly, the events of 1863 and 1864 were described 
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as another struggle for liberation from Danish oppression.10 The entire work provided a 
favorable view of Prussia, and so fit the spirit of the times. 
By the last two decades of the nineteenth century, Schleiden was no newcomer to the 
writing of historical polemics. Already during the fighting, he had begun annotating a collection 
of documents related to the Schleswig-Holstein crisis in order to justify the duchies’ cause. The 
first volume of this compilation, the so-called Aktenstücke, came out in 1851, and dealt 
specifically with the recent end of the Statthalterschaft. It provided all the relevant and available 
documents on the issue. At the appropriate places, Schleiden defended men, such as Beseler, 
who had been criticized for resigning. He also stressed that the government of the duchies had 
done everything that was expected of it, unlike the Danes.11 The work was clearly intended as a 
defense, and as such, considered dangerous by the censors. Schleiden was proud that the work 
was banned in Austria. In the rest of the German states, the book was a success. He claimed that 
500 to 600 copies had been sold in Hamburg and the duchies alone, where the Aktenstücke was 
strangely not prohibited.12 
In 1852, he published two more volumes of the Aktenstücke. These books dealt with the 
work of the provisional government and its diplomacy up to the Malmö ceasefire. Again the 
purpose was clear, a defense of the duchies’ policy. Schleiden had intended to edit and compile a 
fourth and fifth volume, which unfortunately never saw the light of day, although they exist in 
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manuscript form.13 When Schleiden started to write his memoirs in the early to mid-1880s, he 
would fall back on these document collections for the historical context of his personal 
experiences. 
Even so, Schleiden had not reconciled himself to the defeat of the Schleswig-Holstein 
nationalist movement. At the time, new work on the history of Germany had started to appear, 
much of it written by Bismarck apologists like Heinrich von Sybel and Heinrich von Treitschke. 
Both their works emphasized a direct line between Friedrich the Great, who made Prussia a 
powerful state, and the achievements of Otto von Bismarck, whose unification of Germany built 
on those accomplishments. Treitschke, in particular, explained the unification of Germany by the 
Prussians in historical terms, and thus legitimized Bismarck political work. The main thrust of 
this interpretation, which in the historiography of the United States would become known as 
Whiggish history, was that events culminated naturally in a Prussian-created unification.14 In a 
similar fashion, Sybel downplayed the liberal experiment of 1848 as misguided. For Treitschke, 
German unification under Prussia was a natural progression of history, and the creation of a 
Prussian-Germany made the new country superior to its neighbors, not only militarily, but also 
culturally.15 
Schleiden does not clearly state the purpose of his memoir, but his criticism of Sybel and 
others indicates that Schleiden wished to correct the historical legacy of the Schleswig-Holstein 
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movement and his role in the uprising.16 While the first two of the four-volume set are largely 
about Schleiden’s family and personal history, he frequently tied the history of Schleswig-
Holstein to his own life. 
Few family documents have survived to verify Schleiden’s account before 1848. He 
destroyed all the letters of his mother. In addition, the family correspondence and his first eleven 
diaries are lost as well. Corroborating evidence suggests that Schleiden was fairly thorough in his 
research and likely used these lost materials in his writing. However, he also, and unsurprisingly 
for an autobiographical account, made some cosmetic changes. For example, the Victorian moral 
standards of the time did not allow Schleiden to mention the promiscuity of his grandmother, 
Wilhelmina von Nuys.17 He more clearly referred to his diaries, correspondence, and other 
materials in writing about the post-1847 period. Many of the original documents still show his 
underlining of important passages that he had in some form included in the memoirs. As a result, 
one can assume that his work offers a fairly reliable eye-witness account. 
Of course, his involvement in the Schleswig-Holstein war overshadows the entire work. 
Schleiden tried to present a balanced story. The Danish side, while not given the same 
prominence, and often looked at with critical eyes, did get fair attention. In addition, Schleiden’s 
criticism of the Danes was equaled by similar criticism of the Prussians, whom he hated for 
deserting the duchies in their hour of need. Even more, Schleiden criticized members of the 
duchies’ government. The radicals around Olshausen are often presented as trigger-happy 
maniacs, who by 1850, would risk war knowing that it would be a lost cause. Even Christian 
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Bunsen, Frankfurt’s representative in London, was treated skeptically by Schleiden.18 The four 
volumes thus present a major defense of the Schleswig-Holstein cause, and so act as an 
important correction to the German national histories of Sybel and others.19 They are in line with 
works published by other Schleswig-Holstein nationalists to defend their cause against Danish 
oppression, and in Schleiden’s case, there is implicit opposition to Prussian control after 1864. 
These nationalist were not alone in defending their cause following defeat on the 
battlefield. This study has already pointed to a number of similarities between the experiences of 
the Confederate states and Schleswig-Holstein. However much Schleswig-Holstein nationalists 
wished to deny any parallels, their commonalities may also be seen continued in how the two 
defeated separatist movements dealt with the memory of defeat. In the United States, the 
literature associated with the Confederacy became known under the broad title of the “Lost 
Cause.” As with the Schleswig-Holstein literature, which first appeared during a disastrous war 
and then continued into the Wilhelmine era in Germany, the early Lost Cause literature appeared 
in rudimentary forms during the war, if one wishes to consider the justifications for secession, 
and continued well into the Progressive era. 
Like Wilhelm Beseler and Christian Bunsen, who had published legal justifications for 
their cause, early Confederate writers propagated their “War between the States” interpretation 
and argued that secession was a legal means to escape a coercive national government. Much 
like the Schleswig-Holsteiners, these early writers presented a historical background to illustrate 
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how the northern states had, over time, engaged in policies that undermined the southern 
economy and southern society.20 
After the Civil War, with the Confederate armies surrendered and Confederate President 
Jefferson Davis in prison, the conflict between North and South continued. Almost immediately, 
President Andrew Johnson, who succeeded the assassinated Lincoln, was at odds with Congress 
over how the reconstruction process should work and who should control it. At first, Johnson 
promoted a lenient policy that allowed the southern states to reenter the Union with few 
stipulations. However, with the old political elite still in power, and determined to control the 
South politically, Congress took charge of Reconstruction and implemented a set of policies to 
oust former Confederates from office and grant African-Americans political power in the region. 
The perceived harsh treatment brought new violence, thus creating, or even continuing, a form of 
guerrilla warfare in the South in defense of state rights and southern white autonomy. 
In the midst of this conflict, new histories were published. Much like Schleiden used his 
Aktenstücke to write his memoir later in the century, so too did one of the first writers of the Lost 
Cause, Edward A. Pollard, use his wartime publications to explain the conflict’s origins and 
outcome. For Pollard, the war had been one between two distinct nations that had quarreled for 
decades. He argued further that the North, by turning to materialism, had insisted on a coercive 
majority rule that had left the South no other alternative but escape. Based on the principle of 
state rights and self-government, he constructed a defense of secession. Much like the rebels in 
Schleswig-Holstein, who argued that they had risen up in support of their duke when he fell 
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victim to Danish nationalists, Pollard insisted that the southern revolution was about the 
preservation of southern institutions and the southern way of life.21 
After a depressing period of military rule and anti-Reconstruction violence, home rule 
slowly returned to the South. National attention shifted away from the South during the 1870s as 
fraud and industrial growth preoccupied the country, and violence, corruption, and breaks in the 
Republican coalition allowed southern Democrats to return to power. Once the Depression of 
1873 hit the country, northern Congressmen had to refocus on issues closer to home. Following 
the withdrawal of federal troops and the return to power of white southern Democrats, a new 
political regime eradicated the last vestiges of Reconstruction. Southern resilience stood in 
contrast to the Schleswig-Holstein outcome, where the duchies continued to be ruled by an 
oppressive outside power. Nevertheless, southerners persisted in justifying secession and 
explaining their defeat. 
As a result, former Confederates wrote about their war. With the creation of the Southern 
Historical Society in 1869 and the work of such apologists as former rebel general Jubal Early, 
the Lost Cause had outlets and writers ready to promote a Confederate interpretation of events.22 
Like their European counterparts, Lost Cause writers had a clear-cut agenda. They intended to 
set the record straight and leave for future generations a “correct” history of the events leading 
up to the Civil War and explain the defeat of their country. In order to make the history of the 
South fit their romantic and apologetic agenda, proponents had to dismiss the role of slavery in 
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secession and play up the role of the abolitionist radicals. They argued that slavery was a 
benevolent institution, from which slaves benefitted. In explaining the military defeat of the 
Confederacy, they stressed northern superiority and duplicity. Southern gentlemen, such as 
Robert E. Lee, were heroic fighters and culturally superior to their northern counterparts. Like 
the Schleswig-Holstein rebels, southerners did not consider themselves rebels or revolutionaries. 
They had acted in agreement with the law.23 
While Confederates retained a life-long commitment to the defense of their legacy, 
history in the United States, much like in Schleswig-Holstein and Germany, increasingly moved 
toward a nationalist interpretation of the war. While Frölich and Jansen wrote histories that 
presented the occupation of the duchies by Prussia in a favorable light, historians in the United 
States tried to mute the Civil War tragic legacy by presenting a new, balanced interpretation of 
the war. According to early nationalist historians, such as James Ford Rhodes, the Civil War was 
a regrettable incident of fratricide that had been made irrepressible by the stark differences 
between the North and the South. In contrast to his predecessors and in common with other 
writers of this period, Rhodes tried to distribute blame evenly.24 
As the leaders of the southern and Schleswig-Holstein revolutionary generations passed 
away, the legacies of their respective causes were left in the hands of future professional 
historians. On February 25, 1895, Schleiden died in Freiburg im Breisgau, unable to write 
additional volumes of his memoirs, which his workaholic nature probably would have produced. 
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Additional volumes might have explained his opinions on both the American Civil War and 
German unification. However, by the time Schleiden was buried, historians would be responsible 
for retracing the steps of Schleswig-Holstein’s Forty Eighters and for bringing the two 
revolutionary separatist groups together as representatives of a revolutionary nationalist 
separatist Atlantic world. 
Claussen, Olshausen, and Schleiden had developed their separatist-nationalist ideology in 
a time of heightened crisis in the Danish helstat. As the 1840s progressed, Danish infringements 
on the constitutional rights of the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein increased. Tensions were 
high and arrests for treasonous speech were common occurrences. The state rights of the duchies 
were continuously ignored, with the Danish king rejecting any suggestions for reform passed by 
the diets of the duchies. As a result, talk of separatism increased. While Theodor Olshausen and 
Hans R. Claussen gave it voice in the diet and the press, Rudolph M. Schleiden actively 
protected the right of the duchies in the Danish administration. 
When the Danes decided to incorporate Schleswig into the kingdom and thus appease 
Danish national liberals, separatist sentiments in the duchies escalated into revolution and the 
first Schleswig-Holstein war. Testing the belief of the European power in the balance of power, 
the duchies faced a series of obstacle. While Schleiden put his best diplomatic efforts to work to 
overcome European opposition and insure German support, the radicals around Olshausen and 
Claussen placed increasing burdens on the governments of the duchies by challenging the 
maintenance of civil liberties and the continuation of the war. These were formative years for all 
three individuals. 
When the three men came to the United States, they entered a figurative hornet’s nest. 
The sectional conflict in the United States had increased since the conclusion of the war with 
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Mexico, and the clash between northern and southern nationalism was becoming more violent. 
While many northerners saw the oppression of slavery, southerners saw an attack on the 
section’s constitutional rights and way of life. The separatists from Schleswig-Holstein differed 
little from other Forty-Eighters on this issue, in that they, too, stood against the institution of 
slavery and predicted its demise a civil war. 
However, these men were unique in that they had been separatists themselves, and very 
much in the same position as the South. Nevertheless, they felt no sympathy for southern 
secession. The European separatists were ready to fight the southern separatists just as hard and 
relentlessly as they had fought for the separation of Schleswig-Holstein. A study of Forty-
Eighters that explored their backgrounds and their experience in the United States shows a break 
with their earlier separatist ideology. 
Schleiden, as a diplomat, worked for a peaceful solution in the American conflict. 
However, as had happened in Europe, his diplomatic skills failed him when he came up against 
long held mistrust or questions of power and prestige. The radicals, Olshausen and Claussen, as 
they had done in Schleswig-Holstein, challenged the restrictions of liberty imposed by the 
Lincoln administration and its conduct of the war. They even attempted to prevent Lincoln’s 
reelection by supporting a third party challenger in the election of 1864. Faced with political 
defeat and a reemergence of the Schleswig-Holstein question in 1864, Olshausen and Schleiden 
bid the United States farewell. 
In Europe, it became clear that the opposition of all three men to secessionism was 
restricted to the United States. Olshausen and Schleiden still desired the independence of 
Schleswig-Holstein. While Schleiden was happy to assist the Augustenburg pretender in his 
attempt to gain the throne, Olshausen continued to support the idea of a democratic and 
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republican Schleswig-Holstein. In the end, neither one achieved their goals. Like southern 
secessionists across the ocean, Schleswig-Holsteiners continued to be ruled by an oppressive 
outside government after their failed war of rebellion. Schleiden continued the struggle as a 
nationalist in the German parliament. However, the time of territorial nationalism was fast giving 
way to a new brand of social nationalism. 
While historians have looked at the Forty-Eighters in the United States, they have 
grouped them into one large German-American category that obscures the distinct views Forty-
Eighters held and how their work in the United States was the same or different from their 
revolutionary experience in Europe. By looking at three Schleswig-Holstein separatist 
nationalists, this work illustrated the need to understand the political and cultural assumptions 
Forty-Eighters brought with them and their experiences in Europe. By including two 
revolutionary separatists who then returned to Europe, this work further shows that the 
experience in the United States did little to change the radical and/or nationalist views Forty-
Eighters held. Many of them remained, at heart, German nationalists. 
The mid-nineteenth century witnessed many secessionist movements and their 
accompanying nationalist desires for independence and government change. Schleswig-Holstein 
in 1848 and the southern Confederacy are only two such uprisings. The language of these two 
secessionist movements, as shown, was remarkably similar. Both the German and American 
secessionist claimed that their rights had been infringed upon and that their state rights had been 
attacked. They seceded and went to war to protect their rights and autonomy. Like all 
secessionist movements of the era, they were unsuccessful in achieving their goals on the 
battlefield, and so traded in one form of oppression for another. However, the separatist-
nationalist leaders remained unrepentant and strong in their beliefs. After all, both Schleswig-
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Holsteiners and southern Confederates would agree that “not the one who hits first starts a civil 
war, but the one who made the first strike necessary.”25 
 
                                                 
25 Schleiden, Schleswig-Holstein im zweiten Kriegsjahre, 246. 
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